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“If all the world is a stage, then borders are its scenery, its mise en scène, its ordering of 
space and action, wherein actors and observers must work at making borders intelligible and 
manageable and must do so in order for the drama to proceed.” 








Through a conceptualisation of biplacement and a-statal actorness as tools for gleaning 
meaning of vernacular sense-making and practices of borderlanders, this PhD thesis explores 
the epistemological implications of borderlander’s standpoint on security and resilience in the 
postcolonial context of border areas across Cameroon, Nigeria, and Gabon. To examine how 
centring the experiences and sense-making of border communities can help rethink security 
and resilience, the thesis proposes an analysis that escapes the usually assumed dual 
performativity of the border. It questions dominant imaginaries of what the border means in 
concrete terms and what/where it means to be safe in the territorial margins of the nation-state. 
Its central argument is that the ways in which borderlanders engage the border space not only 
challenge and reshape the meaning of the post-colonial border, they also enable us to question 
universalised understandings of vulnerability and threat.   
 
The research is a multi-sited ethnographic study, with an analytical framework that gleans 
security meanings from borderlanders’ geographical imaginations and vernacular bordering 
practices. Based on the ethnographic in-depth investigation of 16 borderlanders, the 
experiences of border communities are foregrounded in the understanding of their socio-spatial 
environment through their narratives about themselves, the border space, and their fears. The 
study deploys a narrative approach both as a frame of reference and a way to present its 
fieldwork insights. In its methodology, the project weaves together vernacular security 
approaches and critical border studies, to inquire how an epistemology that centres 
borderlanders’ narrative agency contributes to unmuting the postcolonial border subject.  
 
In terms of contributions, the study highlights and assesses the impact of side-lining vernacular 
voices in the conceptualising the postcolonial African border space.  It pushes the scholarship 
on borders forward by drawing and illustrating the epistemological implications of evaluating 
how border communities make sense of, perform, and mobilise their situated endeavours in 
common areas of the human condition, such as security and resilience. Most importantly, the 
thesis introduces the concepts of “biplacement” and “a-statal actorness” as tools for a granular 
empirical exploration of postcolonial borders. These novel concepts also help in mapping out 
vernacular entry points for alternative approaches to studying borderlanders, and perhaps 
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1 Chapter 1 - General Introduction 
 




Picture  1  - A tank on the Mfum border bridge (Nigeria-Cameroon) – Source: Video frame  
 
This PhD research is about borders, and how seriously unmuting the perspective of borderlanders on the 
border space help rethink security, resilience, and the postcolonial border itself.  However, I would like to 
start by outlining how the intellectual journey that led to the questions which this PhD thesis seeks to 
answer somehow confounds itself with my personal trajectory.  In the past, I worked with Non-
Government Organisations and civil society movements, with a focus on marginalised groups in society. 
Ten years ago, in Cameroon for example, I was responsible for coordinating a project on Access to 
Knowledge, as part of the A2K programme. In the UK later on, I worked with Consumers International 
in London on a project promoting financial literacy for women and other individuals excluded from the 
traditional banking system in Africa. These experiences allowed me to reflect very deeply on the situation 
of people living in the “margins” of society, and especially on how many assumptions about them can be 
far from their own reality. Moreover, my direct involvement with groups of people who are considered 
marginalised gave me a sense that too much of the effort to support them was inadequate. While a lot was 
being done especially in developing initiatives and humanitarian assistance to support them, 
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representations from people who speak on their behalf seemed to diverge from the narrative of those 
concerned. In other words, a lot was being done to speak for them, to speak on their behalf, to represent 
them. Nevertheless, not as much was being done to speak to them, and actually foreground what they 
think and how they see things.  
 
Later on, as I studied for my Masters degree at the university of Portsmouth, I took an interest in borders 
and my Independent Project was on colonial mapping in Africa, especially the evolution of Cameroon’s 
colonial borders. However, paying specific attention to ordinary borderlanders and how they had been 
silenced in the mapping process by both colonial and national authorities in charge of borders, border 
areas in Africa emerged as a potential physical location to investigate how marginal groups in society 
make sense of, and relate to, their living environment. This sense-making and relationship seemed 
important to me in the context of border given the ways in which national borders in Africa were 
historically constituted and the various contemporary issues such as security that were widely discussed 
in relation to borders and borderlanders.  My combined interest in border and promoting the significance 
of voices from the “margins” can therefore to a great extent explain the objective of this thesis, which is 
to explore the epistemological implications of tuning directly into the vernacular experiences / 
sensemaking of borderlanders.  These are otherwise known as the people living in the geographical 
periphery of the state. In terms of knowledge production and theorising in the field of security and 
resilience, the question to answer is to what extent could their experiences and practices of bordering 
contribute to the thinking about conceptualisation of security and policy imaginations? Framing the 
problematics of this research question in simple terms requires situating the question in the context of a 
specific border site, during a specific (series of) event(s).   
 
An example of such a (series of) events can be found in a disturbing video clip sent me by one of my 
contacts in the border locality of Mfum (Nigeria-Cameroon border). The video was captioned “Border 
Bridge Closed”, recorded around September 2018 from the Nigerian side of the border and featured 
events unfolding at the border bridge between Nigeria and Cameroon. I had spent much of my fieldwork 
time in that specific location a few months earlier, observing and talking to members of the border 
community. September 2018 was amongst the first months of the armed conflict opposing the 
Cameroonian army and the Anglophone separatist movement in the South West of Cameroon. Separatist 
militants were said to often retreat into the Nigerian side of the border, after launching attacks on the 
Cameroonian government targets. Nigerian authorities would consequently close the border to prove they 
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does not support Cameroonian separatists1, and to prevent the confrontation from spilling over into 
Nigeria. 
 
In the first frames of the video featuring an unusually deserted Cameroon-Nigeria Ikom Bridge (see 
picture 2 below), a man of imposing stature, dressed in a well-pressed and richly adorned Nigerian Kaftan, 
can be seen pacing up and down amongst uniformed and plain-clothed border officers. The man is 
shouting into one of his two large cell phones, behind the Nigerian border gate:   
 
“I am experiencing a war situation here!…an armoured car on the bridge!…that is a war situation!…the 
soldiers are on top of the bridge!…international rules do not accept any operation on top of a [border] 
bridge!…the shooting is [getting] into Nigeria and this is not acceptable!…I can’t tolerate that! Don’t tell 
me that kind of trash...you are talking nonsense…let any Nigerian die here, you’ll see the consequences!” 
 
 




1 Cameroon did the same during the 1967-1970 Biafran war of secession and operated a One Nigeria foreign 




Picture  3 – Senior NCI officer with uniformed state border agents - Source: Video frame 
Battling to maintain his voice just above the gunshots’ decibels, and nervously pressing the mobile phone 
to his ear, the pacing man cuts the figure of a towering battlefield commander against the backdrop of the 
deserted bridge crossing. His calm and majestic pacing bluntly contrasts with his agitated voice and the 
panicked scattering of other border agents running up and down around him, deferentially. Reminiscent 
of the usual dynamics at the border I visited not a long time ago, I was able to immediately identify the 
bone of contention and the man’s role. The pacing man in the video was in fact a senior Nigerian border 
official (NCI2 Officer), registering protest to his Cameroonian counterparts over what he sees as 
unacceptable behaviour from the neighbouring country’s military. When he eventually paces away from 
the border gate, instructing his subordinates to seek cover from potentially stray bullets, all uniformed 
men vacate the video’s foreground. It is only then, as the uniform men move out of focus, that a different 
composition of the video frames emerges, one that had hitherto been concealed, i.e. the presence of a large 
crowd of people looming from a distant background. It looks as if these people have all along been 
overshadowed solely by the NCI officer’s body. 
 
 The amassed crowd (pictures 4 & 5 below) is manifestly expecting the bridge to open anytime for them 




2 Nigeria Customs and Immigration 
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of the border, rife with bullets and fear, unless the combats between Anglophone separatists and the 
Cameroonian army had already dispersed them.    
 
 
Picture  4 - Crowd seen from a distance - Source: Video frame 
 
Picture  5 - A crowd of travellers waiting to cross the border - Source: Video frame 
To me, the drama of this “Border Bridge Closed” video clip lies not so much in the fact that this quiet and 
unassuming border crossing near where I had been living just months ago was now looking like a no-go 
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war zone. The suddenly out-of-character and abrasive tone of the exchanges between normally diplomatic 
state representatives does not surprise me that much either. If anything, these developments simply 
illustrated a first-hand account of how state interests are negotiated through borders and/or how volatile 
the dynamics of many international borders around the world can turn. In the context of postcolonial 
borders in Africa, this can be described as a classic display of how various state agents draw on powerful 
resources and institutional instruments to perform the territorial materiality of the postcolonial nation-
state’s border, by mobilising a conventional security discourse. This was not my interest in the video clip. 
 
Not being surprised by this therefore, what fascinated me in this video clip, however, was not the 
intricacies of inter-state border relations, but the plight of the crowd who could be seen only after the NCI 
senior officer and his men left the video foreground. Considering the circumstances, one may comprehend 
the dynamics behind the overtly undiplomatic telephone exchange between the Nigerian official and his 
Cameroonian counterparts. It is nonetheless hard to situate the place of that distant crowd languishing in 
the background of the whole picture. It is unmissable that the crowd awaiting the opportunity to cross the 
border, became visible only when the camera focus shifted away from the border officials. This is such a 
captivating observation to me, because this change of scene in the video played like an essential metaphor 
to the basis of this research. The revelation of this shift in scenes helps beg the following questions: what 
do we see in the border space when the focus moves away from its official dimensions? What does that 
distant social mosaic tell us about the border, especially when conventional flares otherwise keep driving 
our gaze away from them? 
 
What thus interested me most in this video and had interested me throughout my fieldwork in the two 
separate border areas I studied, was indeed the video’s background: those no-names silently standing by 
in defiant dignity, with their luggage strapped onto their heads and their travel purposes trapped within the 
confines of spatiotemporal coordinates over which they seemed to wield no direct influence. Together 
with incidents during fieldwork where I was allowed to take pictures of everybody around the border 
except the border post itself and border officials, I reminded myself of Césaire’s outraged invocation of 
the “chosification” (i.e. objectivisation, thingification) of the colonial subject and the fabrication of 
subalterns (1955). The international border in postcolonial Africa being a vivid vestige of colonialism, the 
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context was giving Césaire’s notion its full meaning. The “thingification”3 of borderlanders into 
invisibility, absence or silence in this video resonated again with my inquiry into the imaginaries of those 
‘invisible’ bystanders, and the ‘unheard’ voices from the indigenous border world.  
 
In the context of those events, such as the border closure, that erupt in their social trajectories and create 
biographical disruptions, I ask myself many questions:  
 
 What were the fears and anxieties of these borderlanders as they stood there waiting for 
the border to reopen? How relevant to them was the threat thus identified in their living 
environment and justifying border closure? Why did they not renounce their journey 
despite the danger of bullets flying?  Were they fearless or just insouciant? If these threats 
are irrelevant to them, which are theirs and how do they deal with their “own” fears and 
insecurities in this specific space?  
 
These questions logically lead to questioning the place of borderlanders in the knowledge production 
process about borders, and more specifically the extent to which they can shape the various policies that 
identify state borders as a critical focus of state deployment and international interventions. Focusing these 
questions on border communities is important, because after all they are those who make the border. They 
do so by identifying as borderlanders and “edgy” residents of their respective countries; by routinely 
enacting or performing the border as a physical trait of their living space; and by engaging with the rituals 
required for the quotidian crossing of the border. Yet, as suggested by a cursory analysis of the video clip 
and subsequently substantiated by empirical data, border people; those who actually live 
on/through/thanks to/despite the border, are known to be side-lined when states, and perhaps scholarship, 
start ‘securitising’ over territoriality, or anything that matters to the “national territorial integrity”. Of 
course, the same border communities have been included in policy discussions, or worse, exploited by 




3 See Tomonaga Tairako (2018) for a Marxist understanding of this term. Tairako distinguishes thingification 
from reification (Versachlichung). He explains that Marx’s theory on reification actually consists of two elements: 
reification and thingification. By reification Marx understands the transformation of the social relations of persons 
to persons into those of things to things, which equals the conversion of persons to things on a dimension of social 
relations. Thingification (Verdinglichung) however, is the second, further conversion of these social relations of 
things to properties of things, known as ‘socio- natural properties.’ As a bearer of socio- natural properties, a thing 




In the face of a security concern as the one raised by the video clip, it is crucial to determine how the 
understanding, imaginations and (in)action of borderlanders articulate with the state-centric ethos such as 
wielded by border officials in this case. Considering the historical trajectory of postcolonial borders and 
the agency of the individuals in the video waiting to cross the bridge, it is fair to assume that the silence of 
those by-standers does conceal experiences and knowledges that have not been allowed expression. These 
are consequently invisible in the video clip, or indeed to any cursory observer. There is a profound urge 
to find out how much more there is to the silences of these by-standers, than meets the eye. Interrogating 
these silences immediately opens up insights into how the voices of borderlanders can contest, disrupt, or 
redefine existing state-based and even people-based understandings of the postcolonial African border. 
Looking at the video again, I cannot not help but return the substantive question that poses itself 
under these circumstances is: 
 
 do the experiences and sense-making of border communities in these 
two border locales tell us more than we already know about the 
postcolonial African border? If so, what is their epistemological 
significance for the knowledge produced about the living spaces of 
border communities?  
 
This question can further be broken down into four (4) main research questions that this study 
therefore seeks to address: 
 
1. How do border communities make sense of their own territorial space, otherwise 
conceptualised as border space? (Chapter 4: sense-making) 
2. Which vernacular practices are engaged by border communities to navigate the border, 
mobilise resources and maintain social trajectories across the border? (Chapter 5: 
practices) 
3. What do the above practices and sense-making tell us about biographical disruptions to 
continuity as seen by borderlanders? (Chapter 6: engaging vernacular idioms of security 
and resilience) 
4. Can this vernacular understanding of border spatiality help reformulate questions of 
security and resilience in African borderlands? (Concluding chapter: epistemological 




The data collected as part of this PhD project allows us to provide substantive answers to the questions 
above. However, suffice it to say that the data presented is essentially a snapshot of how borderlanders 
make sense of their territorial space and relate to it. The main observation remains they dynamic nature of 
the borderlanders’ relationship to the border space. Looking at the border from the standpoint of border 
communities enables us to capture this constant flux, but also to infer meanings and derive epistemological 
implications that are context dependent (spatially and temporally). These findings, far from making grand 
claims or sweeping generalisations about the border, simply illustrate how at a specific point in time and 
at a particular location, unmuting vernacular voices especially in the borderlands can help rethink concepts 
such as security or the border itself.  
 
1.2 Research Context: borders, borderlanders and state-centric understandings of 
spatiality  
 
Unlike in European contexts, where the “spatial turn” in the 1990s across humanities and social 
sciences prompted research interests mainly in the efforts of states to territorialise space, it is 
often the alleged “failure” of the state in Africa that created the need to understand emerging 
theatres of spatialisation generally located in the geographical margins. In the African context 
however, this was largely situated within the framework of the so-called “Washington 
Consensus”, that sought to increase the role of market forces at the expense of the “ubiquitous 
presence” of African states henceforth portrayed as impediments to the development of their 
own populations (McKinnon, 2010; Williamson, 2008). In a different reception of such a notion 
of development and its implications for African societies, African studies in the recent years 
have developed a critical  scholarship on the particular circumstances of populations living 
across frontier zones (Engel & Nugent, 2010). This Africanist scholarship on borders has explored 
various notions such as identity, security and agency mainly through what is largely known as 
“interventions” for state-building or peace-building (Sabaratnam, 2017).  
 
This multivocal space-bound research agenda that emerged in the early 1990s revived provocative 
questions about the relationships between the local and the global (Tsing, 1994), space and 
place (Ferguson & Gupta, 1992), and nation and state (Donnan & Wilson, 1994). The 
explorations of "border culture" and processes of identity building in the geographical space of 
borderlands (Alvarez, 1995), came not only from academic investment on space as an 
analytical category, but also from a profound governance policy commitment to re-centre 
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humans in decision-making. In this regard, Christine Sylvester’s (2013) call for greater 
engagement with ordinary individuals, reflects a critique of IR’s historical neglect of human 
experiences. This critique also echoes the analytical weakness found in border studies, which 
have maintained the state as the main unit of analysis, and essentialised state-based 
geographical space by overlooking individual experiences. The following broad statement by 
Sylvester on IR can also be made specifically about security or other border studies:  
 
“Individuals aggregated into data points cannot share their voices, their power, 
their agendas, and their experiences with international relations. And that is my 
point: in IR, individuals are studied using someone else’s script, not their own 
[…]”. 
                                                                                                    (2013, p. 614) 
 
However, a far more serious challenge lies beyond the empirical engagement of the borderlands 
in Africa and its normative orientation towards the ordinary human being.  When we look 
especially at the field of security, many of these critical approaches that emphasise individual human 
referents have not lived up to their commitments (Booth, 2007, p. 323–25; Browning and Mcdonald, 
2013, p. 243–44). Despite the existence of many explanations to this, there has not been a clear 
articulation of the otherwise causal link that exists between the prevalence of the nation-state 
and this persistent neglect of human experiences. Even the “fascination over geographical 
margins” such as borderlands remains mostly state-bound and territorial (Engel & Nugent, 
2010, p. 42). A critique levelled against the field of IR for example, is the persistent grammar of 
geographical representations that use states as building blocks of their expression. Agnew referred to this 
paradigmatic persistence as the “territorial trap”. This means that state territoriality continues to be 
treated as an unchanging entity, in terms of its “obsolescence or persistence” rather than in terms of its 
significance in different historical-geographical border settings (1994, p. 53).  
 
Even after his seminal 1994 article on the territorial trap, Agnew observed more than a quarter of a century 
later that, serious theoretical problems persist with this single scale analysis. He again criticised the 
territorialisation of power at the national-state scale, which thus denies it [power] to other spatial 
configurations involving place-making and spatial interaction (Agnew, 2010, p. 779).  Nevertheless, the 
“spatial turn”  in IR, was a response to this longstanding critique, with its advocates urging to consider the 
state-society relationship beyond the constraints of territoriality (Engel & Nugent, 2010; Anssi Paasi, 
2003a). This challenge to the nation-state territorial paradigm is particularly significant for African 
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spatiality, whose admission into the international order was achieved through the process of colonial 
mapping. This colonial process inextricably subjugated African state borders to the strictures of 
Westphalian spatiality. Most importantly, postcolonial African spatiality found itself tied to the global 
destiny of the nation-state in the modern world, in such a way that reverberations of state-building agendas 
always tend to follow colonial trajectories (Harvey, 2009, p. 132).  
 
In postcolonial Africa, this can to a large extent be illustrated through colonially inherited nation-states, 
which have undergone so little change in their spatial makeup since independence in the early 1960s. The 
governance of African spatiality has thus been integrated into the international order by subordinating it 
to external agendas on border policing (Harvey, 2009; Muller, 2017).  Therefore, apart from the pre-
eminence of the Westphalian spatial organisation that conceives of state borders as rigid containers of 
societies, African state borders are also integrated in the global securitisation agenda as a foundational 
signifier of threat, to the extent that areas outside this normative control of state instrumentalities are called 
“ungoverned spaces” or “not-yet-civilized” regions, awaiting effective state governance (Gerhart et al., 
2002; Grovogui, Siba, 2002; Korf & Raeymaekers, 2013, p. 10).  It is consequently fair to say that 
colonially drawn African borders have prolonged the colonial and postcolonial state’s 
hegemonic writing of spatial order in Africa, thereby locking the understanding of border 
communities into state-based conceptualisations of space. One of the direct consequences of 
this state-based discursive hegemon over the narrative of space is that African state borders 
have succeeded in obscuring the complexity of spatial practices within transnational societies, 
after silencing the full expression of competing forms of space production which prevailed in 
pre-colonial Africa. These competing forms of space production continue to a large extent to 
structure the perspectives and experiences of border communities all over the continent 
nowadays. In so doing, the now problematic state-based narrative of bordering practices has not only 
consecrated the statist paradigm in the understanding of borders in Africa as physical containers of 
societies, it has also facilitated the continued coloniality4 of the African space. 
 
As many scholars have observed, this centrality of the territorial state as reified through rigid 




4 Coloniality in the sense of decolonial thinkers such as Quijano and Mignolo, who view the dominant paradigm 
of Western knowledge production about other lands as the “instrumentalisation of reason by the colonial matrix 
of power” (Mignolo, 2007, p. 452;Quijano, 2007)  
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humanities and social sciences (Agnew, 1994; Hubbard & Kitchin, 2011; Strandsbjerg, 2010, pp. 89-95). 
Agnew’s observation therefore retains its validity even today in Western countries. Moreover, the 
“territorial trap” in the West also doubles as continued coloniality in the African context. The survival of 
Eurocentric writing of the space order and its implications for postcolonial border communities has 
therefore been contingent upon two political processes with contrary vectors, namely colonisation and 
decolonisation. Both processes used the Westphalian “software” to rationalise all existing  “geo-bodies”ၕ5 
(Duara & Winichakul, 1995, p. 17) into respectively colonial and postcolonial ‘state space[s]’ (Brenner et 
al., 2008).   
 
So,  apart from the sheer subordination of formerly colonised territories to the power of European 
spatiality in the international system (Fotiadis, 2008, p. 7; Sparke & Sparke, 2005, p. 9), this Eurocentric 
state hegemony structures much of the (critical) thinking on the broad range of spatial practices concerning 
the borders of African states. For instance, as part of a global liberal peace agenda supported chiefly by 
external interveners in Africa in the post-Cold War and post- 9/11 era, preoccupations with African borders 
remain committed to a statist normative order, even when non-state actors are expressly taken into 
account. As a matter of fact, borders are now acknowledged as dynamic sites which continuously 
participate in the generation of new meanings beyond the nation-state paradigm (Agbiboa, 2017; 
Roitman, 2005). As a direct consequence of this acknowledgment of borders, border communities occupy 
a key  part in the policy rhetoric of security in Africa both in African regional policies on the one hand 
(African Union Border Governance Strategy, 2017; Poole & Mohammed, 2013),  and interventions 
actioned by security partners external to the continent, such as Africom, AMISOM, G-5 Sahel, MNJTF6, 
Barkhane, etc. on the other hand (Alexandre, 2020; Armées, 2020). However, it remains obvious that 
through various policy implementations and their intended convergence in terms of institutional 
architecture (Pirozzi & Litsegård, 2017; Union & Africaine, 2012), the rationale by which fears, threats 
and risks are assessed and prioritised concerning borders, continues to side-line the very experiences of 
border communities (Hadley, 2005). So, while it is being increasingly recognised that borders shape 
communities as much as they are shaped by those communities, the narrative of this duality still ends up 
assigning a subordinate role to the spatial practices of such communities, and therefore fails to capture 




5 i.e. “a man-made territorial definition which creates effects…” 
6 See list of acronyms  
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dominant understandings of their representations and experiences are still structured by the statist or 
state-centric paradigm in a territorial expression that cannot really deliver on a normative commitment 
to centring ordinary human beings.  This contradiction circles back to the neglect of human experiences 
as mentioned above. 
 
The centrality of the territorial state inevitably obscures the complexities of spatial practices, 
especially in border areas where communities tend to ‘produce’ spatial frameworks that befit 
their own meaning-making processes, and generate patterns of social relations that contest, 
compete and interact with state forms depending on local vernacular interests. In this regard, 
the pervasiveness and persistence of the Westphalian geopolitical narratives has gone far 
beyond the material dimension of geographical assumptions, to obscure the hermeneutical 
realms of vernacular knowledge about border spatiality in Africa. The persistence of the  
“Peters Phenomenon” as highlighted by Vujakovic (2002) is therefore not just an enduring 
cartographic discourse.  It ultimately obscures the complexities of spatial practices for the 
exclusive benefit of the dominant narrative of the Westphalian state order on the one hand, and 
of the postcolonial African state agenda on the other hand. This constitutes a violent 
suppression of the semiotic abstraction that underpins ordinary people’s engagements with 
their material surroundings. In other words, border communities are silenced in their 
differentiated relationship with their physical environment, especially in terms of the epistemic 
value of their biographical trajectories and social relations constructed within the “perceived, 
conceived and lived space” (Lefebvre, Nicholson- Smith, & Harvey, 1974).  
 
The limits of the statist approach to understanding postcolonial borders and the necessity for a 
people-centred approach in the empirical engagement of borderlanders open an opportunity to 
combine the “spatial turn” across the social sciences and humanities with 
postcolonial/decolonial scholarship, in order to advocate the centring of the ‘vernacular’ 
/‘everyday’. This combination enables us to gain insights into the experiences and 
representations of border communities as an expression of a dynamic performativity7, which is 




7 This understanding of power performance is applied on the one hand to borderlanders as performing the border 




context of this study where border communities are considered as wielding an agency 
completely distinct from the intended statist expectations, performativity is understood mainly 
from a symbolic interactionist perspective. The notion frames the relationship between the state 
and border communities as mediated through the physical space of the border. I draw on 
Brickell’s (2005) conceptualisation of performativity, which synthesises Butler’s analysis of 
gender as performative with Goffman’s dramaturgical analysis of performance as social 
interaction.  According to this framework (where I have replaced gender identity with 
borderlander identity), being a “border person” is constructed and is an effect of power 
relations, but individuals are ‘reflexive, acting subjects’ (Brickell, 2005, p.29), who act within 
‘the context of possibilities permitted within the culture’ (2005, p. 31). The central argument 
of this thesis is therefore based on the understanding of power performance applied to 
borderlanders as performing the border community on the one hand, and to state the border, as 
performing state functions on the other hand.  
 
1.3 Central Argument  
 
This research project accepts that all borders remain a demarcation in space, yet it focuses on the plurality 
of meanings of this demarcation from a vernacular perspective in the postcolonial context, in order both 
to reveal and complicate (existing) bottom-up conceptualisations of borderlanders’ understandings. 
Different theorisations of the border point to the importance of recognising territorial demarcations 
between states in general as socially constituent power practices which are plural in their manifestations, 
and pluri-directional in their epistemic production (Atzili & Kadercan, 2017; Johnson et al., 2011; A. 
Paasi, 1998). However, it seems equally important to underline that these constitutive power practices are 
unequally articulated within mainstream scholarship and policy thinking pertaining to African borders. 
Put differently, statist practices of bordering are excessively foregrounded at the expense of vernacular 
practices. The latter practices are often understood only as shaped by statist bordering processes, therefore 
lessening their autonomous epistemic potential. Since borders represent “time written in space” (Popescu, 
2012; Van Houtum, 2011), with both material and symbolic appearances, the historical origins and indeed 
socio-political context of postcolonial African borders warrant a special consideration of the vernacular 
perspective within the space-state-society triptych.  
 
I argue in this thesis that an overreliance on the state-building model underpinning mainstream 
geographical assumptions makes it difficult to operate the necessary paradigmatic shift that could help 
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determine the direct relationship between the border as a type of discrete territorial space and the specific 
human behaviour within.  It is a difficulty that Starr and Most (1976) pointed out almost half a century 
ago, by essentially posing the following question: how do we operationalise an understanding of state 
borders as connected to human behaviours? As seen earlier, answers to this question have come in the 
form of challenges to the state as containers of society (J. Agnew, 2010); critical historiography of the 
African international system (Anthony Pella, 2015; Grovogui, Siba, 2002); or questioning existing 
bottom-up approaches in border studies, security studies, and policy practices. I further argue that these 
various answers have paved the way for novel understandings of borders as integrated geographical units 
with their own internal dynamics, but the extent to which these dynamics are capable of shaping 
knowledge and disrupting assumptions has not been fully explored. This is due mainly to marginalisation 
in terms of knowledge produced by borderlanders and marginalisation in the international scale as far as 
the significance of African borders goes.  
 
Marginalisation as a frame of analysis can be moved across the multiscale environment of the border 
space. At a micro-level, despite a discourse of  “depoliticised” bottom-up approaches in border scholarship 
and a clear rationalisation of geographical specificities in border-focused policy designs (Donnan & 
Wilson, 2010), there is still a need for a deeper epistemic shift in the conceptualisation of African spatiality 
in general and, of border spaces in particular (Mercer et al., 2003).  This includes considering how 
ordinary members of border communities also engage borders for their own benefit, thereby 
deploying a type of knowledge that is not sufficiently considered. This study inquires how this 
knowledge can bear implications for overall knowledge production about African borders, 
including beyond borders. Challenging the overarching liberal peace model is the sine qua non 
condition for this shift to succeed at the micro level of producing knowledges about border 
communities. Beyond that, actually unveiling the missing worlds of border communities and 
unmuting their agency does not necessarily imply setting out to dismantle the Eurocentric 
paradigm. Instead, it is using empirical material to feed a theoretical framework that will 
ultimately demonstrate how a deeper understanding of border communities may better 
illuminate real life problems common to humanity, such as resilience in the face adversity and 
security.   
 
In so doing, this thesis advances “biplacement” and “a-statal actorness” as two conceptual tools 
emerging from the empirical examination to uncover vernacular knowledges. This empirical 
engagement with the border sites and borderlanders uses these conceptual tools to concretely  
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foreground knowledges, sense-making and experiences that could have been dismissed 
otherwise. The notion of “biplacement” uncovered from interpreting fieldwork data calls for 
an understanding of vernacular border imaginations and practices that escape existing models 
and assumptions about borderlander identity. As a key contribution of this thesis, the 
conceptualisation of biplacement depicts the ability of a borderlander not to assign to the border 
the assumed disruptive effect on a biographical trajectory. A better explanation of the concept 
of biplacement is the analogy of “rooms within a house”, as put to me by one the interviewee.  
“Biplacement” equates crossing the border to moving from one room to the other within the 
same house, the house here representing the cross-border living space as determined by the 
borderlander as though states did not exist. Consequently, bordering practices observed and as 
narrated by borderlanders, come together into a pattern of “a-statal actorness”.  “A-statal 
actorness” as a conceptual contribution to understanding vernacular practices of borderlanders 
help situate these practices in a different type of relationship with the dominant statist paradigm 
that has often shaped the study of borders and borderlanders. By emphasising a set of 
behaviours rather individuals, “a-statal actorness” first of all frames the agency of 
borderlanders as centred on other constraints than those of the state. It is conceptualised as the 
direct relationship between the borderlander and their situated spatial environment, expunged 
from the overblown ability of state processes to shape space and define behaviours. I have 
coined this term to escape the rigid dichotomy and the ensuing mechanic antagonism between 
state and statelessness, that is often overemphasised in studying borderland(er)s. In this view, 
borderlanders differ through their practices from non-state actors for example, who are in a 
relationship with the state, albeit a relationship of negation. This thesis on its part argues that 
through their practices, borderlanders act as though the state did not exist. Hence, the 
materiality of the border is just an expression of their immediate environment, as expressed 
through the fluid categories of “denying” and/or acknowledging the border.  
 
1.4 Research Choices  
 
In this section, I elaborate on how decisions have been made about the research objects (why borders, 
security and resilience?); research subjects (why borderlanders?); and research methods (how to access, 
collect and interpret data on these subjects and objects of research). Starting firstly with the choice of sites, 
I elaborate on the reasons why I selected these particular border locales for fieldwork and data collection.  
The second part explores in detail the subjects and objects of research, as well as their implications for the 
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data collection process. The final part of this section explains how these choices determine the ways in 
which the project is designed.  
 
 Choice of Research Sites 
 
In choosing my research sites, I sought to avoid the influence of existing assumptions about borders in 
Africa.  These assumptions often inadvertently reinforce certain epistemic hierarchies regarding the nature 
of borders themselves and the relationship between these borders and borderlanders. In order to avoid 
these influences in choosing the research sites, I departed from the paradigm of physical international 
borders presented by dominant ideas of world politics as rigid frontiers to human spatial imaginations, 
and I also avoided border sites already “drowned” in narratives of security.  
 
International news-reporting organisations play a considerable part in “constructing” specific African 
border contexts, notably by relating them to migration or terrorism. In any case, the notion of border in 
Africa is associated with insecurity and instability, thus shaping dominant discourses about border areas 
as producers of threats (Konings, 2005). There is little funding or media interest in covering such places 
and people that cannot be brandished as sites of insurgency, pandemic, and/or natural disaster epicentres, 
doubling as scenes of post-conflict socioeconomic devastation (Hadley, 2005; Kapil, 1966). The appeal 
of border locales for policymakers, humanitarian workers, and even scholars seems to be directly 
proportional to the extent to which they would be requiring urgent international attention for humanitarian 
intervention or counter-insurgency deployment. Consequently, other border areas do not exist in as much 
as they do not fit within these preconceived notions of “problem-to-solve” African borders in particular, 
and sites of knowledge in general. It is precisely because they are disregarded as sites of knowledge that 
they also do not exist in the gaze of policy professionals and scholars who tend to validate knowledge 
about (in)security for example, only if it is produced from studying sites of insecurity. This type of 
knowledge is therefore “consumed as ‘conflict knowledge’” (Perera, 2017, p. 43). In contrast, I argue that 
studying border areas beyond the dominant paradigm of colonial delineation and of on-going /post-
disaster or conflict, allows rigorous security research to remain granular through a converse approach. 
This departure from the beaten tracks of mainstream geographical delineations and disruption-driven 
agendas, results in a focus on key bottom-up narratives not immensely influenced by the acceleration of 




Thirdly, it is worth noting that for almost any major political, security and economic crises in Africa, the 
epicentre of many are often situated in the border areas. Moreover, as zones between two or more 
political and economic systems, they are often the sites of multiple epicentres for competing or conflicting 
processes. From this observation, I concluded that in order to learn more about such border areas, I had 
to learn from the thinking of people living in the geographical interstices between economic and political 
systems.  
 
I chose sites that are relatively subtracted from intense media coverage and intervention buzz precisely 
because the typical geographical sites for humanitarian or counter-insurgency intervention are more often 
than not already shaped by specific epistemic orientations and embroiled within corresponding policy 
practices. It is usually hard to escape this pre-existing discursive framework. By selecting the southern 
Cameroon-Nigeria border not prone to the Boko Haram phenomenon, and the Cameroon-Gabon border 
which is hardly ever in the news or the subject matter of large international policies, this research is 
insulated from the strictures of current affairs or the discursive tyranny of an active crisis or post-
disaster/post-conflict intervention. This site selection rationale can also help ensure that knowledge 
production that shape solutions to transborder security concerns is not itself defined or determined by the 
prevailing insecurity discourse.  
 
Most importantly, the rationale thus exposed for site choice is perhaps an avenue for addressing the 
research paradox that exists, as highlighted by Suda Perera (2017), between constraints that limit research 
access to conflict-affected areas on the one hand, and the pressure to produce policy-relevant research for 
the same areas on the other hand. The rationale for choosing these research sites posits that, as disentangled 
from the dynamics of conflicts and other logics of state-making, a vernacular approach can help glean an 
a priori understanding of disruption and threat otherwise not accessible in times of conflict and/or 
humanitarian intervention. This rationale has already been concorded by the course of events unfolding 
in one of the two locales studied. In fact, political uprising in Anglophone Cameroon morphed into full-
blown secessionist violent insurgency only a few months after I left the Cameroon-Nigeria border area as 
described in the “Border Closed” snapshot above. Hence, data collected at a time of relative peace in one 
of the two border areas can now be used to talk about a place that has virtually become a conflict zone in 
a relatively short period of time. So, apart from the usefulness of that type of data that can help maintain 
cognitive lucidity in the face of the constraints of a war that will come and go, the changing dynamics 
of the state borders reminds us of their unpredictability, and the necessity to refrain from fixed 
characterisations about border spaces. Most importantly, it underscores the necessity to engage these 
vernacular narratives before they are subsumed or muddled by the grammars of war, natural disasters, 
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epidemics, or political upheavals. On the chosen sites of inquiry that are postcolonial borders, the focus 
on vernacular sense-making by borderlanders themselves ultimately ensures that the subjects, objects, and 
methods of inquiry are indeed not influenced or determined by state-based discourses. 
 
 Choice of Subjects, Objects and Methods of Inquiry 
 
In addition to selecting research sites using a rationale that questions the nature and narrative of the state-
based understanding of the border, I have also selected a thematic investment that can best exemplify how 
a novel outlook on African border spaces can produce epistemic impact. That is why in addition to 
security, resilience has also been included to escape the strictures of dominant definitions of what is or is 
not a threat. These themes have been chosen because they represent important epitomes of 
external/regional humanitarian and development interventions focusing on African borders 
(Faling et al., 2015), but also because they articulate well with the biographical disruptions 
experienced by people who live in borderlands (see “Border Close” snapshot). The questions 
raised by the thinking around these themes also speak to border communities as they grapple 
with common challenges pertaining to the human condition. Furthermore, as a feature of 
sociohistorical developments and common themes of interventions targeting border areas, 
security and resilience in many ways mirror the contextual transformations and tensions 
between the two axes of power involved in the postcolonial border (vernacular axis and official 
axis).  Even though vulnerability can further be broken down into issues of security and resilience, this 
research project has looked at how borderlanders make sense of what they see as threats and disruptions. 
While borderlanders and the insecurity or fears they experience are respectively subjects and objects of 
this inquiry, the overarching notion of the vernacular connects the two. 
 
 I understand the term “vernacular security” as simply what it means for ordinary members of the border 
community to be safe. By relying mainly on the meaning(s) of security in their own terms, borderlanders’ 
“vernacular security” fits in the definition employed by Jarvis and Lister (2013) to sketch the diversity of 
ways in which different publics conceptualise security and security threats (See also Gillespie & 
O’Loughlin, 2009; Jarvis, 2019; Vaughan-Williams & Stevens, 2016). The relationship between human 
beings and their spatial environment can serve as an entry point into their world as real people, as opposed 
to deterministic abstractions. Centring the subject of security is as important as, centring the context of 
security because the situatedness of security is what gives substance to its vernacular. In other words, 
emphasising the experiences of borderlanders as defining their own perspectives on security is a way of 
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both entering the borderlanders’ world through their spatial practices, and evading dominant imaginaries 
of security. That is why the border area lends itself so well to explore these relationships, given its 
interstitial location between two or more political and economic systems. The inevitable dynamics that 
will be generated by vernacular and official axes of the spatial practices, add to its interstitial or transborder 
character. Despite the inductive nature of this study, the inevitable character of the encounter between the 
two axes of border dynamics is assumed, not least because the literature has established the peculiarity of 
African borders shaping communities  to the same extent that they themselves are shaped within these 
discrete geographical units (Messe Mbega, 2015). However, investigating these dynamics of mutual 
influences is not the end goal of this research project, it is rather an entry point to studying vernacular 
understandings of the border space and embedded meanings of security. This requires a befitting and 
methodological approach that divests the border space from its (post)colonial state reification; enables 
insights into the worlds of borderlanders as defined by their own agency; and ultimately provides space 
for the voices of the borderlanders to shape the narratives of their experiences as well as the meaning of 
how they act out their relationship to the border space.  
 
The research tools used here aim at understanding how unmuting vernacular border voices and sense-
making can enrich understandings of fears, anxieties, and ways of addressing them. While it is therefore 
obvious that this inquiry will be focused more on the vernacular side of the interactions, our claim to the 
vernacular cannot be formulated ex nihilo, or just based on the choice of the befitting territorial location 
as the theatre of interesting practices. That is, further problematising the border as a contested space 
hosting both the vernacular and the official, requires a methodological approach that would capture and 
render the narratives of borderlanders as unaltered as possible. I have accordingly deployed a 
methodological approach rooted in theoretical frameworks that seek to evidence the coloniality of 
mainstream knowledge production in a border context where vernacular knowledges are subjugated. This 
methodological approach, called a decolonial vernacular narrative approach rests on three main pillars: 
the postcolonial/decolonial ethos; the vernacular understanding; and the narrative approach.  The first 
pillar, its postcolonial/decolonial ethos deconstructs the postcolonial border as a territorial space whose 
dominant discursive construction as state space both in colonial and postcolonial contexts obscures 
alternative readings. This pillar acknowledges the continued “legacies of colonial rule” long after 
independence (O. U. Rutazibwa & Shilliam, 2019, p. 1), its impact on knowledge production and the 
ways in which the processes of (de)colonisation have silenced the voices of borderlanders by reifying the 
colonial/statist paradigm (Sabaratnam, 2011).  As such, this methodological pillar situates this work in the 
Decoloniality and Postcolonial Critique literature  (O. U. Rutazibwa, 2014) that engage the persisting 
effects of colonisation and contribute to the construction of a new epistemology of/from the 
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South (Santos, 2014) or a plural order of knowledge, so as “to make the invisible visible” 
(Matos-Ala, 2018, p. 1). Without necessarily measuring against epistemologies from the North, 
such a construction should nevertheless bridge what Santos refers to as the “abyssal line” 
(2014, p. 20) through alternative ontological and epistemological stances. In so doing, we reach 
beyond the North/South duality by exposing an understanding of the conditions of  epistemic 
oppression that disempower both “the oppressor and the oppressed” (Byrd & Rothberg, 2011; 
Guha & Spivak, 1988). We should nevertheless not lose sight of the fact that the necessity for 
such an alternative epistemology on border, as well as a host of other academic areas, arises 
both from the realisation of the limits presented by the assumed universality of Eurocentrism 
in theory-making on the one hand, and its debilitating effects presented by Grosfoguel and 
other decolonial thinkers as “epistemicide” on non-western forms of knowledge on the other 
hand (Grosfoguel, 2013). 
 
 The vernacular pillar, on its part, complements the decolonial/postcolonial approach in this that it seeks 
to evidence the epistemic validity of borderlanders’ experiences and practices. It is the concrete side of the 
decolonial ethos as it guides the gathering of vernacular knowledges as produced by borderlanders about 
their territorial space. It presides over the chosen data collection methods such as ethnographic observation 
and semi-structured interviews. The vernacular component of this methodological approach draws from 
a recent turn to narrativity as methodological tool. In fact, scholars such as Nick Megoran (2006) and 
Kuus(2007) focusing on territorial borders have use narrativity to address the need for approaches that 
enable better access to the lived world of the subjects studied, their actual practices and performativity. 
Eeva-Kaisa Prokkola aptly offers that,  
 
When studying the politics of everyday life—the human experiences, emotions 
and ‘little stories’ in and through which political subjectivity is performed and 
lived out—we need methodological tools that are sensitive to the particular 
everyday situations and sites where discourses are negotiated (2014, p. 443) 
 
The last pillar of this methodological mix, the narrative approach, also acts as a frame of reference because 
it encompasses both data collection and rendering. The data collection process is designed with the 
narrative approach in mind, in the sense that the interview guide for example is intended to help the 
borderlanders tell their story as they feel and experience. The ethnographic observation itself is not carried 
out within a defined normative framework that might limit interpretation from the borderlanders’ 
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standpoint. In the rendering of the data, the extensive use of direct quotations is just one of the methods 
used to give power to the voices of borderlanders in telling their stories.    
 
 Project Design  
 
This study was set up to 1) minimise the state paradigm as defining border space, 2) consider both sides 
of an international border to form a single and coherent geographical unit, 3) focus on only ordinary 
members of border communities, and 4) trace issues that are first and foremost part of these communities’ 
daily life as well as subject of border policy investment. As such, a multi-sited fieldwork approach aims 
amongst other things to avoid essentialisation of a specific border location and only retain findings that 
are relevant to at least the two border areas and therefore more likely to provide substantial material for 
epistemic meaningfulness, theoretical discussion, narrative rationale, and policy analysis. This has 
allowed me to gain a comparative perspective on how the same themes and categories of people presented 
themselves similarly or differently, depending on the setting in relation to the border. My fieldwork was 
deliberately designed to collect similar and comparable amounts of material from both sides of both sites.  
  
The fieldwork consisted mainly of the ethnographic observation of two border sites (Cameroon-Nigeria 
and Cameroon-Gabon) and the in-depth interviews of 16 borderlanders. The data collected from this 
fieldwork is interpreted with the methodological framework laid above. As such, the project has sought 
to rationalise the “performative” character of vernacular agency in the face of the permanence of the state 
border as an externally imposed disruption. The external character of the border is mainly constructed 
through its colonial origin. The borders thus studied result from the processes of (de)colonisation, and the 
inquiry is about their present-day impact on neighbouring communities as well as the various directions 
taken by the agency of these communities because of changes in their geographical spaces.  In other 
words, it is a study of the capacity of non-state knowledges to question or redefine mainstream 
understandings of the border, and the accepted meaning of its assumed dual performativity.  This in a 
sense turns upside down the usual focus on the dual performative character of the border, which is 
assumed to dictate and define dynamics in borderlands. Within the epistemological conception of African 
spatiality as marginalised, essentialised or bracketed from mainstream theories of IR, Security Studies, or 
International Political Sociology, this research holds the argument that theorising the African border 
should first and foremost be articulated as a study of vernacular bordering practices varying from one 





What makes this vernacular approach particularly urgent and important for the study of postcolonial 
African borders is the fact that its product is in no way universal or abstract or generalisable, but the result 
of a disavowed particularist-presented-as-universal Western imperial experience of state/border making. 
Having established that borders are a specific location of convergence for competing types of territorial 
politics, specifically that African borders are further complexified by their colonial past (Kehinde, 2010), 
questions arise as to how (much) border communities contribute to the performativity of these political 
spaces. Plus, analysing these contributions from a vernacular epistemic standpoint can expand our 
understanding of this performativity.  The project therefore comprises an empirical dimension on the one 
hand, which engages vernacular agency through expressed representations and practices; and an 
epistemological dimension on the other hand, which examines how these empirics articulate with 
knowledge production informing the notion of security, on the other hand.   
 
Empirically, the project explores how the socio-historic dynamics arising from borders drawn by the 
colonisers prompt various reconfigurations of space-based sense-making amongst borderlanders, and 
how vernacular imaginaries are in turn expressed in community bordering practices in the specific 
contexts of the locales studied. Epistemologically, the project draws on the implications of these 
vernacular imaginings and resulting practices to establish a viable framework to rethink the foundations, 
orientations and agenda for the knowledge produced about/for security and borders. The project is thus 
designed to foreground the epistemic implications of unmuting the situated experiences of 
borderlanders. This design sets the research to assess the extent to which privileging vernacular 
experiences over official institutional understandings of postcolonial borderlands can reposition thinking 
about “borderness” itself and reshuffle border policy thinking. By grounding itself in this empirical 
engagement of the borderlands and avoiding a systematic critique of a particular author or 
theory, this study seeks to move away from abstract theorisation even as it addresses the subject 
matter of resilience and security common to both “big” political processes and ordinary 










1.5 Structure of the thesis 
 
The current chapter has offered an introduction to the whole project by providing an overview of the main 
object of inquiry, stating its overarching rationale, and summarising the project objectives. It has also 
outlined the ways in which this project contributes to the literature on critical border studies and border-
oriented policies on resilience and security. The introductory methodological discussion briefly sets out 
the overall epistemological ethos undergirding this project. Methods and methodology will be further 
discussed in Chapter 3, alongside a detailed presentation of the data collection process.  As the 
fieldwork for this project was multi-sited, Chapter 3 also offers a deep and detailed insight into the two 
field sites, the fieldwork choices made and how they contribute to shaping the findings of this research 
inquiry.  
 
However, before delving into the methods and methodology in Chapter 3, Chapter 2 reviews the state of 
the field on topics that are of interest to this research, namely a historical overview of African borders; 
debates around the spatial turn in humanities and social sciences; the relationships between state, society 
and the border; the specificity of African spatiality and the significance of vernacular systems of 
knowledge to conceptualisations of what it means to be safe in the border context.  
 
Chapter 3 endeavours to articulate the theoretical framework of this project as structured around three 
main axes: Critical Border Studies, the narrative approach, and a postcolonial engagement with 
unmuting borderlanders. It makes a case for vernacular or non-Western forms of knowledge where a 
theoretical space can be framed for the unmuting of borderlanders’ voices to rethink the postcolonial 
border and related human communities.  
 
Chapter 4 on Borderlanders’ Geographical Imaginations of the Border Space (Sense-Making) 
draws from the methodological framework established in Chapter 3 to explore the ways in which both 
those who use the state border and those who reject it end up spatialising the border from a vernacular 
vantage point and how their imaginations of space articulate with imaginations of self.  The chapter is 
essentially about how borderlanders make sense of the border space which they are bound to navigate for 
economic, social and sometimes security reasons. It resituates semi-structured interviews and 
ethnographic observations within a narrative approach as a frame of reference. It also brings to light the 
often “invisibilised” dimension of the border, as discursively constructed by the borderlanders, 
through various techniques such as plural identities, contested claims of legitimacy and personification of 




Chapter 5 on Vernacular Bordering Practices looks at how the tensions running through 
borderlanders’ imaginations of space and self ultimately highlight the ambiguities of vernacular 
bordering practices. It illustrates tensions and intersections through the ways in which spatial environment 
is reflected in various vernacular practices of mobility and engagement across the border space. It draws 
upon the lived experiences of borderlanders to explore how they negotiate with their environment and 
reflects on their sense-making in the deployment of their economic and social strategies across the border 
space. The concluding part of the chapter refers to these strategies to enunciate how these findings can 
question knowledge production about borders, especially as regards policies in the field of resilience and 
border security. 
 
Consequently, Chapter 6 on Vernacular Idioms of Security and Resilience engages vernacular 
sense-making and bordering practices to glean idioms of security and resilience that stand out. Starting 
from the impossibilities of mainstream “security speak” which is unable to capture certain realities and 
experiences as verbalised by borderlanders, this chapter seeks to uncover the transcript of security and 
resilience that emerges from the bordering practices of these border communities, especially when one 
looks at them from a vernacular perspective. It is illustrated with instances of holistic security practices 
and resilience strategies as captured through vernacular imaginations of border space as well as 
corresponding actions. The chapter ends with an analysis on the divergence in the narrative of 
threat/disturbance and discusses the necessity of an alternative framework for understanding notions of 
threat and (in)security.  
 
This alternative framework is outlined in the Conclusion of the thesis. This final chapter firstly summarises 
the key insights and arguments developed throughout the thesis. It then analyses the epistemological 
implications of these insights and arguments, before building on them to offer an alternative framework 





















 “The space in which we live, which draws us out of ourselves, in which the erosion of our 
lives, our time and our history occurs, the space that claws and gnaws at us, […] we live 






















2 Chapter 2 - State of the field  
 
In this chapter, I revisit in more detail all the theoretical points raised in the introductory chapter 
above. To do this, I explore key debates in the scholarly thinking pertaining to critical studies 
of borders, security and resilience. I also draw connections between the theoretical framework 
that emerges, and the two operational concepts I have derived from data analysis, i.e. “bi-
placement” and “a-statal actorness”.  This chapter is therefore divided into two parts. The first 
part discusses territorial borders in terms of their terminological plurality, historical 
development in the African context; and borders in relation to space, state, and society.  The 
second part of this chapter focuses on the concept of the vernacular as applied to security and 
resilience amongst other critical approaches, and the significance of such critical 




The last two decades have seen an emergence of border studies literature, drawing from a wide range of 
academic disciplines, such as geography, international relations, anthropology, political science, 
sociology, history and philosophy (Popescu, 2012, pp. 15–22). This body of literature has inspired 
comprehensive border collections, such as The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies edited by 
Doris Wastl-Walter (2011) or A Companion to Border Studies (Wilson & Donnan, 2012). As this 
beginning of the 21st century is marked by globalisation, its immense impact on border studies has led to 
important shifts from a dominant concern with formal state frontiers and ethno-cultural areas to the 
examination of border-making in diverse socio-spatial contexts and geographical scales (Scott, 2018). In 
the same vein, more and more studies of borders have focused on multifaceted processes of border-
making as well as their social consequences (Haselsberger, 2014). In the specific African context, these 
shifts have enabled new insights through investigations on the socio-spatial impact of  postcolonial 
borders (Mbembe, 2000; Nyamnjoh, 2007), revisiting the age-old issue of the dynamic relationships 
between postcolonial borders and (in)security and/or identity formation (Kapil, 1966).   
 
These important shifts and novel insights have only added to an increased interest in the dynamics of 
borders usually linked to the geographical genealogy of the Westphalian nation-state and global 
geopolitical rivalries dating as far back as the 19th century (Dodds, 2000; O’Tuathail, 1996).  Nonetheless, 
these major shifts and increased interest regarding the subject matter of the border seem to have either 
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side-tracked the importance of defining the term “border” itself, or simply led to its prolific use in various 
areas of thinking as a polysemic term.  Consequently, the multidisciplinary popularity is not necessarily 
supported by a consensual terminological definition in the literature. On the contrary, if anything, we 
collect more and more evidence that border-related terms are very elastic and overlapping.  For a study 
such as this that focuses on borders, I believe it is essential to provide an overview of the concept, however 
brief, not least because it serves the purpose of highlighting the differences and interrelationships between 
the main terms that will be recurrent throughout this thesis. Moreover, such an overview clarifies and 
instructs as regards the arguments used in this thesis, given the ambiguity often raised by these main terms, 
which often overlap or, seem to be used interchangeably.  In the following section therefore, I will revisit 
the following terms principally: border, boundary, borderland(er).  
 
 Terminological discussion  
 
The changes that traditional definitions of borders and borderlands have undergone in the post-
independence, post-cold war eras, and within the context of globalisation have most notably made the 
terms border, boundary and frontier interchangeable nowadays. In the same vein, the concept of 
borderland has been developed and studied under a specific geographical understanding of the border. It 
is worth noting first and foremost that even though life on earth is divided along cultural, 
economic, political, and (micro)social lines, the significance of these terms in this thesis is 
understood as mainly political, in the important role that they play in defining, classifying, and 
controlling a territory. This is because their contemporary performative ability to assign things, 
ideas and people to particular spaces and regulate movements across these spaces through what 
Sack et al. call “a primary geographic expression of social power” (1986, p. 5), is a function of 
state power as unilaterally exerted unto space. In their supposed “role of ordering society” 
(Popescu, 2012, p. 8), all these terms conflate a usage and interpretation that foreground the 
modern state system and border actors as territory bound. In other words, these definitions 
would be unable to capture the meaning of borders in pre-colonial African political systems for 
example, or indeed, of any other fashion of ordering society outside the coordinates of the 
Westphalian territorial state model. 
 
In fact, the standard definition of border as “a point or limit that indicates where two things become 
different”, and boundary as “a line separating one country or state from another” (Merriam-Webster, 2020) 
is also concurred with by renowned border studies scholars like Newman and Paasi, who confirms its 
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“separating” attribute, before emphasising that a boundary “may occur in real or virtual space” (1998, p. 
191). Boundary and border, on their part, are both politically charged concepts. While boundary 
designates the bounds, so to speak, within which a given political unit is fastened together internally; 
border signifies the limits of such a political unit. Even though boundary is - in most instances - 
synonymous to border, it is a broader term for describing abstract separation between values, classes, 
ideas, political (id)entities, etc. (Meinhof et al., 2003). Border, on the other hand, depicts a formal physical 
delimitation between two or more collective subjective entities. It often has the effect of widening the 
geographical and mental distance between locations, that otherwise are contiguous to each other. Twin 
border towns and villages are a classic example of this. Hence boundaries can incorporate borders and 
frontiers, albeit it with emphasis on the immaterial rather than the material dimensions of thinking.  As a 
cognitive separating wall in the minds instead of on the ground, boundaries can participate in the 
(re)production of identities, which find their way into societal realms of practices.  
 
The term frontierၕ8, synonymous to borderland, carries a slightly more forward-looking and outward 
orientation than boundary and border. It is “an area ahead of the hinterland”, that used to be referred to as 
“the foreland” or “the march” in the past (Kristof, 1959). It is understood as constituting the line of 
separation as much as the proximity to that line, i.e. the land surrounding an abstract line across physical 
space – the borderland. In this sense, frontiers (or borderlands) can be seen as non-political “transition 
zone[s]” between two political spaces, the spatial intersection between nation states (Kristof, 1959, p. 270; 
Turner, 1935).  My references to borderland and borderlanders throughout this thesis are therefore based 
on this non-political connotation of difference or separation that is lacking in “boundary” and “border”.  
As the scholarship on borders focuses on how boundary and border articulate with wider and distant 
political processes, it tends to overlook the territorial space of the border itself as an integrated 
geographical unit, and to naturalise the social behaviours of borderlanders into categories that gives too 
much weight to the borderline.  In contrast, the use of  “border acknowledger” or “border deniers” 
throughout this thesis to refer to people who live by, pass through or use the border in one way or another, 
is not done so in the understanding that these individuals should be essentialised by the official dimension 
of the state border. Moreover, the notions of “biplacement” and “a-statal actorness” that have emerged 








borderlanders. The case of postcolonial borders in Africa is especially pertinent because of historical and 
structural complications which reinforce the necessity to see them as particular analytical categories rooted 
territorially, but with a powerful sociohistorical dimension. This also reasserts the question as to whether 
the territorial can ever be non-political as long as borders exist.  
 
Instead of “boundary”, the terminology “border” is also repeatedly engaged throughout this thesis. This  
might seem surprising or counterintuitive, because boundary is inward-looking; carries an undertone of 
flexibility and uses the separating line as what one may characterise as the last port of call. Whereas the 
term border, on the other hand, denotes static differentiation between supposedly stable entities and is 
therefore seen as point of departure (as it were) for understanding borderlands, otherwise known as 
frontiers. The rationale for electing “border” as operational terminology is that this study explores the 
border area as a geographical ‘epicentre’ of multiple processes involving communities, rather than a 
territorial space fundamentally defined by state demarcation known as the border. Borderlanders are seen 
as entangled in a web of relations with(in) their spatial environment including, but not limited to, the 
materiality of such an international border. This is served by the realisation that membership to the border 
community is not necessarily place-based and can be politicised on the account of contested claim to 
territorialisation. It is for this reason that, instead of the more malleable concept of boundary, this study 
elects to operationalise border as its main terminology for designating the contested space between two 
countries as invested by various actors. That is, insofar as the border is considered both as a producer of 
knowledge and as a site of experiences.  
 
Furthermore, this terminological choice is not a dismissal of the dynamic character of the spaces between 
states, otherwise known as borderlands, but rather a way of highlighting the distinct spatial identity of 
these dynamics as reflected within communities that navigate these border spaces. It is therefore a choice 
justified in the project’s focus on border communities and how their “situated knowledges” (Hunter, 2009, 
p. 151), articulate with the vernacular dimension of the border. After focusing on the terminological 










 Historical overview 
 
The colonial origin of Africa’s political geography has been consistently regarded as a defining factor in 
the ways in which its borders underlie state sovereignty and nation-building processes (A. Asiwaju, 1984; 
1993; Kirk-Greene, 1985). The main contention in this political geography’s genesis is that Europeans 
hastily partitioned Africa with little or no knowledge, nor even mere concern for existing realities on the 
ground. As a result, lines were arbitrarily “drawn” that artificially cut through indigenous homelands and 
thereby disrupting precolonial polities. Having largely been passed down unchanged to African leaders at 
independence, and maintained as such in the post-independence era following the OAU’s Utis Possidetis 
Juris9 (UPJ) principle, the territorial outlines of today’s African states are usually compared to a poorly 
tailored suit, which African polities “wear” with much discomfort (C. Lefebvre, 2011, pp. 199–200).  This 
characterisation has raised heated debates around whether or not African agency can be recovered from 
the historical process of African border making. In the following paragraphs, I propose to critically 
overview these debates, bearing in mind the main contention of my thesis that seeks to give more 
prominence to vernacular epistemology, i.e. border communities in the conceptualisation of the 
African borderland.  
 
Historical evidence on the “Big Scramble for Africa” points to the fact that European imperial 
colonisers had little, or no geographical knowledge of the territories partitioned by colonial 
borders. This geographical vacuity, on the part of the colonisers, has informed a recurrent 
argument on the arbitrary demarcation of African precolonial territories. Empirical studies have 
recovered how colonially superimposed borders divided ethnic groups, and destabilised pre-existing 
economic and social organisations (Griffiths, 1986; Zartman, 1965). Scholarship on border communities 
has often focused on the impact of this arbitrary spatial reconfiguration on populations who bore the brunt 
of this partition. One of the most cited consequences is the massive disruptions caused to existing 
ethno-cultural affinities (Prescott & Anene, 1971, p. 3; Starr & Most, 1976). As reported by 




9 uti possidetis juris (UPJ) is a principle of customary international law that serves to preserve the boundaries of 
colonies emerging as States.  Originally applied to establish the boundaries of decolonized territories in Latin 
America, UPJ has become a rule of wider application, notably in Africa.  The policy behind the principle was 
relied upon by the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina 
Faso/Republic of Mali), ICJ Judgment, 22 December 1986.  
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existing economic and social units and distorting the development of the entire region” (1998, p. 127). 
African borders as “lines drawn” by former colonial masters, do not only delineate a geographical space 
within the African continent, they also provide a historical reading of the Westphalian  origins of many 
evolving socio-political dynamics, especially in relation to territoriality. In postcolonial Africa, 
secessionist aspirations, inter-state border conflicts and armed separatism can also rightly be attributed to 
this process of colonial mapping (Ikome, 2004; Sone, 2017, pp. 228–231). In the same vein, even the 
character of African borders under international law is questioned by many scholars based on these 
foundational origins. For example, following a detailed study of individual boundary in East Africa 
involving treaties and inter-imperial relations as well as the problems associated with the externally-
imposed borders, McEwen (1971) concludes that treaties between European powers and African 
“traditional” chiefs over territorial control was a spurious exploitation of international law, since pre-
colonial African societies and territorial spaces were neither subjects of, nor stakeholders in, ‘international 
law’. Hence there is a large consensus in the literature about the negative legacy of borders inherited from 
colonial masters in Africa (Griffiths, 1986, pp. 210–214).  
 
The perhaps simplistic association of colonial borders with artificiality proceeds from their assessed 
negative impact on border communities. Apart from being thus categorised as “bad boundaries” (Weigert 
et al., 1957, pp. 93–94), one of the obvious characterisations of the artificiality of African borders, is their 
lack of African agency. However, this categorisation conceals two further issues: it reinforces the state as 
the exclusive and Manichean prism for seeing good and bad; and contributes as a speech act to construct 
a narrative of the border centring the state. While acknowledging the artificiality of colonial borders, it is 
worth keeping in mind other implications of the state-based good/bad border argument as it lends itself 
more to a societal perspective on border making (I shall return to this on the border and society section 
below). The dichotomy between “good border” and “bad border” has played a major role in shaping 
knowledge production about African borders, not only by confining the conceptualisation of border within 
the nation-building paradigm, but also by using state centrality to occult and/or subordinate concurrent 
forms and dynamics of bordering processes, thereby silencing border communities engaged in 
meaningful social constructs. This particular conceptualisation of the African border has dominated 
studies of how cross-border relationships are organised between/within African states and societies, both 
in historical and contemporary perspectives (Chalfin, 2010; Nugent & Asijawu, 1996). Through various 
themes such as state formation, centre-margin dynamics, power and agency (Zeller, 2010),  the literature 
has thus focused only mainly on the impact of colonially defined borders on the state-society nexus. This 
can be observed for example in the examination of the cross-border ethnic loyalties, which remains 
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underpinned by the state centrality in border performativity (Hadley, 2005; Loungou, 1999; Parham, 
2016).  
 
However, of particular significance to the border-agency relationship is the fact, the “Fathers” 
of African independence gained political control on formerly colonial boundaries and their 
discursive structures of territoriality. Although the geographical legacy of colonialism is 
germane to the debates around self-determination and agency in “places of colonies” 
(Abdoulaye, 2014; Ajayi & Crowder, 1972; Arrous & Ki-Zerbo, 2009, pp. 24–27), African 
borders have remained self-reproducing instruments for narratives of domination that have 
transcended their immediate time and space of creation. The decolonisation process could 
indeed be read as the expression of Africans deciding on how to dispose of colonial property. 
However, from an African perspective, this is only a limited understanding of socio-spatial 
dynamics. I argue that the African political elites who sought and obtained that independence 
were thwarted in their emancipatory process when they rubber-stamped borders designed by 
colonisers, both by not questioning them and by subsequently adopting the Africa-wide Utis 
Possidetis Juris border principle and thereby prioritised the continued reification of colonial 
spatial ordering over pre-existing indigenous spatial organisation.  
 
These elites who had sought to dismantle the colonial system, ended up seizing and reinforcing 
the colonial political structure, by failing to disrupt the existing colonial spatial arrangement. 
Since these political actors appear to have merely inserted themselves as players in the state-
based dominant world system, they therefore became part of the fabric that constitutes the 
vehicle of agency in the international system, the state. Consequently, African borders should 
be approached as both an inheritance of colonial understanding of space and a historical 
evidence that borderland population identity and agency can be recovered despite the statist 
dimension of the border. In any case, a reversal to pre-colonial territorial arrangements on a 
time axis to arrive at the precolonial dynamics in the places of today’s borderlands is 
impossible. Moreover, the postcolonial discursive rhetorical instrumentation of those borders 
as “empty signifiers” by African political leaders throughout various socio-historical and 
geopolitical changes have continued to evolve in tension with the agency of borderland 
communities, and in the exclusive pursuit of state interests (Arrous & Ki-Zerbo, 2009; Wallach, 
2011, pp. 361–362). In order words, very much like European empires rationalised those 
borders in their colonial competition, post-independence African leaders found them to be 
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potent rhetorical instruments for consolidating their respective nation-building narratives and 
for articulating various regional economic agendas. 
 
Communities living at the edges of these national territorial units have since Independence 
found themselves navigating territorial spaces known as state borders and adjusting 
accordingly. Understanding what propels, but also inhibits transformations and adjustments 
within border areas means engaging with the ambivalent legacies of colonialism as well as the 
ways in which other contemporaneous external processes are appropriated, adjusted or 
contested in these postcolonial contexts by communities inhabiting these spaces. Placing the 
analytical cursor against the “geographical text” instead, as it were, allows for a reading of 
borders’ past trajectories through precolonial and colonial politics of territoriality from the 
bottom up. This also affords the opportunity for apprehending the essential reconversions of 
African border contexts in the contemporary world order. The divided or transnational 
character of many communities’ ancestral home today validates most of the accusations against 
colonial spatial organisation in Africa. However, limiting the focus on the impact of colonial 
bordering on border communities in (post)colonial times presents the risk of essentialising 
border communities as static monoliths.  
 
In the case of the Cameroon-Nigeria border and the Cameroon-Gabon border for instance, very 
little attention has indeed been paid to the extent to which these communities supposedly 
affected by the borders might have had an internal dynamic of their own, and/or a defining 
influence on the constitutive performativity of the said state border. In other words, every other 
thing being equal, other disruptions might have occurred to these socio-spatial systems and 
would not have nonetheless been the only way to define the populations inhabiting the 
geographical areas in question. This approach does not seek to dismiss the might of the colonial 
technology of subjugation or pitch itself against the solid body of historiography on African 
borders referred to in this research project. Instead, it only seeks to refrain from giving the 
postcolonial African border more reproducing of its power than it has already garnered, by 
recovering dominated/muted voices. Anene and Prescott lay the historical pathways to this approach 
to bordering  by arguing in their work on Nigerian borders, that “no one who goes through the 
documentary material of the boundary negotiations for Nigeria will fail to be impressed by the extent to 
which data on treaty with native rulers including the extensiveness of their states figured in the 




This  does not exactly suggest that the borders were negotiated on equal terms between European 
colonisers and local rulers, but rather that, as Uzoigwe (1985)  points out in his article entitled Reflections 
on the Berlin west Africa Conference, most data accounts give no detail on how local political 
dynamics played in the background of such treaties. The question remains, for instance, whether these 
local rulers could simply have exploited the presence of the Europeans (with superior firepower) to lay 
claim on contested or coveted territories and enact colonial borders in the same process (Niang, 2018).  A 
case in point is the then King of Calabar (Nigeria-Cameroon border) who took advantage on his dominant 
business position in the palm trade with the Europeans, to lay claim on swathes of territories extending all 
the way to the present southern Cameroon-Nigeria border. This is a territory that had never been part of 
the land he had controlled before the signing of his protection treaty with the British (Prescott & Anene, 
1971, pp. 12–16). Another contextual example is the fact that the 1886 treaty between Duala 
Chiefs and the Germans in present-day Cameroon enshrined both a strategic security interest 
on the part of the local leaders and preservation of existing patron-client networks (protection 
treaty). If anything, this entanglement between local politics and European agents, whether 
confrontational or conciliatory, was indicative of the dynamic nature of local politics then, as 
well as a measure of rivalries within and between various precolonial polities as successfully 
argued by Amy Niang (2018).  
 
Looking at the possible motivating factors behind these practices such as protection against a belligerent 
neighbour or a bid for preferential treatment, indigenous societies (admittedly more local political leaders 
than ordinary members of the communities) appear to have been more engaged in their own politics rather 
than submitting to the colonisers (Oduwobi, 2004, pp. 89–96), even though this turned out to mean 
effectively agreeing to the terms of colonisation. Arguments both for and against indigenous Africans 
having agreed to, or at least played an active part in the colonial bordering process portray the complex 
political dynamics at play within African precolonial societies and foreshadow the impossibility to 
comprehend vernacular dynamics from the study of official borders. The puzzle now is that, much 
more with borders than with political systems, the space of the border seems to make a tabula 
rasa as though the inception of the colonial border marks the end of precolonial local history. 
This ushers in a narrative of the border that can only be articulated or subsumed in the 
nationalist discourses of the post-colonial state narrative contested.  
 
Hence, the historiographical materialisation of the colonial state suppresses the agency of 
borderland societies in three key ways. First, it tends to conceal the historical evidence that 
indeed, even before 1884, and most importantly even before the treaties were concluded with 
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local chiefs including for the areas that would in the longue durée be affected by borders, local 
politics intermingled in various alliances with Europeans parties. Secondly, it makes no case 
of the micro-level dynamics that developed as a result of these spatial transformations, again 
positioning the postcolonial state making trajectory as the dominant lens through which to read 
border space in historical terms. Thirdly, it overlooks the “natural” resilience of borderlands 
which, although demarcated on maps, still remained out of reach for colonisers a long time 
after the treaties became effective, as these areas were more often than not inaccessible, and 
the colonial administration lacked the resources to cover them all. 
 
To this date, various processes of the postcolonial state reification are at odds with dynamics 
on the ground in the borderlands. Yet, these processes are often used as the point of analysis 
for knowledge about borderlands. Parallel developments are considered as new phenomena 
and not properly associated to their historical continuity. If we turn the approach upside down 
though, there is a way of seeing the changing landmarks registered in the state paradigm of 
nation-building in Africa simply as watershed moments in the ways in which inhabitants of 
borderlands creatively respond to various forms of state rationality in their spatial environment. 
In other words, the colonial and postcolonial bordering process comports two readings, even 
though the more prominent has always been aligned with the historical trajectory of state 
formation in Africa. It is therefore worth emphasising that this state rationality is not the 
exclusive determinant of borderlanders’ behaviour, and that what has not been forcefully 
highlighted so far in the scholarship is the fact that these various formats of the African 
bordering seen in different historical stages discursively reify one and the same materiality of 
the border. The potential of these historical “topsy turvy” of the border to be perceived as a sort 
of dynamics reveals a lacuna in the analysis of border performativity. Historical landmarks in 
the border dimension of the state-building process in Africa are foregrounded in places where 
the dynamics of the border communities are, to a considerable extent, self-generating and 
independent of the state bordering process.  
 
Current epistemological assumptions on contemporary African border communities seem to argue that 
these communities exist only by, and because of, the border. Yet, while it is fair to say that Colonialism 
brought a dimension to African spatial organisation, it has not defined it in the sense of creating or re-
inventing space. Recovering and unmuting the agency of these border communities in the present 
requires that we contest this notion of the all-overpowering impact of colonialism over the 
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whole of African reality, as a rejection of the “fatal impact”10 theory (Moorehead, 1966). It is important 
to consider border communities beyond the decree of the imperial or state border, as simply communities 
doing their best to domesticate their living space. This is how this scholarship can escape the 
historiographic dichotomy which, while presenting border communities as victims of colonial mapping, 
also - maybe inadvertently - contributes to erasing or belittling their agency from various narratives. Put 
differently, postcolonial borders can do three things at the same time. (1) They simultaneously 
embody enduring colonial influences and (2) serve as a site for reading community practices 
that may amount to an epistemic “product of resistance to colonialism and imperialism” 
(Lawson, 2012, p. 56). But beyond this, (3) they are also sites of living and practices since 
precolonial times that were not defined by colonisation, and this extends beyond the time and 
space of the postcolonial state. In this sense and as shall be elaborated upon in the next section, 
while mainstream geography, which is known to have pioneered the study of borders and 
boundaries, has been mainly focused on the state-centric institutional processes of demarcation 
and the political bordering of territorial space, critical historiographers and geographers have 
done well to pay more attention to the ways in which borderland communities proceed to shape 














10 This theory suggests that colonised races of the pacific were unable to resist the strength of the arms, the 
organisation and desire for riches of European nations. The fatal impact theory goes with the notion of blame 
against the colonised people and an implicit acquiescence the prevalence of might, instead of right. Postcolonial 
theorists such as Bhabha (1994) and (1978) find such ideas demeaning to the colonised people as they exclusively 
foreground the agency of the colonisers, portraying Indigenous people as recipients only defined by impact from 
external forces on them.   
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 The spatial turn and its implications for African borders 
 
The embedding of border paradigms in political geography and sociology of space is 
consubstantial to debates regarding approaches to studying local agency. These debates explore 
the organisation of territorial space and the possible socio-political impacts of spatial 
arrangement on human communities. With the “spatial turn” in social sciences, critical border 
studies have been at the forefront of advancing provocative agency-based research agendas on 
the border-society nexus (Taylor, 2000, p. 158). The conventional genealogy of space as an 
analytical category marks the early 1990s as its foundational milestone. However, this meta-theoretical 
device is much older and could be traced at least as far back as the beginning of the 19th century when 
Einstein introduced the general theory of relativity, thus founding a new way of thinking about space, that 
sought to escape beyond the Newtonian absolutist understanding of space as independent of the observer’s 
position.  
 
Building upon this, Einstein’s fellow countryman, German philosopher Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) 
elaborated on space as an analytical category. A few years later, French philosopher Henri Lefebvre (1901 
– 1991) published the influential book entitled The Production of Space (1974), spelling out a research 
programme for the spatial turn. This spatialisation of thought and experience in the modern world was 
being ushered in by prominent thinkers such as Foucault, Giddens and Jameson. After the Fall of the 
Berlin Wall and its symbolic implications for the nation-state’s borders, this line of thinking built on the 
work of modernist thinkers to take ground in social sciences and humanities, with the intellectual 
contribution of critical geographers such as John Agnew (1994) and Edward W. Soja (1989) who urged 
the rethinking of the dialectics of space, time and social being in critical theory.  
 
However, this somewhat linear and Eurocentric genealogy of thought about space can be contested in the 
ways in which it excludes insights from Africa-centered or other non-western conceptualisations of time 
and space. The “spatial turn” in social sciences emerged at a critical transitional era when, the West’s 
obsession with history and the past in 19th century was being gradually replaced with what Foucault 
referred to as the “epoch of space” (1984, p. 22). Yet, it is surprising that this same historical time period 
(between the 19th and the 20th centuries) that registered crucial landmarks of the European colonial process 
in Africa failed to infuse the “epoch of space” with the spatialised experiences of African indigenous 
societies. Notwithstanding, Nikitah O. Imani exposes how Africa-centered conceptions of time and space 
can enrich the pertaining thinking. In this regard, he considers for example how the Sasa and Zamani 
conceptions of time among the Swahili can bring constructive nuances to “the corner reality” (Imani, 
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2012, p. 106).  In the same vein,  Aja Egbeke (1994), a Nigerian thinker, articulates how Igbo 
conceptualisations of time and space are rooted in indigenous practices and beliefs regarding causality, 
rather than confined within a three dimensional space situated on the linear time matrix, having length, 
width, and height.  
 
This focus on how space is constructed by ontological practices was also theorised by Cameroonian 
philosopher Fabien Eboussi Boulaga (1977), as the concept of the “Muntu”. Beyond an exposition of the 
Muntu’s worldview as valid, Boulaga insists the Muntu’s “word”11 should escape drowning by other 
“words” by asserting himself as the subject and object of his words. By entitling and publishing his book 
“La crise du Muntu” (The Muntu in Crisis) exactly in the same time period that Western critical thinkers 
such as Foucault were depicting a paradigmatic shift towards spatial experiences, Boulaga’s thought can 
also be read as an assessment of the how the experiences of colonial spaces have been left out of 
modernity, virtually shutting down the voices of the emancipated Africans who had just gained 
independence in the 1960s. In this sense, these modern shifts seem limited within the coordinates of the 
Eurocentric worldview, and this is therefore a caveat to be mindful of, in the examination of the spatial 
turn in the social sciences. However, mobilising this spatial turn to analyse postcolonial borders in Africa 
is not synonymous to centralising European vernaculars to talk about specific African spaces and 
experiences. It is an acknowledgement of its effective destabilising effect on the nation-state normative 
framework as epitomised by those borders.  
 
With the innovation of the spatial turn in many disciplines, containerised societies within nation-states 
have become less and less considered as the main or only focus of analysis to understand the state-society 
relationship. By yielding to the strong plea of the 1990s to reconceptualise space in order to escape the 
notion of territories as “frozen frameworks where social life occurs”, (Anssi Paasi, 2003b, p. 110), more 
and more scholars of African border(lands) have used this conceptual shift to reinforce their critique 
against the essentialisation of the nation-state as the dominant regime of territoriality and unit of analysis 
(Boeckler et al., 2018; Engel & Nugent, 2010; Englebert et al., 2002). In fact, the third ECAS12 held in 
Leipzig in June 2009 under the theme Respacing Africa focused mainly on assessing the extent to which 




11 Parole in French, literally “speech” 
12 European Conference on African Studies 
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positing that territories are social constructs embedded in social relations and designed to serve specific 
ends. This process was identified in the early 1990s by Shields (1991) as social spatialisatiၕon.  
 
Social spatialisatiၕon foregrounds margins as examples of contested spaces where social activities, 
material things, phenomena or processes take on specific spatial frames. In expanding this notion, Paasi 
famously stated that, “Territories are […] made, given meanings, destroyed, and remade as part of social 
life and individualၕ action” (Anssi Paasi, 2003b, p. 110).  This idea is further developed when he states that 
social spatialisation is the process through which “ […] individual actors and collectivities are socialized 
as members of specific territorially bounded spatial entities, participate in their reproduction and 'learn' 
collective territorial identities, narratives of shared traditions and inherent spatial images” (2009, p. 226). 
In the Africanist scholarship too, there has been a persistent call since the spatial turn in the 1990s for new 
frameworks, concepts and approaches that are “more authentically grounded in African history and the 
ideas, institutions, intellectual perspectives and practices of African states and societies” (Bischoff et al., 
2015, p. 4). This paradigmatic shift from the isotropic conceptualisations of state territoriality, in the 
analysis of African spatiality, has inevitably highlighted the insufficiencies of recent engagement with the 
conceptualisation of African territoriality both in academic and policy circles.  
 
There is a case to argue that the most obvious place to observe these insufficiencies in the 
conceptualisations of African territoriality as discrete geographical units, is the territorial border. Because 
if we admit that territoriality is a contested expression of power and agency through material space, then 
the border is the tool par excellence to forcefully projecting these in the various practices of claiming, 
establishing and maintaining the limits of territorial space.  Wilson and Donnan aptly established that 
“If all the world is a stage, then borders are its scenery, its mise en scène, its ordering of space 
and action, wherein actors and observers must work at making borders intelligible and 
manageable and must do so in order for the drama to proceed.” (2012, pp. 19–20). As such, the 
African border cannot be analysed in terms of its geographical materiality only. That is to say, in terms of 
Newman’s traditional understanding (material, as opposed to hermeneutical) of borders “as constituting 
the physical and highly visible lines of separation between political, social and economic space” (2006, p. 
144). Without completely rejecting this material dimension of the border, Nervin indicates that this 
understanding should only be the point of departure of accessing the symbolic role of borders as being 
both physical juridical ‘lines’ on the one hand, and “zones of cultural production, space of meaning-
making and meaning-breaking” on the other hand (Donnan and Wilson 2001, 64). This is echoed in the 
works of critical geographers such as John Ruggie and John Agnew who had earlier on launched the 




While Ruggie’s analysis of non -territorial regions of the world retained a more global institutional 
approach (1993, pp. 73–75), Agnew’s granular focus remains the territorial state which misleads 
conceptualisation by placing the nation-state “as not simply the primary but as the singular actor of 
modern world politics” (2015, p. 43). Anssi Paasi’s contribution to the assault against the “territorial trap" 
articulates the crucial post-constructivist argument of plural meanings. He argues that, instead of their 
complete dismissal, territories as “bounded spaces” should be understood as only a type of the spatiality 
of power amongst others, even as territory will continue to significantly define the understanding of the 
state, and therefore of world politics (2009, 214). Paassi’ s conclusive argument above is significant in the 
sense that it underlines the persisting and significant role that the edges of “bounded spaces” play in the 
articulation of power, while also giving prominence to how social imaginations work to contest such 
power within a specific space. This is arguably the strongest median between the two major political 
geographic perspectives on the links between the geographical environment and human societies. These 
two major political geographic perspectives consist of environmental determinism, on the one hand, and 
the institutional performance on the other hand. The former contends that inherent and physical features 
of the spatial environment are significant in the behaviour of people inhabiting that environment (Gallup 
et al., 1998; Sachs, 2003).  Whereas Krugman is amongst the group of scholars who attribute societal 
performance to institutions managing the specific geographical area (Fujita et al., 1999). Rather than 
arguing for any of the above perspectives, this debate may be extended to transnational border spaces as 
a contested space where competing accounts of societal dynamics can be explored side by side.   
 
The organisation of social imaginations to domesticate specific geographical and political realms within 
African border contexts is documented. Janet Roitman’s (2005) historical and ethnographic study of a 
frontier region -  the Chad Basin that covers northern Cameroon, north-eastern Nigeria, Chad, and the 
Central African Republic is a case in point. Her study provides an analysis of multiple worlds that centrally 
involve different logics of borderness. In this multiply bordered region, Roitman focuses on shifting fiscal 
relations between people and the state as an approach to trace the multiple and ambiguous reframing of 
political citizenship in the region. Similarly, Catherine Boone's (2003) analysis of centre-periphery 
relationships in Ghana, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire demonstrates that instead of geographical and 
demographical constraints, larger sociological dynamics at the border determine the ways in which 
central-state rulers act in their attempts to project power into the periphery. She pays specific attention to 
the interaction between central rulers and local elites in peripheral areas. There is however a case to argue 
that these elites are no longer peripheral and if so, then only through territorial fetishism given their 
structural and direct connection to central powers. In fact, one could argue that both Roitman and Boone 
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come short of critically analysing border space beyond its received form, within the one-dimensional 
paradigm of territoriality as a regime for state control. This does nevertheless not diminish the rich analysis 
of social processes across border spaces, even though the ways in which their mostly elite-based and state-
based orientations tend to re-edit the notion that border spaces only exist because of/through/for the state. 
In other words, these analyses create an underlying sense that, should those borders disappear, all 
community life in that specific geographical area would come to an end. There is a persisting sense of 
space being treated as given, because the processes studied are too state-dependent to qualify as spatial 
products of social practices alone, unlike representations of social action as structuring space.  
 
Hence, despite their bottom-up focus on local border communities, such characterisation of African 
border spatiality that emerges from the studies of Boone and Roitman tend to reinforce the reification of 
state power over the agency of peripheral areas as spatial continuity and geographical units. It revives the 
notion that inhabitants of borderlands are incapable of existence without or beyond the state-centred 
parameters. Such a bottom-up and margin-driven consideration of borderlands is ultimately only an 
analysis of state formation by other means, a counterintuitive step that inadvertently continues to confine 
thinking within the shackles of what Agnew called the “territorial trap”.   The challenge in foregrounding 
social processes in African border areas remains to avoid presenting borderlands and border communities 


















 The Performative Relationship between Border, State and Society 
 
The different forms that postcolonial state borders take nowadays articulate their ability to 
engage with those likely to use the border instead of hostile armies. It is therefore expected that 
the performativity of the border should very much reflect anticipated behaviours, perceptions, 
and identity of border users. Border policies designed to control this performativity rationalise 
the border space along the lines of specific political objectives. The key element in this 
rationalisation process is that it does not merely reflect the political thinking of the powers that 
be, it also bears a portrayal of the envisaged functions of the border and the part played by 
those likely to use it against the backdrop of constant change. Such reality of African borders has 
been studied empirically (Dobler, 2010; Ndumbe, 2013; Walther, 2009), drawing upon the ethnographic 
and historiographic research on borders and borderlands globally (Alvarez, 2012; Heyman, 2010; T. M. 
Wilson & Donnan, 2012).  This study of borders combines two main disciplinary approaches to examine 
it, both as an abstract construct in the political realm and as a physical reality with which human societies 
engage as borderland actors. History and social sciences often come together in the borderland scholarship 
to study the relationship between the reality of border spaces and their impact on societies around their 
immediate vicinities.  
 
In this examination, it seems that the (de)construction of border is a by-product of human societies, which 
states only instrumentalise for their own purposes. Tharailath Koshy Oommen states that “The rise 
and fall, the construction and deconstruction of various types of boundaries is the very story of 
human civilization”(1995, p. 251). In the same vein, Cerny explains that ever since Plato’s 
Republic, two kinds of bordering and structural differentiation have presided over politics and 
society. The first, ‘vertical’ dimension is rooted in physical space, while the second, ‘horizontal’ 
dimension is one of social stratification or functional differentiation (2008, pp. 13–14).  
Cukwurah (1967) on his part, posits that the original social organisation by humans comprised several 
independent bands of people on adjoining territories who would eventually come into contact because of 
concomitant pressure on land, and would negotiate mutually agreed mode of spatial interaction as well as 
inter-group relations, which usually included borders. In his influential book on precolonial African 
territoriality entitled The African Frontier, Igor Kopytoff (1989) re-visits Turner's conception of the 
American frontier as an expansion of settlement into a supposedly free land where wilderness was 
transformed into a civilised space leading the emergence of a metropolitan society. Kopytoff advances 
border making as not only consubstantial to human societies, but as a forefront of their development and 
growth.  In the same social conceptualisation of border making, Prescott (1965) claims that boundary 
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negotiation between disparate human communities served to diffuse tension, avoid conflict, and preserve 
material benefits of territorial occupation. Indeed, we may rightly conceive of these bordering processes 
as simply deliberate constructs, consciously and purposely contrived to meet specific social demands. 
This understanding can be applied to both states and human societies, especially that states are forms of 
human agency on par with the leadership of any community acting out various needs for the determination 
of boundaries out of expediency.  
 
Every other thing being equal, the pioneering work by French Marxist philosopher and sociologist Henri 
Lefebvre, The Production of Space as presented in the preceding section, also articulates the space as a 
product of social practices, resulting from past contestations and never-ending present negotiations.  
Lefebvre presents space as a product of social construction, shaped by meanings and values which define 
perceptions and practices in specific spatial areas.  He makes his case with the concepts of the trialectics 
of spatiality, historicality, and sociality which bring time, space and society in a ceaseless entanglement 
of meaning production. Edward Soja goes even further by combining Lefebvre's concepts with Michel 
Foucault's notion of beterotopia as places and spaces of otherness that function in non-hegemonic 
conditions, to develop his concept of third space: spaces that are both real and imagined (1996).  This is 
similar to what Entrikin calls “the betweenness of place” (2011). Taken together, all these notions can be 
seen as conceptualisations of various types of intersections between imagined and physical spaces, or 
between different constructions of spaces. By narrowing the examination of these interactions 
between the geographical environment and human societies on the border space, a distinction 
emerges between ‘physical’ and ‘performative’ border. Cerny notes that the latter “define[s] 
the boundaries of human life at least as much as, or more than, hard geographical spaces; they 
are complex and multidimensional, reflecting the myriad dimensions of politics, economy and 
society more closely than mere geography” (2008, pp. 1-2).  
 
The common, yet unarticulated thread to these debates is the constant spatial transformations 
that affect geographical imaginations13 of local communities within border areas, and how 
these geographical imaginations themselves structure the behaviour, or the performance, of 
those who live by the border. I have proposed the concepts of “biplacement” to study these 




13 Detailed discussion of “geographical imaginations” in Chapter 4 
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border performance. As an example of this, Kaiser has explored the ever-present eventfulness 
embedded in the performative processes of borders by opening a discussion on performativity 
and the power of border performatives, in the relationship between performativity and social 
events. This approach goes beyond the post-structural approach to research on borders, which 
underscores the workings of power in naturalising and essentialising borders as things rather 
than socio-spatial practices (2012, pp. 522–537). Applied to the context of the two border areas 
in this study, these various concepts of intersections, transformations, and constructions of both 
physical and imagined spaces work to emphasise how processes of colonisation, postcolonial 
state-building and external interventions are also embedded in the unending discursive 
practices. Most importantly, this opens a path to also conceptualise vernacular practices of 
borderlanders as processes of space production, as evidenced by the performativity of the 
border. There however remains a persistent tension between attempts at essentialising the 
border in a specific way and the ever-present potentiality of change and adaptation performed 
by communities in their various vernacular practices.  By linking performativity to key 
livelihood events, in the sense of things happening at the border at the initiative of 
borderlanders, mobility emerges as repetitive eventful practices performed by border 



















2.2 Borderland security in the Vernacular and the Everyday 
 
This second part of the literature review chapter will explore various critical approaches to 
security in order to establish the relevance of vernacular security to the study of borders, and 
especially the conditions under which the significance of such an approach is important for 
borders in Africa.  
 
 Critical approaches to security 
 
Securitisation Theory successfully demonstrated that there is no intrinsic value to any given threat outside 
of its socio-linguistic construction (Buzan et al., 1998). However, various scholars pointed out the limits 
of this presentation of threat in existential terms, by drawing attention to the role of audience reception 
(Balzacq, 2005; McDonald, 2008; Meyer, 2009). Thierry Balzacq (2010, p. 19), especially noted that 
Securitisation Theory has tended to “skirt the distinctive role of the audience” because of the Copenhagen 
School’s prior focus on what security elite actors do and say. Pointing out the same shortcoming, Christoph 
Meyer (2009, p. 650) criticised Securitisation Theory for not adequately addressing “different levels of 
risk perception and fear among different types of audiences”. Johan Eriksson, on his part concluded that 
the securitisation frame is unable to account for the way in which certain threat images acquire wider 
‘societal salience’ whereas others do not, and he explains this lacuna by the fact that the focus on elite 
speech acts ends up overlooking the “cultural context in which a threat image is identified” (2001, p. 222). 
This is perhaps a clear expression of the limits of the empirical engagement implied by the centrality of 
the citizen in the security rhetoric. This security rationality that seeks to depoliticise the prioritisation of 
threats therefore seems unable to empirically incorporate its plural meaning outside traditional security 
frameworks, and in this regard, securitisation theory has not been the only alternative conceptualisation 
of security that received criticism.   
 
Many other proximate approaches in security emphasising individual human referents such as human 
security, critical security studies, post-colonialism, feminism, ontological security studies, and everyday 
security studies present some conceptual flaws in their attempts to decentre the statist/militaristic/positivist 
assumptions of security studies as traditionally constituted (Jarvis Lee, 2019). For instance, critics of 
human security acknowledge its successes in producing a “normative reference point for human-centred 
policy movements”, but tie these successes to the concept’s ambiguity and potential to be diverted to more 
traditional security frameworks (E. Newman, 2016, p. 2). More precisely, in the words of Giorgio Shani, 
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“human security may be sufficiently malleable to allow itself to be used to legitimise greater state control 
over society in the name of protection” (2007, p. 7). Another reconceptualisation of security from the 
“bottom up” that came under criticism was the “Welsh School” of Critical Security Studies (CSS), which 
focuses on breaking security from more traditional collocates such as sovereignty, order and power, and 
reconfiguring the term around emancipation as explained by CSS leading theorists like Peoples (2011, 
pp. 1116–1119) and Ken Booth (1991, p. 319). Despite its insistence on the fact that security analysis 
should begin with concrete insecurities and real fears, CSS attracts the same criticism as Human Security 
with which it shares the same thematic breadth, namely a universalism that could be traced to security’s 
traditional connection to oppressive political projects and imaginaries (Neocleous, 2008, pp. 4–6). 
Mindful of these criticisms of explicit universalism; the unacknowledged eurocentrism or security’s 
masked connections with oppressive imaginaries, some other works on security has sought to effectively 
escape from Eurocentric assumptions, while pursuing critical research trajectories.  
 
On the conundrum of how to use people-based (as opposed to state-based) specific knowledge 
to achieve better human security, some scholars have argued for the necessity, or at least the 
analytical usefulness of the concept of ‘vernacular security’(2005). Bubandt draws his 
argument from the much wider constructivist scholarship which views security as a socially 
situated and discursively defined practice. Whereas materialist theories such as realism and 
liberalism take interests and identities as given, both traditional and critical constructivists 
emphasise on their origin and the notion of change (Holstein & Gubrium, 2013, pp. 373–378). 
Operating on the ontological assumption that actors are shaped by - and within - their living 
spaces as they collaboratively negotiate meanings, the constructivist approach to security 
involves an attempt to understand (not necessarily to explain) human (in)security in terms of 
those who experience it, within an interpretive "bottom-up" analysis of the social worlds in 
question. Even from an economic and complex systems theory standpoint, Samir Rihani views 
economic development as a “home-grown” product rather than an externally bestowed 
blessing; more precisely “the result of local interactions between people” (2002, p. 11).  
 
Apart from the wider outlook on the politically and socially contextualised ontology of security, 
Bubandt’s argument on the analytical usefulness of the vernacular contests the material 
impossibility of a seamless extension of global governance. He does this by demonstrating for 
instance how in eastern Indonesia, “the implementation of the statist idea of security 
encountered local universes containing ontological notions of safety and uncertainty that often 
accommodated and undermined the security project of New Order rule in unexpected ways” 
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(Bubandt, 2005, p. 276). In the interstices of such global-national-local encounters, the 
vernacular challenges the assumed semantic homogeneity of security with the political history 
and the local ontological ways in which danger, risk, threats and (in)security are understood or 
defined. It is these contradictory processes of reformulation, accommodation or rejection that 
Bubandt has termed “vernacular security”, inspired by anthropological studies of global 
modernity with concepts such as Appadurai’s “vernacular globalisation” (1996) or Mbembe’s 
“representation in the gigantic” (2000).    
 
The notion of pluralities or the ‘multiple’ has been criticised both as a potential vessel for 
relaxing relativism and universalising Eurocentric experience. The risk here is the systematic 
comparison, which refers back to western-centric universal concepts of often limited analytical 
value. There is a danger in trading the universalist paradigm of the world order for the 
particularistic paradigm, especially if this is carried out only for the sake of contesting the 
former (Lindberg et al., 2014). The first danger of particularism for a study on African borders 
is essentialising Africa while confronting the “colonial matrix of power”. Any mythologisation 
of African border experiences would lack the much-needed “projective capacity to imagine 
alternative possibilities” (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 962).  For the vernacular to therefore 
bear its own meaning in the African context,  i.e. to speak with its own voice while referring to 
itself, caution should be taken against the ability of  Eurocentrism to adapt, subvert and diffuse 
itself,  including in the form of anti-Eurocentric or non-Eurocentric eurocentrism (Duzgun, 
2018). It is a case of critical approaches to security recognising that one vernacular exerted its 
hegemony over the others, but also that each vernacular is not performed in isolation. Many 
vernaculars are imbricated in a world with differing agendas. The vernacular is therefore 
always plural because “every local site of modernity is brought into social existence in a 
tension-filled relationship between local concerns and global forms of discursive and 
institutional power” (Bubandt, 2005, p. 276; Pieterse, 2000; J. W. Scott, 2018).  
 
 Relevance of Vernacular security approaches for studying African borders 
 
The question to address now, given the plurality of vernaculars and their entanglement, is which 
vernacular approach is a best fit for the study of African borders. Empirical investigations into 
transnational insecurity in Africa have focused (perhaps only) on political actors of varying 
degrees. Cyril Obi (2008), for instance, explores transnational security challenges in West 
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Africa through the actions and discourses of NGOs, government representatives and ECOWAS 
agents. This focus on top-level and otherwise institutional actors downplays the theoretical 
constraints raised by critics the securitisation theory as described in the previous section. The 
relationship (even though of supposed independence) of such actors to the state paradigm 
affects both the performative nature of national boundaries in themselves and the agency of 
local actors not affiliated to institutional networks. Locally, policy instruments like the African 
Union Border Programme (AUBP) are primarily concerned with threats to the exercise of 
national sovereignty. They are based on an understanding of these threats as resulting from 
poorly defined state borders, “drawn during the colonial period in a context of rivalries between 
European countries and their scramble for territories in Africa […] a recurrent source of 
conflicts and disputes” (AUBP, 2018; African Union Border Governance Strategy, 2017).  
 
Cross-border security in Africa, in the view of the African Union, is therefore only a convenient 
accessory to - and dependent upon - the AUBP’s main goal to clearly demarcate territorial 
spaces where nation-states can exert their respective sovereignties. As a paradigmatic offspring 
of this western-centric model, African transnational security policies, and border policies in 
general (whether externally driven or not) reflect an adjusted Westphalian understanding of 
African borders. This adjusted understanding results mainly from challenges to the notion of 
physical borders in the West, as seen earlier, rather than from a determining principle of African 
spatiality per se. Furthermore, the localised changes in the narrative portraying African 
specificity are tuned to local realities mainly through the input of African state agencies or the 
so-called non-state actors who, as I argue in more detail later on (Chapter 4), do not operate 
from a position of a-statalၕ actorness.  
 
These border policies paradoxically reinforce the centrality of African states on issues of border 
(in)security, due in part to their inabilities to escape the shackles of the “territorial trap” 
(Agnew, 1994). Building upon this paradox, a change of narrative and self-identity of external 
interveners is carried out primarily on the basis of their own interests, and not of those of the 
African state partners involved, much less of the local communities, even though these are 
framed in terms of “longstanding mutual interests” (European Union, 2011, p. 4). Olivia 
Rutazibwa argues that local ownership and participation have been advocated and framed in 
the discourse of external interveners in the developing world in general, as ways of countering 
contradictions inherent in the international ethical ambition. Consequently, effective local 
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ownership cannot be articulated through the type of local partners involved, however 
“depoliticised” they may seem (2010).  
 
At a more local level, Julia Brown (2011) for instance identifies fundamental weaknesses in 
the participatory model of water management likely to result in more injustice rather than less. 
As a solution to this paradoxical engagement with local ownership, Sabaratnam advocates for a 
“careful engagement with the experiences and critical political consciousness of those who are rendered 
as ‘objects’ of power . . . [by] engaging with the ways in which different people politicize various aspects 
of their experiences, narrate the terms of their situations and critically interpret the world around them” 
(2013, p. 272). Similarly, Hönke and Müller diagnose that engaging local ownership on security issues in 
the postcolonial world requires richer, thicker, and more localised understandings of security, “gleaning 
the meanings that the people we study attribute to their social and political reality.” (2012, p. 395). Thus, 
the identified aporia of various people-oriented security approaches only highlights the scope that exists 
for engaging their inadequacy of  “addressing the security and strategic concerns of the weak, the vast 
majority of the people living on the planet”(Barkawi & Laffey, 2006a, p. 352). 
 
Emphasising the experiences of the global South’s inhabitants echoes the ways in which gendered 
insecurities within feminist security studies demonstrate that “the mundane matters” (Doughty & Murray, 
2016; Enloe, 2011), and how violence and insecurities are narrated, experienced, and lived through 
assumptions, categories, and behaviours that are intrinsically gendered. Although this discussion of critical 
approaches to security obviously cannot do justice to all relevant contributions, it does point to the assessed 
importance of alternative approaches to security and the necessity to decentre understandings of security 
by focusing on “real people”.  Operating on the ontological assumption that these “real people” are shaped 
by - and within - their living spaces as they collaboratively negotiate meanings, the constructivist approach 
to security involves an attempt to understand (not necessarily to explain) human (in)security in the terms 
chosen by those who experience it, within an interpretive "bottom-up" analysis of the social worlds in 
question. It is therefore analytically a problem not to centrally include those who are subjects for at least 
two reasons. First, meanings of (in)security are intersubjectively produced by, culturally embedded in, and 
politically contested via “processes of identity construction in which the self and other, or multiple others, 
are constituted” (Weldes, 1999, p. 10). It follows almost in obvious terms that the borderlander 
experiences should then be the “hotspot” of meaning in shaping issues of security at least in the border 
areas. Second, even a critical analysis of dominant discourses of security comports the potential to silence 
the voices of communities already marginalised by the internal workings of the postcolonial African state 




In the African context of borders, where Westphalian territoriality had been co-constitutive of 
colonial mapping, the epistemological phenomenology of the international border dismisses both the 
(1) particular spatiality of African states and the (2) heterogeneously experienced reality of borders, for 
the benefit of one master narrative on border security.  Bubandt’s concept of vernacular security becomes 
very useful in divesting this totalising narrative of security. There is a strong case to argue that this 
divestment should necessarily be carried out through actively engaging the perceptions and experiences 
of the ordinary citizen in the evaluation and prioritisation process concerning threat. However, despite a 
rhetoric that aligns with this rationale in various border-oriented policies in Africa, we are still unable to 
articulate precisely how border communities conceptualize and experience ‘threats’ and ‘(in)stability’ in 
their social worlds. The views, cultural repertoires of knowledge and testimonies of the African borderland 
subject of (in)security remain largely invisible despite an explicit engagement to recover them. Far less is 
known about whether/how these border communities construct awareness of, engage with and/or contest 
state policies that tend to enjoin them to contribute to state security and build societal resilience. In the 
deficit of vernacular knowledge as source of expertise, the state-centric paradigm (albeit in its new 
rhetoric) still ends up foregrounded in externally-driven security policy interventions and national border 
priorities, and again, despite a narrative that tends to suggest otherwise. This deficit becomes more 
apparent when the security focus is articulated in the borderlands in terms of resilience across border 
communities. Engaging the vernacular to understand the “imaginaries, conceptions, fears, and insecurities 
of real people as experienced and lived within daily life.” ( Jarvis, 2019, p. 120), demands a specific 
consideration of vernacular security for the border locales in question.    
 
 Significance of the border “vernacular” for security and resilience 
 
In the context of the “vernacular” and “everyday” turns in critical security studies, studying the Cameroon-
Nigeria and Cameroon-Gabon border locales participates in the process of seeking to reformulate the 
importance of the embodied experiences of ordinary people, within a tradition of thought that recovers 
the individual as the referent object of threat and (in)security. In the extent to which it articulates with the 
experiences of border communities in this study, I argue that the concept of a-statal actorness (which will 
be introduced gradually, and then fully articulated in the Conclusion of the thesis) describes a performance 
of agency that operates as though the state did not exist or does not exist centrally. The a-statal actor differs 
from the non-state actor in the sense that the non-state actor is in a relationship with the state, is dependent 
on the state which it contests for its existence. Both the state and the non-state actor are co-constituents of 
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the same reality. Meanwhile, a-statal actorness is primarily a representation of a relationship to the world, 
that is considered unaware of (or un-interested in) the state system. That is also why I used actorness 
instead of actors more often. “A-statal actorness” treats the border as one of the many discrete entities in 
relations within a complex spatial web.  I also argue that extending security to plurality means doing away 
with considerations that turn definitional challenges into central problems – and by the same token,  an 
unending exercise. This also means looking at security from an angle that does not prioritise the linguistics 
of its identification. For example, the distinction between security and resilience is one that speaks to this 
desire to compartmentalise different sides of the vulnerability coin, or vernacularise threat as a way of 
relegating difference instead of centralising it. While security and resilience can be seen as two distinct 
fields of scholarly investment, the extensive scholarship on resilience thinking draws out two key points 
that resilience shares with the notion of security.  
 
Firstly, both concepts are structured around the broad notion of the threat and critics argue for an even 
broader framework for understanding threat in the two cases. Secondly, there is suspicion both for 
resilience and security that they can be hijacked as a biopolitical excuse for greater control over society 
(Chandler, 2013). The growing literature that has explored what it means to study threat and (in)security 
from the perspective of popular – or ‘vernacular’ – constructions draws from the same broad-based mix 
of ethnographic, emancipatory, cosmopolitan and constructivist perspectives as vernacular resilience 
(Gillespie & O’Loughlin, 2009; Jarvis & Lister, 2013). Their main focus typically revolves around how 
particular individuals and groups articulate their attitudes and understandings. However, these studies 
have been carried out mostly in western contexts and despite foregrounding context as determining value 
in the construction of subjectivities, specific geographical dynamics have not been a central concern. 
Furthermore, the “vernacular” and the “everyday” turns have developed largely in parallel rather than in 
conversation with each other. This leads to several blind spots, even though both turns share a common 
focus on empirical approaches to recover the voices and de-silence the agency of the marginalised 
(Anzaldúa, 1999; Capetillo-ponce, 2006).  
 
Building upon Gloria Anzaldua’s thought about experiences in borderlands, this focus is shaped by what 
Mignolo has conceptualized as “border gnosis”, i.e. sensing and knowing by the virtue of the fact that one 
lives in, and directly experiences, imperial/colonial borderlands (Mignolo, 2000, p. 157). Both empirical 
trajectories (vernacular/everyday) have however established a solid insight that citizens and policymakers 
often differ in their understanding of threat images and (in)security. Beyond this insight, if we politicise 
the foundations of border space while connecting and building on the respective insights from both the 
“everyday” (Kolossov & Scott, 2013) and the “vernacular” (Bubandt, 2005) turns in critical security 
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studies, it becomes apparent that popular constructions, experiences and stories of (in)security have the 
potential to not only draw over the epistemic “abyssal line”, but also to disrupt ‘official’ accounts of 
security. This joins similar calls in the field of resilience, that have put forward the argument that 
anticipatory value-judgment on resilience cannot be epistemologically justifiable as resilience 
must be “context-informed” (Bourbeau, 2013, p. 11). In the same vein, Corry fustigates the 
critical literature for confining resilience to the sole neoliberal paradigm, not least because of 
the inconsistency of this framing as compared to resilience’s own purported philosophical 
origins and complexity, but also for insufficient “empirical examination” that positively and 
systematically links resilience to neoliberal practice(2014, p. 271). Most importantly, “many 
current debates about the nature of resilience dislocate it from the everyday practices of 
communities” (Ryan, 2015, p. 299). Allowing empirical examination of resilient practices of 
across African borders will therefore also speak to the theorisation of threat in the same space.  
 
In conclusion, this modest exploration of the literature pertaining to borders in Africa and 
people-centred approaches to security has pulled together theoretical connections that bring to 
light knowledge gaps in the historiographical analysis of African borders, the performative 
dynamics of the border space, and the significance of the vernacular in the context of the border 
locales.  Despite addressing core issues that otherwise conflate in the topic of security in Africa 
borders, criticisms of dominant models and conceptual challenges to the place of space leave 
a knowledge gap, which underscores the crucial importance of context to theory, once again. 
That is the basis of my methodological approach which involves “walking backwards” from 
existing theories to the field where “lived experiences” will provide fresh material for 














3 Chapter 3 - Methods and Methodology 
 
This chapter’s first section is a reflection on the project’s overall research ethos. After 
introducing the research philosophy that underpins this project, I will in turn examine research 
contributions, and their potential impact.  The chapter starts with an overview of the literature 
that has shaped the current research ethos rooted in postcolonial critique. The second section 
of the chapter looks at the methodological implications of this theoretical framework and 
therefore discusses the methods used for data collection. The third and last part of this chapter 
introduces the research sites in more detail and focus. 
 
3.1 A Postcolonial Vernacular Narrative Methodology 
 
 Research ethos  
 
Postcolonial critique as a way of looking at knowledge differently refers to the principles of 
self-determination for people whose societies and spaces have been altered by various 
processes and discourses of colonisation. Robbie Shilliam describes the effects of these 
processes and discourse as “a cutting logic that seeks to – but on the whole never quite manages 
to – segregate peoples from their lands, their pasts, their ancestors and spirits” (2015, p. 13).  
And it is exactly because coloniality “on the whole never quite manages” to succeed in 
silencing the colonised, that their experiences and knowledges are still an epistemic treasure 
trove. State borders in Africa are palpable vestiges of colonial rule, and their analysis in many 
ways can equate an assessment of how colonialism persist in its afterlives. The 
Decolonial/Postcolonial ethos conflates both an epistemological project that counters the 
continued effects of colonialism (Shilliam, 2015), and a methodology/research strategy that 
consists in desilencing or demythologising (Rutazibwa, 2018; Sabaratnam, 2011). The 
methodology and methods used in the conduct of this PhD research project seek to foreground 
the vernacular of borderlanders through a narrative approach deployed in the postcolonial 
context of borders in Africa. Theoretically, this stems from the implications of the decolonising 
literature, and especially the need to desilence/demythologise the agency of colonised people 
as articulated by authors focusing on  Decoloniality and Postcolonial Critique such as Olivia 




This body of literature echoes Ngugi Wa Thiong'o's 1986 "Decolonizing the Mind” and builds 
on the thesis advanced by pioneering Postcolonial critiques like Saïd (1978), namely that 
colonialism did more than impose territorial control and plunder resources. This literature looks 
at the continued impact of colonialism on the mental universe of the colonised, long after 
independence was gained. In the area of knowledge production, Tuhiwai Smith argues that 
colonialism is far from being a "finished business”, by assessing its impact on research.  Her 
work proposes a “new Indigenous Research Agenda” which aims to replace Western-centric  
academic methods(1999).  A scholarship has emerged which explores the epistemological 
implications of foregrounding vernacular experiences and practices as sites of knowledge that 
would otherwise be discarded, diminished or simply dismissed(Grosfoguel, 2013; Mignolo, 
2011; Santos, 2014). This highlights a critical knowledge gap created by the silencing of 
(formerly) colonised people, and this thesis draws its ethos mainly from to need to provide 
empirical illustration to desilincing/umuting colonised voices.  
 
For an understanding of African borders and related issues, a postcolonial methodology also 
responds to the call by many scholars to depart from the liberal peace paradigm that has shaped 
African national borders inherited largely Utis possidetis Jurisၕ from European colonisation. 
One of these reasons being that the objectives of  “liberal peace-building are insensitive to local 
contexts [and] disempowers [sic] local communities” whose varying geographical locations 
falsify this one-size-fits-all normative approach (Selby, 2013, p. 58). This caution echoes calls 
for a counter theoretical narrative completely disentangled, or in Mignolo’s terms, “delinked” 
from the western-centric paradigm (Mignolo, 2007). A research on the representations of 
border communities should therefore be aware of the potential re-appropriation and/or 
reproduction of such dominant narratives of the border not only in terms of knowledge 
production, but also in the ways in which border communities may convey their 
representations. Moving away from the colonial prism has consequently enabled an emphasis 
on micro-sociological analyses of concrete human experience in postcolonial border spaces as 
shaped by vernacular agency rather than by colonial enterprise and its legacy reflected in state-
based conceptualisations of the border.  
 
This postcolonial critical assessment of the border cannot prosper without being mindful of the 
various forms in which coloniality persists. The postcolonial assessment of the African border 
also means in the first instance acknowledging it as a legacy of colonialism connected the 
spatial rhetoric of global politics. In the second instance, the national level is a reification of 
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borders as nation-building instruments. At the local level finally, borderlanders are thus 
subjected to this triple convergence of dominant and silencing dynamics. This 
acknowledgement goes hand in hand with recognising its implications for the knowledge 
produced about borders. Particularly, postcolonial theorists such as Dipesh Chakrabarty, 
suggest expanding the RENEW14 model and therefore advocate the provincialising 
Westphalian conceptualisations of space as a relative form of knowledge in order to discontinue 
its colonisation of African spatiality (Chakrabarty, 2000). There is a clear need to avoid the 
beaten tracks of theoretical criticisms while departing from Eurocentric conceptualisations of 
African space, and from state-centred categorisation of border dynamics. One way of doing 
this is to create a conceptual space that divests the notion of border from its Westphalian spatial 
conceptualisations before tracing how the post-colonial African border can be re-thought 
within this framework as an analytical category. Studying border communities beyond the 
matrix of colonial power has enabled me for instance to operationalise fluid categories such as 
“border deniers” and “border acknowledgers”, or novel concepts such as “biplacement” and 
“a-statal actorness”. This also enables us to see borderlanders as subjects rather than objects of 
knowledge.  
 
Following on from this, the methodology of this study consists of three pillars. Firstly, the Critical Border 
Studies (CBS) approach, as formalised by Parker and Vaughan-Williams (2012). CBS aims at 
‘decentring’ the border, i.e. moving it away from research pathways centred around state-based 
conceptualisations of the border seen as ‘the line’. CBS thus lays emphasis on how alternative lenses on 
borderlands can shed more light on the border as a site of investigation (‘line in the sand’). Secondly, this 
rather theoretical-political abstraction of the border problematisation is put in conversation with 
ethnographic and critical approaches in human geography and security studies. As a direct result of the 
focus on the experiences of people, the narrative approach that presided over data collection with a 
prioritisation of life stories, is also reflected in the analysis thereof.  Hence, the narrative approach also 
enables CBS lenses to directly explore the lived experiences of borderlanders (Merje Kuus, 2007; 
Megoran, 2006). The third and certainly the most important pillar of this thesis’ methodology subscribes 
to a desilencing ethos building on postcolonial, decolonial and grounded theory approaches (Barkawi & 




14 Rethinking Europe in a non-European World 
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knowledges and epistemic justice.  As ultimately applied to the topics of security and resilience in 
the postcolonial border context, this overall methodological approach seeks to divest the border of the 
legacy of colonialism as a dominant paradigm, in order to “unmute” the voices of borderlanders speaking 
to the continued domination as intermediated via the postcolonial nation-state.  
 
This postcolonial methodological engagement with the state border in Africa draws upon the critiques of 
postcolonial politics both in terms of its historical processes and present-day struggles confronting the 
legacies of colonialism (O. U. Rutazibwa & Shilliam, 2019, pp. 1–7). Borders inherited from colonial 
mapping of Africa are not just legacies of colonialism. In the post-colonial era, they continue to mediate 
the instrumentalities of the nation-state within the same colonial paradigm, especially as far as border 
communities are concerned. The postcolonial ethos is therefore an awareness of these multifaceted 
legacies of colonialism, and the extent to which they continue to dominate mainstream imaginings of the 
African territorial space (Parasram & Tilley, 2019).  The methodological objectives set out by these 
three pillars are achieved in this project through underscoring the importance of centralising the 
vernacular of those silenced by the colonial process and using this to re-engage context to situated theory. 
By emphasising the significance of vernacular narratives to empirical enquiry about insecurity and threats, 
such an approach momentarily disables the post-colonial state paradigm by avoiding the latter’s stifling 
effect for borderlanders’ voices.  
 
In this sense, this methodological approach also echoes other scholarly philosophies rooted in desilencing 
vernacular knowledges, such as CIRM (Critical Indigenous Research Methodologies). CIRM criticise the 
disregard of Indigenous15 knowledges and Indigenous peoples’ own research methods (Smith, 2012). In 
the same vein and given that the context of study is two border locales in central Africa, this non-
Eurocentric methodological stance fits very well within the CODESIRA’s objectives16. Like many non-
Eurocentric approaches, CODESIRA advocates the appropriation by African researchers of the 
ideologies developed by the proponents of epistemological and methodological deconstruction, 




15 ‘Indigenous’ (capital I) denotes the native peoples of colonised lands, such as Aboriginal Australians or Inuit 
Alaskans, while ‘indigenous’ denotes the native peoples of non-colonised lands. CIRM tends to focus more on 
lands which have becoming settlers’ colonies. I take the view that epistemic subjugation does not necessarily 
require the (continued) physical presence of the colonisers (former). Knowledge production is more insidious in 
its abstract nature. 
16 The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (https://www.codesria.org/). 
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significance of the “vernacular” and the narrative approach here is the embedded notion that current 
bottom-up understandings of the conditions and daily experiences of ordinary people almost always tend 
to speak for these people, rather than to them, or even with them. With the specific normative commitment 
to avoid speaking for people, CIRM is rooted in relationships, responsibility, respect, reciprocity, and 
accountability. Most importantly, it offers a potentially useful corrective to the paternalising tendency of 
other people-based approaches, by emphasising the direct “speak” of traditionally silenced individuals, 
such as border communities. 
 
In its endeavour to recover a space of meaning for communities that are marginalised or silenced, this 
methodology also shares common features with many other approaches such as PRA ( Participatory Rural 
Appraisal), that aims to bring about a "reversal of learning" in order to learn from rural people directly 
(Chambers, 1981). Equally, CBS requires us to look at the border in terms of diverse bordering practices 
and to analyse bordering practices through the lens of the performance which produces and reproduces 
them (Parker & Vaughan-Williams, 2012, p. 729). However, while Chambers’ approach in “putting the 
last first” (1983, p. 8) successfully foregrounds the validity of non-western vernaculars, it differs from this 
thesis’ approach in at least two ways. Firstly, the rural context in the PRA approach limits its application 
to the specific set-up of rurality while this combined approach focuses more on borders as geographical 
units. While some border locations can be found in rural areas, intense border dynamics are mediated 
through the urban border locales. Secondly, vernacular knowledge in PRA is a means to an end, i.e. 
solving specific development problems, while the approach of this thesis takes rather seeks to establish 
coherent and concise meaning of border based on vernacular understanding. It is, to some extent, a 
difference between sense-making and problem-solving.  With regards to performance and bordering 
practices as laid out in the CBS approach, this project has made the choice to focus principally on 
the border communities’ side of this dual performativity that results from the encounter between the state 
dimension and the vernacular production of the border. This heuristic approach nevertheless presents 
limits in terms of claiming to an exhaustive examination of the border world when the state dimension is 
discarded or minimised. However, the dominance of the state narrative as regards borders leaves space 
for such a disproportionate consideration. As such, the experiences, practices and sense-making as 
expressed by borderlanders is our entry point into the border as site of knowledge. In this understanding, 
the border is both a territorial space that creates multiple imaginaries and a thematic area capable of 
generating meaning and knowledge necessary to unveil the social world of border communities. 
 
Once this ideological clarification has been made, the only challenge remaining is how to actually unveil 
the social world of border communities without re-writing their stories in preconceived terms. Researchers 
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such as Torill Moen believe that the narrative as a unit of analysis provides the means for doing this. In 
other words, the narrative approach can solve the problem faced by the researcher who is seeking “to 
examine and understand how human actions are related to the social context in which they occur and how 
and where they occur” (Moen, 2006, p. 56). Theoretical explorations of the postcolonial African 
borders show that politically constructed narratives of the border are only the product of 
geographical devices rather than a reflection of a societal reality. As this project’s fieldwork 
has found out, the societal reality itself is often much more complex, especially when we look 
at how borderlanders make sense of their specific geographical environment. Hence the 
narrative approach consists in letting the stories of borderlanders speak for themselves, rather than 
using the data collected as a pretext to talk about border communities through the works of other authors. 
It is a more holistic movement across project design, implementation, and rendering.  
 
For instance, the design of my questionnaire guide provided spaces for digression or side-tracking by the 
interviewees. In the same vein, the data collected have been “narrativised”, to use Czarniawska’s terms 
(2004, p. 55). As a reflection of this narrativization in the writing of my thesis, certain terms, such as 
Bayam Salam or Border Girl, which could have been italicised are instead written in proper noun forms 
with capital letters. This is a recognition of the centrality claimed for the borderlander’s narrative. Too 
often, claims about the necessity to respect vernacular forms of knowledge are undermined by the very 
articulation of these claims itself, through apparently insignificant biases such as italicising signifiers that 
are otherwise central to this vernacular discourse. Thus, marginalisation is again produced as part of 
criticising it. In the same vein, foregrounding vernacular narratives has meant that rendering the 
narratives of borderlanders features numerous verbatim excerpts of semi-structured interviews, 
instead of lengthy analysis thereof. This is a logical development of the commitment to 
prioritise and give due respect to vernacular knowledges. In so doing, this PhD project 
contributes to knowledge both empirically and theoretically.  
 
 Research Contributions 
 
The project contributes to the literature on how to conceptualise African space and engage situated actors 
by centring the vernacular beyond binary connotations of the state-based paradigm. Proposing novel 
concepts such as “biplacement” and “a-statal actorness” creates an encompassing framework that 
articulates vernacular sense-making within the border as a site of knowledge, widening the scope security 
and resilience. The narrative approach used in the rendering of the data collected allows the 
72 
 
foregrounding of practices and sense-making in border communities as valid epistemologies, 
with a focus on border communities as the main producer of knowledge for the understanding 
of borderlands. It does so by firstly looking at a border space beyond the strictures of current 
affairs even as it enquires about common themes of the human “drama” and international 
intervention. This approach operates an epistemological framework that seeks to unmute 
vernacular practices as a form of knowledge that should also count. It challenges the 
conceptualisation of the postcolonial African border as receptacle site of static state power; and 
centres the actions and sense-making of communities as the dynamics that actually constitutes 
the border in terms of its performativity and knowledge base. The project also contributes to the 
ethnographies of borders globally, and more particularly to the Africanist scholarship that examines the 
relationship between the continuous processes of state formation and their embeddedness in the dynamics 
of relationship between society and the state. To enrich this line of thinking, it seeks to offer an 
interdisciplinary contribution to the literature on non-statist, and other alternative conceptions of 
territoriality and security. It ultimately tests the impact of such conceptions on policy and scholarly 
questions through its examination of vernacular understandings of resilience and security practices. Apart 
from addressing a specific audience, this project makes three key contributions: methodological, 
empirical, and theoretical.  
 
In its empirical design, this study focuses on an area not determined by knowledge production 
about the border-security nexus. The chosen border locales are not often in the spotlight, as 
these are outside seemingly acute security situation. In so doing, I study security and resilience 
in fieldwork sites that escape the grip of the usual geographies of vulnerability and the tyranny 
of current affairs. This contributes to diversify data sources for investigations pertaining to 
borders. Furthermore, this project helps address the scarcity of material focusing on the sense-
making and practices of borders communities, through its multi-sited data collection process. 
The type of empirical data collected in the  chosen border areas as part of this research and the methods 
used substantially broaden the empirical foci of case studies in Africa, thanks to the interplay between 
different transnational social spheres and other (aspects of) security actors that have hitherto escaped the 
gaze of traditional empirical studies involving non-state actors of security in Africa.  
 
This project makes a theoretical contribution by adding to the literature on critical security, critical border 
studies, and the spatial turn in African border scholarship especially by refreshing the implications of 
essentialising African borderlands in knowledge production, both at theoretical and policy levels. This 
research thus provides a much-needed example of how new theoretical perspectives or conceptual 
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insights into knowledge production can improve border security thinking.  The patterns emerging from 
observing practices and sense-making within border communities provide a basis for questioning existing 
theoretical assumptions about transnational practices in the postcolonial context and for establishing a 
theoretical junction between African border specificity and the push in the scholarship to centralise 
territorial space as a conceptual tool in understanding world affairs. By conceptualising and foregrounding 
the borderlander as an agent in control of their milieu, this research endeavours to de-silence the agency 
of border communities because their plight speaks to a larger intellectual concern today. This concern is 
focused on African epistemic freedom, that not only constitutes the precondition for the economic and 
political liberation of Africa, but also one that can contribute effectively to addressing problems faced by 
the world by engaging the right audience.   
 
 Audience and Potential Impact 
 
Its relevance extends beyond central Africa to provide transferable research avenues or policy 
improvement opportunities for other border locales of postcolonial character. This project will be of 
interest to researchers with critical approaches in the fields of African borders, security and geography. 
Furthermore, border communities who are frequently misunderstood, overlooked or simply inadvertently 
silenced by humanitarian workers, national governments and global policy makers will benefit from 
having their voices mediated through epistemological discussions in academic enquiries and policy 
practices. Combined with practical insights into security and resilience practices by borderlands 
themselves, the rendering of vernacular narratives and the restitution of their experiences are an 
opportunity to contribute to meaningful discussions about the value of vernacular systems of knowledges 
and how precisely they can help deepen our thinking about resilience and security. Even though this 
project does not make direct policy recommendations, the epistemological stance it reinforces speaks 
directly to humanitarian aid workers or development professionals. They can improve on workable ideas 
based on this postcolonial understanding of border communities and design better participatory methods 
for their people-oriented project implementation. Hence, this project indirectly contributes to platforms 
that value vernacular knowledges to improve humanitarian thinking. National governments in of 
postcolonial nation-states may also benefit on behalf of border communities where in the context of 
resource scarcity, clarified priorities and appropriate perspectives stand to produce more effective support 
for resilience, which in turn can yield more positive impact when addressing economic, social and 
environmental problems arising across border spaces. The next chapter of this thesis will now turn to the 





Following a presentation of the border locales and a reflection on fieldwork implementation, 
this second section explores the methods used for data collection methods. I will accordingly 
address desk research, ethnographic observation, and interviews in this section.  
 
 Desk research 
 
Desk research allowed me to access both primary and secondary data. In the first stage, an 
initial review of the literature and general desk research produced background information 
about the fieldwork locales; an overview of relevant policy issues, theoretical gaps, and 
empirical challenges for knowledge production about borders. The secondary sources of data 
collection were mainly literature-based. These multiple sources of information have enabled 
me to reflect deeper on the data collected from the field. I formally requested and obtained full 
access to the online archives of the Basel Mission based in Germany. I spent a great deal of 
time on these online archives, studying colonial maps of Cameroon, Nigeria, Gabon and Gabon 
for material on the early colonial period of Germany in South West Africa. Bearing in mind 
that I ultimately sought to explore how the sense-making and practices of border communities 
articulated with common themes of human concerns such as security and resilience pursued 
through various intervention policies, I also collected 'grey literature’ on security and resilience 
targeting border areas in Africa generally, as a secondary source of data. I have not come across 
any specific security and resilience literature for these specific border areas. Reasons for this 
could be that they are not considered sites of disaster or post-conflict intervention. Also, these 
sites were not chosen based on a specific security agenda, either nationally or internationally.  
 
Throughout, between, and following field work from 2017 to 2018, I collected a substantial 
amount of material from online sources covering those border areas or neighbouring locations. 
Sources include social media feeds and news items largely but not exclusively published 
online. From September 2016, I kept a specific archive of news items relating to the 
Anglophone protest, morphed into a developing separatist movement in Cameroon, as it 
concerns one of the two areas where I had completed my fieldwork. After fieldwork, I 
categorised all news media sources according to the topics emerging from fieldwork events I 
was following up on. This extensive desk research also focused on relevant theories, border 
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historiographies and policies targeting these geographical areas. Within policies, I have focused 
exclusively on security and resilience policies relevant to African borders in general. While 
country specific information was gathered mainly through desk research, physical presence in 
fieldwork sites also enabled access to primary sources not available on the internet (local 
newspapers, unconnected libraries, human sources, cultural artefacts, etc.). Secondary data 
materials were sourced from libraries in the United Kingdom, mainly from the University of 
Portsmouth library both on campus and using its online facilities which connect to hundreds of 
databases such as EBSCO. I also consulted works on African borders and security at the 
University library in Yaoundé, Cameroon. I attended workshops relating to resilience and 
security in France and in Germany. Content analysis of newspaper articles, especially on 
contemporary border issues, also provided useful data for the research. Inter-governmental, 
non-governmental and governmental policy documents, especially those of their agencies 
involved in border issues, were also consulted. Desk research data on each country and its 
border area was complemented and cross-referenced with ethnographic observation data, as 
well as data obtained from semi-structured interviews conducted as follows.  
 
 Ethnographic Observation 
 
The use of ethnographic participant observation has been tested as a successful method for 
empirical engagement of border communities (Megoran, 2006, p. 623; Rogerson & 
Mushawemhuka, 2015). The multi-sited ethnographic observation method is most useful for 
this study because it is a “spatialisable”  method, which allows for the tracing of observed 
social phenomena over different locations, realms (vernacular, statal, international), and time 
periods (pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial). It also helps highlight the status-quo ante, 
the evolution of border dynamics from a statist standpoint, and the construction of the same 
border through the action(s) of border communities. However, I have added semi-structured 
interviews to ethnographic observation, so as to be able to answer the “how” and “why” 
questions about border communities, in addition to the questions relating to the “what” and the 
“where”, which obviously the interview method alone cannot adequately tackle. Ethnographic 
observation enables a close study of the physical environment and human interactions within 
it. Apart from allowing me to gain deeper insights into the border context, ethnographic 
observation enabled me to identify potential respondents, pre-screen them, and finally select 




I conceived of ethnographic observation as being as much a phenomenological task as it is a self-
centred introspection through the gaze of the object of inquiry. Ethnographic observation for this 
project required extensive travel, back and forth across the international land borders and their 
geographical vicinities, affording me the invaluable opportunity of observing while 
participating in various activities such as helping a transporter, assisting a tradesman or helping 
out in a church. My visits to various border locations were planned most of the time to follow 
up on the events and people I had encountered a few days or a week earlier. I would reverse 
the fieldwork location of my main base to alternate equally between the two sides of each 
border locale. Apart from shadowing specific individuals as arranged, I sometimes chose to 
cross the border on my own for various purposes like shopping, attending a party, church 
service, and other routine activities that are important aspects of daily life (in the borderland). 
This allowed me to reflect on the process of cross-border mobility as it happened. Based on 
preliminary findings, I quickly realised that it would be problematic for me to limit my concept 
of the place of ethnographic inquiry along the lines of state demarcation or the main border 
towns. Physical access to official state demarcation markers would have necessitated a much 
longer time spent in the field with very little ethnographic data as most of these geographical 
locations were uninhabited by humans. Sometimes they were located in swampy basins or deep 
inside the forest, when they had not been tampered with by local communities.  
 
Instead, I decided to increase my participation in crossing the border with borderland residents, 
travellers, and transporters. On several occasions, I accompanied people on daytrips across the 
Gabon-Cameroon border, including once to the Guinean town of Ebebeyin, with an equal 
number of journeys in the reverse direction. I had done the same at the Cameroon-Nigeria 
border a few months earlier. These crossings allowed me to not only observe how people 
navigate the borderland and negotiate their way across the state border. They also did require 
me to submit to the demands of the borders in order to obtain daily border passes, sometimes 
just verbally or even in the form of a nod from an immigration officer. Crossing the borders 
alongside people who could share their “live” feelings about the whole process in real-time 
was always an excellent opportunity to not only directly observe how regulation of movement 
across borders attempts to control borderlanders, but also how they instantly react as a-statal 
actorness (more on this in Chapter 4). These periods of field work allowed me to make and 
maintain contact with borderland residents and travellers in both border areas. I made notes of 
all field observations and kept a detailed diary of these field notes throughout all phases of 
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fieldwork. I also made notes of casual conversations with people as I travelled across the border 
areas, but also around other parts of Nigeria or Gabon as I travelled to/from the border locales. 
Some of these conversations were recorded with the permission of my interlocutors. In addition 
to observing and talking to people, my data came from sources as different and as varied as 
historical analysis, archival search, and policy analysis.  
 
 Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
Semi-structured interviews consisted in using some 80 questions17 to guide a sustained 
conversation with 32 individuals (I however retained only 16 interviews for deep analysis, out 
of which 8 are built in the frame of the narrative restitution). Just as the research sites were 
carefully selected for the reasons explained earlier, participants in semi-structured interviews 
were selected based on their potential to provide rich data on how borderlanders make sense of 
their condition as people living around, or using the border. My focus in the interviews was to 
generate data about the experiences and thinking of ordinary borderlanders. As such, I did not 
interview any high-level immigration officials and even the casual conversations I had with 
lower-ranking immigration and security officials were limited to administrative necessities that 
had brought us together or exceptionally, small talk. I did not ask them questions about 
professional aspects of their work and/or government policy. This was not my objective. I had 
obtained my data about policies from desk research. However, my interviews with border 
residents, tradespeople, travellers, and transporters focused mainly on how their own life 
histories and personal horizons extended across the border. In the process, I was able to interact 
with people as they dealt with customs and immigration officials, and when they talked about 
smuggling activities and techniques of outmanoeuvring state agencies. I spent a lot of time 
with different types of travellers and transporters, but I also spent a significant amount of time 
with ordinary borderland dwellers especially Yomi and Eudes whose imaginations of self and 
space represented a divergence from other borderlanders bent on performing their mobility 





17 See Appendix for interview guide 
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Apart from merely observing, casual conversations and spontaneous questions afforded me a 
deeper understanding of perception and representations of borderlanders. As such, a non-
negligible component of the fieldwork can be said to rely on these spontaneous interactions 
which probed my interlocutors to cover various topics ranging from inherited oral history of 
precolonial rule, to security and contemporary challenges they face to maintain their 
livelihoods. It is worth stating here that the interest in their take on these various topics was 
less the accuracy of their restitution than their lived experiences and the meanings they assign 
to these experiences. For example, my observation of songs and folklores woven into various 
cultural and religious practices gave me an insight not only into the past of these communities 
but also into how they perceptively relate to the physical world around them.  
 
The conduct of the semi-structured interviews was undergirded by a line of inquiry structured 
around the key characteristics of open-ended questioning, personable approach and openness 
to non-linearity as well as digressions. At the Cameroon-Nigeria border, random conversations 
and semi-structured interviews were carried out in Pidgin English and English. There were a 
few instances of French, especially in random conversation with travellers. Every single person 
encountered was fluent in Pidgin English and English, in addition to at least one other language. 
Hence, I must make it clear that some quotations from the interviews are actually English 
versions of interactions that took place in Pidgin English, especially at the Nigeria Cameroon 
border.  Others are translations from/via French.. The interviews at the Cameroon-Gabon-
Guinea border were conducted entirely in French. In cases where the local Ntumu or Spanish 
were used, I would request my interlocutor to translate into French, which was done readily as 
all also had at least a decent level of French. The targeted respondents included people I met 
during ethnographic observation, most of whom had participated in casual conversations or 
had been recommended by other respondents based on the characteristics I had communicated 
during random conversations. 
 
The respondents who participated in semi-structured interviews were also selected on the basis 
of accessibility, availability and demographic suitability. One of the high points of the 
fieldwork was the focus group interview at the Gabon-Cameroon-Border, as it allowed the 
participants to also question one another about their contested identities, and their relationship 
to the border space. As far as I could tell, this laid bare what I will come to conceptualise as 
their a-statal actorness. Because this was primarily intended to generate qualitative data rather 
than quantitative statistics, I did not ask respondents too many identifying details. However, I 
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endeavoured to achieve a gender balance among the respondents (at almost 50/50 
male/female). I made a particular effort to hear from younger respondents under the age 20, 
but only managed to sit one down for a semi-structured interview.  
 
Table 1 - Demographic distribution of respondents used in deep analysis 
Age Frequency Sex - Male Sex - Female 
 70 + 2 2 0 
60-69 2 1 1 
40-49 3 2 1 
30-39 5 3 2 
20-29 4 2 2 
- 20 1 0 1 
Total 16 9 7 
 
List of main concepts and themes covered during interviews:   
 
 Biographical disruptions  
 (In)security in borderlanders’ own terms (language) 
 Fears and threats in the border area 
 (In)dependence from state (infra)structures 
 Identity and individual relationship to border space 
 Shared practice of mobility, security, and negotiation 
 Overlap between common state policy aims and vernacular aims 
 Power dynamics across the borderland 
 Spaces within the border space 
 Social networking across border  
 
In order to facilitate thematic and geographical references during semi-structured interviews, I 
had printed medium-scale maps of the border area which I would invite respondents to refer to 
if needed. Many were able to show me the general area of their places of work, residence or 
education, and most importantly, I was able to geographically pinpoint specific areas for certain 
recurrent themes such as cattle theft, ritual violence, ethnic tension, transport conditions, 
commercial products, markets, and the seasonal environmental changes that affected 
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livelihoods. It is worth mentioning here, before developing later, that I also noticed on the 
printed maps that almost all respondents had a bi-locational relation to the border area, meaning 
that they were either having residence on either side of the border, or living on one side and 
working on the other side, etc. Secondly, the level of genealogical entanglement was such that 
virtually most residents knew or were related to one another. When dealing with the topic of 
local history, I used some pictures in history books found locally to start conversations about 
their personal life. I also asked questions about cultural events, common linguistic references, 
religious beliefs, and cultural expressions such as songs. I did not pay for the interviews but 
offered refreshment and organised transportation for some of the interviewees. 
   
Table 2 - Emerging themes 
 
The fact that I was sometimes transcribing rather than recording proved more time-consuming 
and sometimes lacked fluidity and the desired spontaneity. I have also considered my own 
positionality and subjectivity as a researcher in taking these interview notes and analysing the 
ways in which my questions were framed. Even though preliminary research had suggested 
general lines of inquiry that guided my semi-structured interview questionnaire, I made the 
choice not to limit myself with a pre-coding system as is in fact recommended when conducting 
qualitative research. Once all the data was collected, transcribed and organised, I then 
developed a method of thematic identification and labelling that is bespoke for this specific 
Themes    Contents    
Identity    Nationality, ethnic group, clan, language, residency, family, etc 
purpose of presence    Work, family, travel  
Degree of Attachment  Low, high, medium 
Social capital    Ancestry, knowledge, languages, connections    
Political structure Traditional authority, social associations, state authorities 
Values  Religious, traditional, official, moral 
Socio-professional category Traveller, go-between, transporter, farmer, etc  
Security / resilience  Types of insecurity, quest for peace, official narrative, personal 
narrative, fears, anxieties, threats, responses   




research project. I used Nvivo, a data analysis software, to help organise the labelling process, 
code data to specific themes and establish necessary links with the rest of the project (literature, 
policy analysis, and archival research). As an essential first step-in managing the analytical 
process of the data collected in the field, I brought together those elements of the data corpus 
that I conceived of as sharing some perceived commonality. This step prepared the transcripts 
for more in-depth analysis. I then indexed them and linked via Nvivo to relevant topics in the 
literature or policy. This preliminary codification enabled me to reduce the transcripts and field 
notes to a manageable level, with the purpose of achieving a simple conceptual schema. 
Additionally, this thematic analysis also enabled me to open the data and think beyond the data 
through the overall project’s philosophical ethos as articulated in third section this chapter as 
below.  
 
3.3 Border Locales 
 
 




Map  2- The two distinct border locales - Source: Built in QGIS  
 
Map  3  - The Border Locales - Source: Built in QGIS 
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As reflected in the topographical representation of the border areas studied (Map  2), both sites 
are located at the heart of the forest region of Central Africa, within which border towns are 
separated from one another in their respective countries by a large river with deep banks in 
many places. Both border locales are situated in the southern part of Cameroon, bordering 
Gabon and Equatorial Guinea on the South on the one hand, and bordering Nigeria on 
Cameroon’s South West on the other hand (see maps above). The border town is where the 
essence, meaning and value of the border performativity can best be manufactured through the 
actions and expressed perceptions of borderlanders. In prioritising the prevalence of towns or 
cities as pivotal points, cross-border dynamics across border space become more accessible for 
analysis.  In the case of these two border locales, the structure of cross border dynamics 
represents a pattern of “twinned" towns across the border acting as warehouses, and clusters of 
towns on the main corridor of passage across the border (see clusters as represented by dots on 
Map 3 above).  
 
 Fieldwork implementation, challenges and positionality 
 
This project’s fieldwork collected contemporaneous empirical data on security and resilience 
in order to contribute to a theorisation of African borders based on a differing epistemological 
approach. My aim for this thesis has been to explore what more state-society relations and 
everyday life in the territorial margins of two African borderlands can tell us about sense-
making and practices related to security and resilience. The empirical material used in the thesis 
was therefore mostly collected during fieldwork conducted between January 2017 and January 
2018 in two different international border locales in Africa, precisely across the southern border 
between Nigeria and Cameroon (Ikom-Ejumodjock); and across the three-part border area 
joining Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon (Kye Ossie - Bitam). I completed the first leg 
of the fieldwork in Nigeria-Cameroon from January to April 2017. The second leg was carried 
out in the Cameroon-Gabon-Guinea three-part border area between October 2017 and January 
2018. I spent three months in each of the border locales thus described to collect data for this 
study. These research contacts add to two shorter visits to each of the border locales prior to 
starting the PhD project at the University of Portsmouth.  
 
During the total of six months of data collection, my stay involved a great deal of travel back 
and forth across the borders. The fieldwork itself mainly involved the use of two qualitative 
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research methods: ethnographic observation and semi-structured interviews of respondents. I 
stayed in touch with many contacts in these areas and continued conversations with them to 
refine data collection, even when I was no longer in the country. Having often travelled to all 
the above countries in the past prior to undertaking the PhD programme, a good degree of 
experience with local customs, including knowledge of pidgin English, has been an asset. 
Research tools I used included a diary, a brief written presentation of my project, which I would 
read out to potential respondents, my interview guide, and a voice recorder.  At the end of each 
series of interviews in a border area, a focus group discussion (FGD) was employed to take 
advantage of a group discussion in relation to emerging themes in previous interviews. 
Ethnographic observation included first-hand experience in the borderland, border crossing 
dynamics, negotiation strategies and social interactions around the border. 
 
The study followed main travel routes across borders in these two locales, with ethnographic 
observations, semi-structured interviews involving 16 members from the two separate border 
communities, as well as informal discussions conducted with transporters, traders and other 
cross-border actors/“facilitators”. Casual conversations during ethnographic observation were 
carried out with randomly chosen individuals, whom I call “informants” (as opposed to 
respondents), because although the conversations with such people did inform my ethnographic 
observation, the exchanges were spontaneous, unstructured and usually not recorded, and their 
“traces” on the final data cannot be systematised. Efforts were also made to achieve the best 
demographic mix possible under the circumstances. Ethnographic observation consisted in 
taking several trips between the borders and main border towns as well as other adjacent 
villages, observing and asking questions. I also visited a few churches, attended social 
gatherings and various group meetings, and followed discussions and issues pertaining to 
tradesmen and transporters’ associations.   
 
For my trips along the main border roads in Nigeria, I agreed with a “bus preacher” to shadow 
him and observe his interactions with the community. In Gabon, I spent most of my travel time 
with the same cross-border driver who would also carry other passengers. My overall fieldwork 
inquiry essentially sought to understand the perceptions of how living in such transnational 
space plays out or affects/shapes lives. I applied for and was granted research authorisations 
from the Cameroonian, Gabonese and Nigerian authorities during all phases of fieldwork.  
Even though these authorisations legally covered my activities, I was still faced with a lot of 
questioning by local security personnel in all the three countries.  Conducting fieldwork across 
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these specific border areas forced me into the position of identifying as a borderlander myself, 
as I faced the challenges of currency disparity across the Cameroon-Nigeria border for instance, 
and harassment by some customs officials, and the daily hardships of transport in a neglected 
peripheral region.  However, by so doing, I was able to deeply gauge how these border 
communities draw boundaries around themselves, create new spaces within the border space 
and how they situate themselves in relation to the border. I succeeded in following people and the 
issues they were pursuing as part of their daily lives across the international border in the two locations.  
 
As a Cameroonian national who was born and raised in the culture widely shared across the 
fieldwork sites, I felt that my cultural awareness constituted an entry point into the realms of 
perception and representation of these border communities. Additionally, as I speak English, 
Pidgin English and French, I also felt that my language skills would afford me the opportunity 
of receiving immediate responses from respondents and having deeper conversations, follow-
up or probing questions, which would not be possible with the questionnaire only. Repeating the 
same data collection methods in two different settings; refining my observations and cross-examining 
information from the two border spaces allowed me to question and reflect critically on my own 
assumptions as an African imbued with “natural” knowledge of the area. Furthermore, the reluctance and 
questioning of some ordinary people in the field who challenged my credentials, or openly doubted my 
ability to comprehend their world despite seeing the documents (for my credentials) and the obviousness 
of my African identity led me to assess the objective distance that laid between me and my object of 




Map  4 - Comparison of border sites - Source: Built in QGIS 
That distance also spoke to me in paradoxical terms of the “abyssal line”, the real cognitive frontier 
between what is usually considered knowledge of the border, and the social worlds of border communities 
who only let in those to whom these worlds are of any genuine use. Given this paradox between my 
obvious Africanness (born and raised in Cameroon), and the suspicion that hovered around my 
interactions with borderlanders, this fieldwork also brought to light the tension that lies between my 
African experiences and my scholarly socialisation in the Western/Eurocentric academy. I later reflected 
on why my credentials and identity were disputed based on my conversational interactions and 
observations. In fact, in a place where many White tourists travelling by land and crossing the border with 
expensive motorbikes or large 4X4 vehicles was a rather common sight, the “tourist questions” I was 
asking instantly prompted my interlocutors to associate me with the dominant paradigm of white tourism, 
development assistance or multinational entrepreneurship. As I was later told, this association normally 
invites “tourist answers” which are normally tailored to the assumed limited ability of the westerner to 
comprehend certain things African, and based on a general suspicion of a deceptive agenda presented by 
such tourists. Furthermore, withholding or truncating information given in “tourist answers” can 
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potentially generate profits for the locals. Examples of this include giving the wrong exchange rate, 
scamming, or doubling the price of items. On the other hand, the repeated questions to ascertain my 
intentions and the nature of my work also sought to establish whether I am a representative of the state, 
and in which case another type of reluctant treatment would have been given. Questions were repeatedly 
asked about my nationality, the funding I had for the study and the “real” purpose of my study.  All of 
these suspicions contributed to the overall reluctance of interviewees to be recorded.  
 
As regards semi-structured interviews, especially in the Nigeria-Cameroon border area, I was 
faced with constant reluctance about recording on the part of my interviewees. Some 
respondents who had agreed to do the interview eventually changed their mind and decided not 
to go along with the process once I mentioned that I intended to record our conversations. 
Apparently, word quickly spread around concerning my research activities and developed 
uneasiness with many people, owing to the overall national security situation in Nigeria, and 
the then brewing anglophone crisis across the border from Cameroon. Apparently, there had 
recently been a situation where people were recorded talking about various things and these 
recordings were eventually used by the authorities to make several arrests in relation to Boko 
Haram. I found this surprising since these same borderlanders had told me that Boko Haram 
was not a problem in that part of the country, and that they were not worried about it. But the 
explanation they had for me was that Boko Haram has connections and hideouts everywhere 
around the country and abroad, even though they tended to operate in specific locations North 
of Abuja. I was told stories of people now languishing in jail for just having innocently bought 
a second-hand SIM card off someone, and which was later traced to Boko Haram or other 
criminal activities. In the Cameroon-Nigeria border area therefore, those who agreed to go 
through with the semi-structured interviews insisted that they should not be recorded, and I had 
no other choice than agreeing to that. This made the semi-structured interview process more 
difficult as it was more tedious to take notes while listening at the same time after asking 
(follow-up) questions. Nevertheless, I was however able to fully develop the notes taken from 
memory immediately after the interviews. Fortunately, all the semi-structured interviews in the 
Cameroon-Gabon-Guinea three-part border were audio recorded. I also took notes during all 
interviews and, whenever possible, edited and expanded these within maximum 24 hours of 





 The Nigeria-Cameroon Border Locale  
 
 
Picture  6 - Mfum Border Bridge (Nigeria Side)18  
 
Picture  7 -Nigeria Customs Service Office  
Pictures 6&7 above feature the (then) new customs office being built at the Cameroon-Nigeria 
border post in Mfum on the Nigerian side. Cameroon shares the entirety of its western border 
with Nigeria. These 21,000 km-border spans across mountains and desert in the North, dense 
forests in the South, and meets at 21 border points in the ocean. Since colonial times therefore, 
there have always been literally hundreds of official border points between Nigeria and 
Cameroon, ranging on land, sea, and rivers, not accounting for informal or illegal crossing 




18 Unless otherwise specified, I am the author of all pictures used.  
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(the then British) Nigeria and Western Cameroons (then French Cameroon) as from 1955. The 
pre-1961 maritime routes between the coasts of the two countries had been facilitating travels 
and commercial exchanges ever since (Mundemba to Calabar in Nigeria by sea, and between 
Calabar and Ekondo-Titi). That notwithstanding, this study focuses only on the border area 
around Mfum and Ekok, two Nigerian and Cameroonian border towns respectively, which are 
connected by a border bridge over a river.   
 
The suspension bridge (picture 6 above) built in 1948 is the official border crossing point 
connecting Nigeria with Cameroon at the Mfum border station. The customs check points for 
each of the two countries (Cameroon and Nigeria) are located on the edge of the bridge on their 
respective side of the border (See pictures above). Technically, there is not even a tiny stretch 
of ‘no man’s land’ between Nigeria and Cameroon here, as is often the case in other border 
locations, apart from the bridge itself. The one-lane bridge is accessible from the Nigerian side 
only when you have been cleared to enter Cameroon and equally, from the Cameroonian side 
of the border, you would not be allowed onto the bridge unless you have permission to enter 
Nigeria. The Cameroon-Nigeria border at Nfum technically separates the two border towns of 
Ekok (Cameroon) and Ikom (Nigeria), even though a closer observation puts Mfum (instead 
of Ikom) in a twin relationship with Ekok in Cameroon, much the same as the town of Ikom in 





Map  5 - Border Towns - Source: Built from QGIS 
 
Despite the infrastructural disparity between Ikom and Mfum, both border towns are on a par 
when it comes to roads. Apart from the main national roads, including the Bamenda-Enugu 
Road (aka Smuggler Highway) which links both towns, and indeed all the four key towns, all 
other roads branching into neighbouring villages or around town are dirt roads or dilapidated 
tarred roads. Development of state infrastructures on both sides of the border seems to have 
built heavily upon British colonial design and infrastructures, which are still visible across the 
whole border area, especially in the form of administrative buildings. In the Esai community 
for instance, administrative buildings and houses from the British colonial era still exist, even 




Map 6- Cameroon-Nigeria border - Source: Built in QGIS 
 
As shown in map 6 above, the border towns of Mfum in Nigeria and Ekok in Cameroon are 
“twin” towns, only separated by a river. However, the whole border area from Ikom in Nigeria 
all the way to Eyumodjock in Cameroon, including the neighbouring villages on both sides of 
the border, has been inhabited by the Ejagham-speaking people of the Ekoi ethnic group since 
pre-colonial times. There exists amongst all the Ejagham-speaking inhabitants of the border 
area, a similar cultural affiliation in terms of dressing and traditional festivals, despite minor 
idiosyncratic divergences. These changes and minor differences can be labelled the visible 
effects of immigration and/or religion. Christianity now predominates religious life in the area, 
though the practice of traditional religious forms continues on both sides of the border. 
 
 The Ekoi (Ejagham) people, found on either side of this southern Cameroon-Nigeria border 
area, use common dialectical varieties of the same Ekoi language and share the same culture 
expressed through their famous Ekpe headdresses for example. The ancient use of nsibidi 
ideographs (picture) is common to both sides of the border as reflected in their distinctive art 
of sculpture as well as complex forms of social organisation modelled on this art form (Okehie-
Offoha & Sadiku, 1996, pp. 16–32). Regardless of this resemblance in vernacular culture as 
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reflected in traditional attires and even eating habits, one cannot miss the specific “modern” 
layer of cultural imports from other parts of Nigeria and Cameroon into this area. Apart from 
a variety of other African languages spoken concurrently with English and Pidgin English, the 
influence of (most probably) the Nigeria film industry as well as a specific type of evangelism 
manufactured in Nigeria is heavily represented, across towns bordering Nigeria, and beyond 
into the whole English-speaking part of Cameroon.  
 
 
Picture 8 - Sample nsibidi ideographs. Source:(Njideka Agbo, 2019) 
Close family ties that exist between the borderlanders coupled with the visa-free agreement to 
make the movement of local people almost seamless across the border area, even though 
immigration officials still require documentation and payment to cross the border using the 
bridge. This cannot be however systematised for individuals crossing the border daily, such as 
Nigerian students who attend schools in Cameroon or vice-versa. Despite the ancestral lineage 
of the majority of people living in this border locale, there is a significant mixture of other 
people from all ethnic and linguistic backgrounds from all over Cameroon and Nigeria. This 
category of borderlanders mostly settled here because of a business activity. Nigerian 
tradesmen I have met on both sides of the border are mostly from the Igbo ethnic background, 
many of them born there even though they do not have the Ejagham lineage that is more 
prevalent in the area. Whatever the stories and trajectories, all individuals I encountered 
identified simultaneously with one or two ethnic groups, and one or two nationalities. In 
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addition to English and Pidgin English, all were fluent in a least one additional African 
language.  
 
In Nigeria, Ikom and Mfum are the main border towns, whereas Ekok and Eyumudjock mirror 
them on the Cameroonian side of the border. Referring back to the prioritisation of border 
towns dynamics as described at the start of this chapter and owing to role played by the towns 
of Ekok and Ikom in the border dynamics across this area, I have elected to symmetrically pair 
Ekok and Mfum in Nigeria on the one hand, and Eyumodjock and  Ikom on the other.  As can 
be seen on map 6 above, Eyumodjock is at the crossroad of two main roads, same as Ikom in 
Nigeria. The most visible activity at the border is the transportation business, for obvious 
reasons. Many Nigerians also travel to Cameroon mainly to sell car parts and any manufactured 
products that could be more expensive across the border. There is a good proportion of 
Cameroonians spending a night in Ikom just as a stopover on their way to Lagos or Abuja for 
more diverse reasons including jobs and church attendance. Conversely, many Nigerians also 
spend the night in Ekok or Eyumodjock, while they are en route to Douala or Yaoundé for a 
variety of reasons, including family visits. To this travelling population, one must add 
Nigerians who live and work on the Cameroonian side of the border, and vice-versa.  
 





Map  7 – The Cameroon-Gabon-Eq. Guinea Three Part Border - Source : Built in QGIS 
Bitam (Gabon) and Ambam (Cameroon) (See Map 8 below) have been border towns since the 
early 20th century when Cameroon (Kamerun) was a German colonial territory and Gabon, a 
French colonial territory. Over time, they have changed and evolved in many ways including 
the type of border activities carried out and their inhabitants. Ebebeyin (Eq. Guinea) is 
famously known to have been part of the three neighbouring countries in separate occasions, 
owing to territorial disputes between (post)colonial states. Nowadays however, the main 
political and structural aspect of this border area to be taken into consideration is its location 
at the heart of the CEMAC regional integration process. Unlike the Cameroon-Nigeria border 
area described above, and which also doubles as the border between two regional entities 
(CEMAC & ECOWAS), the three-part border area between Cameroon, Gabon and Equatorial 
Guinea is an integral part of the economic integration discourse at the CEMAC regional level. 
Policy discourse on economic integration comprises a component that seeks to promote the 
convergence of economic strategies from the three countries, and this includes constantly 
reassessing the functions of their respective borders. Geographically speaking, the three-part 
border between Cameroon (South), Gabon and the Equatorial Guinea (North) can be described 
as connected across the Ntem Valley through a triangular relationship between the border town 





Map  8 - Cameroon - Gabon border - Source: Built in QGIS 
Although I will refer to Eq. Guinea from time to time and especially to its border town of 
Ebebeyin, I will concentrate mainly on Cameroon and Gabon where I spent more fieldwork 
time. In addition to the main border town of Kyé-Ossi, a dozen other Cameroonian villages sit 
on the border with Gabon on the one hand (Andjou’ou, Meyo Nkoulou, Mefoup, Kono Fonossi, 
Alen Esseng, Nlomo, etc.), and Equatorial Guinea on the other hand (Mekomo, Akonangui, 
Ebengon, Meguikom, Metet, Meyo, Biboulou, Minkomo). Ambam (Cameroon) and Bitam 
(Gabon) offer many similarities, so much so that they can be considered as twin towns like 
Mfum and Ekok in the Cameroon-Nigeria border. The complex and differentiated web of 
relations between these two towns and other key border sites such as Olamze and Kye-Ossi 
(Cameroon) or Minvoul and Oyem (Gabon) plays such an instrumental part in the overall 
dynamics of that border area that I have decided to base my consideration of twin border towns 
as well as pivotal hubs of border activities, on the distance covered in moving resources and 
people across the international border. Kye-Ossie gains prominence due to its immediate 
proximity to the border while the Ntem River separates this town from the larger town of 
Ambam. Kye-Ossi is located at roughly 25 km from the other border point between Cameroon 




Bitam is strategically located as the only Gabonese town that simultaneously borders both 
Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. Bitam is also placed on a plateau at the intersection of three 
different main roads that link the town to the rest of Gabon. The first one is the Route Nationale 
2 (RN2) which travels all the way to Libreville, the Nation’s capital city through the town of 
Ndjolé. Secondly, Route Nationale 5 (RN5) connects Bitam to Libreville too, via Medouneu. 
Finally, the Route Interieure 2 (RI 2) links Bitam and the town of Minvoul (See map 9 below). 
This stresses the strategic importance of Bitam on which the whole of Gabon relies for food 
supply on a daily basis (see Map 9 below). 
 
 




Map  10 - Border hotspots 
At Kye-Ossi, border posts for the three countries are found respectively within 3 kilometres 
from one another. The border town of Kye-Ossi hosts the largest market that provisions the two 
other countries with fresh food, manufactured products, and items of clothing. This means that 
the direction and flow of goods and money is unidirectional. Across all these border villages, 
local populations move from one country to the other without any strict formalities as the 
borders are not formalised. In the locality of Ebengon for instance, Cameroon is separated from 
the Guinean village of Koumadjap by only a small but dense forest wherein only villagers can 
tell the territorial limits of each neighbouring state. The same goes true for the Cameroonian 
villages located in the Ma’an subdivision bordering Equatorial Guinea. Further south of 
Cameroon, the natural border with Gabon as formalised by the Kyé river is crossed on a daily 
basis by villagers from both sides of the border using boats. 
 
 In the valleys travelled by the Ntem River and its tributaries, the native populations known as 
the Ntoumous, are settled across the territorial space of the three countries and share the same 
ancestors and cultural practices despite a de facto territorial separation since the colonial era. 
In the border town of Kyé–Ossi however, the cosmopolitan character of the population make-
up is due to immigration of indigenous people from other regions of Cameroon essentially. 
Most of these immigrants have settled and have been living here for generations working in 
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border trade or agriculture. I have met residents of Kye-Ossi who hail from as far as the Far 
North region of Cameroon, just South of Chad. People also come from other regions such as 
the Bamouns and the Bamilékés. Kye-Ossi is not the only cosmopolitan border town here. 
Abang Minko’o in Cameroon, albeit to a lesser extent, also has a significant number of non-
native Ntoumous residents. The town that mirrors Kye-Ossi’s cosmopolitanism is Bitam in 
Gabon, where the same Cameroonians are found, including people from the English-speaking 
part of Cameroon. Bitam is a more cosmopolitan town as compared to its Cameroonian 
counterparts such as Kye-Ossi and Ambam.  
 
The market in Ambam, known as Marché Mondial, is striking in the extent of its influence and 
by the formidable reach of its catchment area. Given the tight border control at Ambam and 
stringent immigration rules especially for nationals of non-neighbouring countries, an 
incalculable amount of money changes hands between the middlemen, corrupt immigration 
officers, transporters, and villagers. Transportation using motorbikes is a booming business in 
the area, where there are at least two specialised sales offices of brand-new motorcycles. This 
is surprising given the small size of the town of Ambam. Immigration is only second to 
transportation in the border area in terms of revenues generated both for the government and 
private individuals. In order to meet the demand of the cities of the interior of Gabon and 
Equatorial Guinea, hundreds of trucks loaded with food items and manufactured products cross 
the various border points on a daily basis, paying official fees and sometimes bribing their way 
into Gabon or Equatorial Guinea. Because of the lack of the manufacturing industry in the 
border area and the fact that food stuff produced here is virtually insignificant as compared to 
the overall volume of food sold and bought at the border for export, the third economic activity 
is the buying and selling of foodstuff and other products, but primarily foodstuff. In fact, 
tradeswomen who specialise in buying and selling food across the border are known as 
“Bayam-Sellam”.  
 
The products they buy and sell across the border include bread, cakes, lettuce, cabbage, carrots, 
pepper, ginger and traditional craft products (rack, hood, pestle, mortar, basket, etc.). Cassava 
and bananas are the only staples produced directly in the border regions of Cameroon and 
Gabon and supplied to the food market that extends all the way down to Libreville and Malabo. 
Locally produced in the border are also fishery products derived from small-scale fishing or 
fishponds, vegetables, livestock products and episodically cocoa and coffee. Agricultural 
products such as tomato fruits, vegetable products, but especially bananas plantain circulate 
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from Ambam to Bitam. This flow is also fed in small quantities by some traditional breeding 
products that leave the close and distant vicinities of Ambam for Bitam. If we look exclusively 
at the goods coming directly from the cities of Ambam and Bitam, the flows operating between 
these two localities are of unequal importance. The main product that goes from Bitam to 
Ambam and other localities over the border in Cameroon, is bread. Many trucks that pass 
through the border going to Cameroon are in fact empty. Meanwhile, Bitam and other localities 
in the Ntem département in Gabon receive agricultural products from of border towns and 
villages of Cameroon on a daily basis. The products are collected from the border markets of 
Abang Minko'o and Kye-Ossi. In fact, food products moving from these towns to Bitam are 
both varied and considerable, and their circulation between the two countries mobilizes various 
actors on both sides of the border (porters, farmers, tradespeople, transporters, customs 
officials).  
 
Borderlanders on the Cameroonian side of the border complain incessantly that their localities 
are not connected to the national electric grid. Hence, generators are used for anything that 
requires electric power, from charging phones to running a beer parlour. Charging one’s 
electronic appliances is often an additional incentive to cross into Gabon or Equatorial Guinea 
where there is stable electricity in the nearest border towns of Bitam or Ebebeyin and villages 
around. Running water is available only through private boreholes. Apart from the main 
national road connecting the principal border towns of Ambam and Kye-Ossi to Gabon, the 
other roads are essentially mud roads that become impracticable during rainy seasons. In border 
villages, infrastructures are limited to basic provisions such as primary schools, local churches 
and health centres. Kyé–Ossi and Abang Minko’o are an exception to this because of their 
strategic position at the border. With a similar geographical composition, it is quite difficult to 
establish infrastructural differences between villages and towns from both sides of the border. 
However, thanks to the make-up of the populations they shelter, Ambam, Kye-Ossi and Bitam 
stand out from other villages, towns and even semi-urban centres around them. Suffice it to 
say, that while there is electricity in Bitam, just less than 60 km away from Cameroon, lack of 
running water, poor government services and dilapidated market infrastructures for instance 
makes such a comparison inconsequential. Kye-Ossi, Ambam and Bitam seem to be configured 
in a way that each of these individual spaces offers natural, human, and economic 





4 Chapter 4 – Imaginations of border space and sense-making  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the mental universe of borderlanders as shaped by 
their experiences and the border space itself as a physical site of semiotic performance. It will 
specifically answer the research question 1, i.e. How do border communities make sense of 
their own territorial space, otherwise conceptualised as border space? Sense-making as 
formed by borderlanders is mediated through expressed interpretations of displayed attitudes 
and behaviour patterns. This can be seen for example in how they move from one set of 
attitudes/behaviours (border deniers) to another (border acknowledger); and through their 
interpretation of, and performative response to, the signs and symbols that materialise the 
border.  Such an interpretation is also an entry point into the plural vernacular spaces that are 
created by the borderlanders and the hierarchies within.  However, before attending directly to 
these spatial imaginations of borderlanders, an overview of the authors of these imaginations 
is provided. By way of example and as a practical experimentation with this thesis’ overarching 
ethos of desilencing through foregrounding borderlanders and their own narratives, I will first 
introduce the key interviewees involved in these narratives to situate the themes that emerged 
from our conversations. As an illustration of how these themes are woven into their life stories, 
a sample narrative of one of the interviewees with running commentary will provide 
background and context to examine the imaginations of space from the perspective of these 
borderlanders.  
 
Next, the examination of vernacular spatial imaginations is articulated in two main loci. The 
first locus deals with how my ethnographic observation of the border locales decodes the 
grammar of border signs and symbols. In order to understand and explain the imaginations of 
the border space as a site of contested power and scene of performativity, the chapter will draw 
upon various theorisations of the border to conduct a hermeneutical analysis of the border-
borderlander relationship. Understanding the parameters of this relationship is crucial as its 
performativity predicates the geographical imaginations of the borderlanders. The second locus 
covers how this contested relationship results in a hierarchical spatialisation of the border as 
well as the contending and overlapping vernacular spaces produced around, and within the 





Being a recurrent phrase in this chapter, Geographical imaginations deserves attention in this 
introductory section of the chapter.  According to a very detailed definition by Jessey Gilley 
(2010, p. 1223), a geographical imagination is  
 
a way of thinking about the world and considering the relative 
importance of places and the relationships between “our” places and 
“other” places. The term encompasses a variety of meanings, including 
individual mental images and socially produced discourses about 
cultures, spaces, and differences. How people see the world is 
influenced by many factors, including social class, education, and 
personal and political philosophies. The particular moments in history 
in which people live also play a major role in how they view the world 
around them. 
 
This definition echoes other scholarly take on the concept, seen as shaping much of the world’s 
social and spatial thought.  Authors such as Derek Gregory and David Harvey argue that people 
(both individually and collectively) develop a sense of boundaries, which separate “our” spaces 
and places from other spaces and places through their geographical imaginations (1990, 2005). 
This thus situates the centrality of geographical imaginations in the social and spatial 
constructions of identity and relationship to space. These constructions are fundamental to the 
knowledges produced by borderlanders as part of everyday assumptions, perceptions, and 
expectations.  
 
However, it is worth noting that the facets of borderlanders’ geographical imaginations studied 
here differ in kind from those usually gained through travel, the media, or formal geographical 
education. Insights from fieldwork suggest that border experiences are the primary vectors in 
how borderlanders relate to the particular discourses and social narratives about how the world 
is structured, and their place within. This emphasises their relation to the world rather than the 
assumed antagonistic relationship to the state. In contrast to the dominant perceptual and 
cognitive discourses that shape national geographical imaginations along ideological lines 
(Gilley, J., 2010, p. 1224), studying the geographical imaginations of borderlanders is an 
attempt to understand how the vernacular sustains and justifies actions that make reality 
conform to what is seen in the imagination. It is exploring the unexpressed relationship between 





Various references to semi-structured interviews will involve my conversations mainly (but not 
only) with the following individuals whose background I provide below: Florence, Odette, 
Souley, Yomi, Aliou, and Eudes19 mainly.  
 
Eudes , Docta,  Aliou : Cameroon – Gabon (Eq. Guinea) Border  
 
 At the Cameroon-Gabon border, I visited Eudes on three separate occasions to interview him and 
understand his life. Eudes was born in the village of Fénété where he now lives, and which sits not too 
far from the border with Gabon. He describes himself as a professional pestle and mortar maker. Eudes 
was born into a family of wood workers of various descriptions. He told me his father and grandfather 
made masks, statues, and various household items out of wood. Eudes said that when he was younger, his 
father would send him to deliver statues and masks all over the [border]ၕ region, and sometimes the return 
journey alone would take him two or three days, walking and resting in the homes of relatives around the 
region.  
 
Docta is a transborder tradesman, who buys contraband pharmaceutical products from 
Cameroon and sells across the border in Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. Docta normally lives 
in Kye-Ossi (Cameroon), but spends many days on different sides of the border depending on 
his business activities at the time.  
 
I also met and interviewed Aliou at this border location.  Aliou is from the Tikar ethnic group 
in Northen Cameroon. He lives in Kye-Ossi in Cameroon.  He is 43 years old, owns a “snack 
bar” run by his wife with the help of two employees. He also owns land and lives in a house 
he has built in Kye-Ossi. He says that all his life is the border. He speaks French, his own 
mother tongue, a bit of Spanish and understands bits of the local Ntumu’s language, his wife’s 
mother tongue. He has gone back to visit his birthplace in northern Cameroon, only on a few 




19 Italics mean that these are not real names. All names of individuals and specific locations have been changed 
for anonymity purposes.  
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illegal immigrants to cross the border from Cameroon into Equatorial Guinea or Gabon. He 
has contacts in each of these two countries. These contacts of his act as relays when he sends 
somebody over. He also has contacts with immigration and customs officials from all sides of 
the three-part border.  He belongs to various border associations, including for traders and 
transporters.   
 
 
Map 11 - Three-part border (CMR - GBN – EqGN) – Source: Built From QGIS  
 
Odette & Souley, Yomi: Cameroon – Nigeria Border 
 
At the Cameroon-Nigeria border, Odette and Souley are both tradespeople who cross the border 
from Cameroon to Nigeria every other day to meet their customers to whom they supply 
various forest products for food and health. I met the couple when they had come to source 
their supplies from Yomi in his village of Mkot (see map 12 below) in Nigeria. The products 
they sell include various types of mushrooms, dried and fresh fruits, seeds, spices and 
vegetables. It is worth noting that Souley and Odette source most of their products from the rainforest 
area of Cross River State in Nigeria. The couple told me that, owing to the topographical configuration of 
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the forest, the specific products they trade are more accessible from the Cameroonian side of the forest 
than from the Nigerian side, even though the forest itself is located in Nigeria. Yomi regularly enters the 
forest from the Cameroonian side in order to fetch and sell these products. On the one hand, Cameroon 
is reputed for having the best-quality-forest-products, so crossing the border back into Nigeria with their 
products is economically advantageous. The couple therefore takes advantage of their ancestral links with 




Map 12- Mkot, Yomi's village – Source: Built from QGIS 
 
 Narrative Sample of Borderland Experiences and Sense-Making: The Case of 
Florence 
 
I will now present a narrative sample excerpted from my encounters and interviews with 
Florence. Alongside Florence’s direct words in the narrative sample below, is a running 
commentary on the themes that will be elaborated upon in the following chapters. Most 
importantly however, this running commentary is not exhaustive, but provides the contextual 
background of the border together with a life story. Florence’s narrative as brought forward in 
this sample ends up sketching the border locales, everyday experiences of borderlanders as 
well as the themes that will be referred to in more detail throughout the rest of the thesis. The 
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commentary of Florence’s specific case should also be seen here both as snapshot of a 
borderlander’s everyday life open to plural interpretation by anyone, as well as a thematic 
introduction to fieldwork data interpretation.  
 
Like many other interviewees especially at the Cameroon-Nigeria border, Florence did not 
allow me to audiotape our conversations for fear of “Wahala” (getting into trouble), so the 
interview was handwritten. I met and interviewed Florence four consecutive times in Ikom, 
one of the main towns on the Nigerian side of the Cameroon-Nigeria border (see Map 13 
below). This semi-structured interview provided an insight into her geographical imagination 
as well as an appraisal of her borderlander agency through cross-border mobility events and 
how she verbalised the rationale for her actions. Throughout the interview, Florence’s sense-
making of the border is expressed through her own relationship to the border space and her 
navigation thereof. This relationship reveals tensions, intersections, overlapping, and 
sometimes convergences between the multiple spaces of the border and her own dynamic 
border identity. This interview also renders her vernacular understanding of obstacles, 
challenges and threats to her livelihood. 
 
 




Florence was born in Ajassor (see map 13 above) just a few years after independence when the 
border was “becoming big …when they constructed the border bridgeၕ”20. She only completed 
primary school and stopped because “there was no one to pay for me to continue”.  Her parents 
both died in the space of two years in the early 2000s21, and by that time she had already left 
Ajassor to live in Ikom (larger border town but further away from to the border) with her 
Cameroonian husband. Florence met Eugene “in this border business”, after separating from 
the father of her first child. Florence described her childhood, referring to her younger self as 
“Border Girl life”. When prompted about what she meant by “Border Girl life”, Florence 
referred to her ancestry in Ajassor, near the border bridge between Cameroon and Nigeria and 
described a Border Girl as one who grows up “doing everything that children living here do”. 
 
DW22 : Can you give me a few examples of the things border children do? 
 
Florence: I don’t know, everything, selling things by the roadside, going down to Mfum to buy 
or sell things for our parents, usually being sent over to Cameroon to get things. You know in 
those days, the road was not tarred as it is now, so you had to be a border girl to know all the 
shortcuts to get to Mfum and also avoid bad people at the same time. Well even today, if you 
are not a border girl, they cannot let a young child cross the border on her own, you see.   
                                             
 
The way in which Florence refers to herself since childhood as a Border Girl and describes the 
activities thereof, strongly underlines the formative process of a borderlander. She also 
introduces the characteristics and manifestations of her border identity not necessarily defined 
by the border as one might quickly conclude, but instead as shaped by an awareness of the 
additional geographical significance of her living space. Furthermore, Florence brings up many 




20 Text sections in italics are excerpts from semi-structured interviews and casual conversations. These are all 
Personal Communications, that took place from January to April 2017 (Cameroon-Nigeria Border), and from 
October 2017 to January 2018 (Cameroon-Gabon-Eq. Guinea Border) 
21 Specific information cannot be divulgated for anonymisation purpose.  
22 DW stands for Dieunedort Wandji (interviewer), throughout interview transcripts.  
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to the two sides of the border, which gives the ultimate impression that she is dislocated from 
the border as “the line” and instead emphasises her control over the border as a potential 
disruption to her biographical trajectory.  For example, Florence said that the fact that her first 
boyfriend lived over the border in Cameroon presented an advantage in a cultural context where 
having a boyfriend as a teenager is usually frowned upon by parents. 
 
 “That way my parents never knew anything about him. I would see him whenever I crossed the 
border, and nobody knew me there. He would also come here to see me, and nobody knew him 
over here. So, nobody could report any of us to our respective parents that they saw me or him 
with such and such personၕ” 
                                                
Florence was also very keen on demonstrating her strong attachment to the land. Her parents 
are now all deceased, yet she still visits some living relatives where she grew up in Ajassor and 
Ajassor village (cousins, uncles, and one her maternal grandmother who is still alive). 
 
 “I also visit my parents, where they are buried in Ajassor village, just to let them know that I 
have not forgotten about them. I will never forget them. I talk to my children about them, so 
that they know about their roots”  
 
This line of connection that flows from ancestral lineage to territorial space adds a layer to 
Florence’s identity not being defined exclusively by the border. She is first and foremost a 
daughter of the soil, and the border dimension is an addition that she addresses as part of 
mastering her living environment. Florence told me that when her parents were alive, they used 
to farm the land in Ajassor village, a rural farming zone located a few kilometres from Ajassor 
town. They would then sell the products at Ajassor Market on market days and even non-market 
days. 
 
“I remember even then that on Market Days one had to be mindful of what to take to the market. 
My mother would say that anything that people could buy from Cameroon would be cheaper 
on Market Day, so no point selling these on Market days. I would then be sent to sell them by 
the roadside on non-market days.  My father would, during rainy seasons for instance, cross 
the border and buy foodstuff from Cameroon to sell on the Market Day. That way, he said he 
earned more than spending his time growing stuff himself or going into the forest to harvest 
forest products. Later on, he taught me how to do it when I was just nine or ten years old. From 
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then on, he would let me go on his behalf because they did not harass border children a lot at 
the border. Whenever there was no school, my parents sent me to the market to sell farm 
products myself. After school sometimes, I used to sell the remainder of what my mother had 
been unable to sell on Market Day by the roadside in front of our family house. Every time 
there was no school, or during holidays, I knew that I was going to do business, go to Cameroon 
or to farm, and get things to sell here. All border girls did this. And they still do it today. The 
only difference is that, neither me nor my parents never had the idea then to buy things here in 
Nigeria and sell in Cameroon. I don’t really know why. It was so obvious though.”   
 
Florence told me that as a teenager she became well-versed in the workings of the fresh food 
market in the border area, especially concerning items coming from Cameroon. Her family had 
established a reputation in the Ajassor neighbourhood and, even as a teenager, she was already 
part of this reputation.  
 
“Because I could do everything my parents did, go to the farm to harvest and sell; go over to 
Cameroon to buy and bring back here for selling. It is only the cocoa and coffee business that 
I did not know.”  
 
This is indicative of a geographical imagination shaped not by the border as a dividing line per 
se, but rather by a reliance on discrete locations connected across space. Going to the farm to 
Ajassor Village (in Nigeria) and crossing the border to buy food from Ekok (into Cameroon) 
are not mobility events that Florence sees as distinct from one another. She describes them 
together as livelihoods activities connected to sourcing products that she can sell. The sense 
that she thus makes of the border space is deeply ingrained even in her awareness of the 
difference and variations that exist from one side of the border to another. For example, in 
describing what she sees as various beliefs of a shared myth that border residents have co-
constructed over the years with the presence of the border, Florence said that since her teenage 
years, the same product harvested in Nigeria, will not be seen as having the same quality or 
value as that coming from Cameroon. Consequently, food products that come from Nigeria but 
circle through the Cameroon-Nigeria border back into Nigeria, would be more expensive (and 





Again, it would be inaccurate to assume that difference in product quality as constructed by 
borderlanders squarely aligns with the jurisdictional differentials portrayed by the state border 
between Cameroon and Nigeria. In reality, it is far more complex and reflects both conscious 
and unconscious discourses about quality and value, which cannot be dissociated from the 
character of the border space as a site of intense economic exchanges. In this vein, when talking 
about the price and value of education across the border, Florence expressed her amusement 
with the irony of these discursive constructions that did not even correspond to their physical 
or geographical pretexts. To illustrate this, she talked about an episode of her teenage days in 
the late 70s and early 80s. Back then, some of her age-mates used to attend school across the 
border in Cameroon. Florence said that people in her neighbourhood in Nigeria thought that 
these children stood a better chance in life because they were being taught (in) French in the 
Cameroon’s school curriculum, since Nigerians see Cameroon as a French-speaking country.  
 
“These kids used to pretend that they can speak French, just because they were attending 
school in Cameroon, even though no one ever heard them speak French. What is funny is that 
even people who used spend a lot of time in Cameroon in places like Ekok, Mamfe and even 
Bamenda [Cameroon], knew very well that no one speaks French there. English was and still 
is the official language there. They speak English in schools and pidgin English outside school. 
So, where were these children supposed to learn French? Nevertheless, for some reason, people 
just liked the idea that once you cross the border as a student and go to Cameroon, you start 
speaking French. Like magic! [clicking her fingers to the air] I remember one girl attending 
school across the border in Cameroon, who used to make up words in French, just to impress 
those of us who could not afford to go to school there. She would talk thinks like jevoua voua 
mon nomme voua voua oui oui [twisting her lips and tongue to accent the exaggeration]. And 
we were very impressed. And one day, a French tourist was passing here. Everybody rushed to 
that girl’s house to call her so she can come and speak French with the tourist. The girl refused 
to come, claiming that most of her French was left in her classroom in Cameroon, and she 
therefore would not have much of a French to speak to the French tourist. I know you probably 
will not believe this, but it is a true story and you can just ask people around Ajassor. [Long 
laughter]” 
 
This admittedly funny story unassumingly highlights the impact of the border on linguistic 
representations, and the same certainly holds true for other representations. More precisely, this 
is not simply the impact of the border as such, but rather the impact of the sense borderlanders 
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make of the border. While in fact, crossing the border from Nigeria into Cameroon lands you 
in the English-speaking part of Cameroon, borderlanders have formed a geographical 
imagination of this space differential that has nothing to do with the linguistic reality. In the 
same manner of currency differentials across the Cameroon-Nigeria border, the imagined 
values of education from one side of the border to the other reminds us of the difference in 
price and value assigned to products from Nigeria, which had circled back into Nigeria again 
through Cameroon’s border. These are only a few examples of vernacular sense-making that 
diverge from the intended meaning of the official border. This divergence also underlines the 
tension arising from the vernacular bordering practices and sense-making that simultaneous 
dismiss and acknowledge the border. This tension that makes the border-based linguistic 
imaginary of others funny to Florence, a proud Border Girl, is also woven unto the biographical 
trajectories described by many other borderlanders.  
 
In Florence’s case however, her biographical trajectory includes many disruptions, but these 
did not get her to relocate across the border, unlike other borderlanders.  Instead, Florence cites 
the following reasons for relocating from Ajassor (where she was born) to Ikom (where she 
now lives).  
 
“First, there was no way I could expand my business over there in Ajassor. My parents had 
grown old and I did not have time to continue going to the farms and do this business. Some 
people in Ajassor village took our farm and started to claim that it was their parents’ farm that 
my parents had just borrowed. It was too complicated, and I had no man in the family except 
my dad who could fight for the land. And my dad was already very unwell. It had been two 
years since he last went to that farm. When I heard the news and went down there to ask why 
these people were taking our land, they came out with machetes and threatened to kill me. So, 
I just left to protect my life. Some people have been killed here for less than that, you know, and 
they end up with your property while you are no more. 
 
DW: And what happens to those who would kill people like that? 
 
Florence: “Well, sometimes, they can be arrested, but not all the time. If you are not from a 
powerful family, the police might not even get involved. And sometimes, even when they are 




DW: “And what was the other reason why you left Ajassor for Ikom?” 
 
Florence: Jealousy. My mother advised me to move on, because as my business was growing, 
many people in Ajassor were showing me the “black eye”. Some of them had their children 
who had gone to school more than me, others in Cameroon, but they couldn’t do what I was 
doing, so they were jealous. 
 
DW: “But Ajassor is not far from here [Ikom]. Those people can still see you here…. why not 
go to Onitsha for example?” 
 
Florence: “I could not continue to do my business if I went too far from the border, and also 
from my parents who were already old. So Ikom was the only place I could go and still be close 
to my parents and the border, or go to Cameroon.”  
 
On her relationship with her current husband, Florence admitted that it presented many 
advantages to both members of the couple for business in the border area context, the husband 
being Cameroonian and Florence being Nigerian.  
 
Florence: “Obviously I did not marry him for that reason. Many Cameroonians had wanted me 
before, even the father of my first child is Cameroonian, and many Nigerian women are married 
to Cameroonians and Cameroonian women too are married here. It just happens because we 
are all together here.”  
 
Florence said about her husband that, “When he lived on the Cameroonian side, he would waste 
a lot of time in the morning to travel here [in Nigeria] first before he can pick his stuff and by 
the time he returned to Ekok [in Cameroon], many customers would have already bought from 
someone else and left. Now, he just wakes up, picks up his cargo and off he goes straight to the 
market. [….] can you imagine, although my husband has been living here for more than 10 
years, I still have to go and pick him up at the border every single time he buys supplies for me 
from Cameroon? If I don’t pick him up and say that the things belong to me, he will pay all the 
15 checkpoints between Mfum and here. The same thing for me if I go to Cameroon. That is 
not fair, and that is why some people prefer to use back routes, even if it takes more time and 




Florence also said that once her husband crosses the border into Cameroon no paper can be 
asked off him, even if the border officials in question are newly appointed.  
 
Florence: “As a Cameroonian, he is free to roam around there as he pleases. He will always 
be Cameroonian, and I will always be Nigerian when it comes to these border people. After 
all, his vaccination scar23 is different from mine” ၕ  
 
Florence said that she has many friends, relatives and customers living on the Cameroonian 
side who visit her regularly. Her story is one of essential fellowship with other people from 
“the other side who only mind their own business” as opposed to relatives and acquaintances 
on the Nigerian side who are jealous and envious of her. This is a paradox of geographical 
imagination that brings her physical location in tension with her cross-border solidarity. She 
said that since the death of her parents, she has not been visiting her own family home where 
her sister now lives with her own children. Her sister can visit her in Ikom at the market or at 
her own home, but Florence is afraid of her former neighbours’ “black eye”.  Florence is very 
conscious of her prosperity which she can measure from the poor background she had come 
from and certainly compare to her sister’s, a modest primary school teacher in Ajassor, married 
to a Border Driver.  
 
Florence’s story is also one of generational transmission of bordering practices, in the sense 
that she says she inherited the drive to succeed from watching her mother fight like a soldier 
to put food on the table especially when her father became incapacitated. She portrayed her 
mother as a woman “who took no nonsense from nobody and she would give you wahala if you 
wanted wahala [trouble]”. She described how nobody could touch their farm when her mother 
was still in good health, and she would stand up to border officials (men) who tried to extort 
money from her. Her mother had taught her how “to fight the border”, otherwise she would be 
working “just to grease these government men”. In talking about extortion at the border, 
Florence took to portraying a moral self, a citizen who was willing to pay the fair taxes and 
custom duties, but resented the habit of Government officials who abused the authority 








“We don’t even complain about lack of schools or roads here, even though they have made this 
road now.”  
 
In her understanding of “fighting the border”, Florence positions herself as a politicised being, 
with moral superiority over border officials and taxmen representing the Government. She 
draws such a moral authority from the solidarity she had with all the other hardworking border 
people who were constantly extorted by these government representatives abusing their power. 
The extent to which this politicisation is simply a mobility negotiation strategy, or a 
centralisation of marginality has not been fully established in this study, but suffice it to say 
that “fighting the border” amounts to personifying the multifaceted state dimension of the 
border to achieve personal goals. Florence sees the state border as both legitimate and 
illegitimate, depending on circumstances. Based on this tension, I have mapped out Border 
Deniers and Border Acknowledgers as different mantles that borderlanders can wear. 
Moreover, Florence also conflates this sense-making with her own moral self, indicating her 
entitlement not only to judge, but also to benefit from the border’s economic dynamics. This is 
an illustration of how several layers of the vernacular sense-making of border might overlap, 
intersect or contrast.  
 
In the final part of the semi-structured interview, which focused on illegal practices across the 
border and (in)security, Florence solicited my “common sense” to see that people who 
smuggled things across the border were doing so exactly as a reaction to these abuses from the 
government. When I asked her about child trafficking and the smuggling of things like 
weapons, she reacted with disdain and said: 
 
 “Those are criminals that the government should be going after instead of harassing poor 
people who are just trying to make both ends meet. But sometimes, the boys in the community 
are better at spotting criminals trafficking children, who are different from those who are just 
travelling with children without papers”. 
 
Again, her ambivalent categorisation of practices that are all deemed illegal by state border 
authorities is a testament of diverging conceptualisations of the border between the official and 
the vernacular. In the same vein, positioning herself as a moral authority who refuses to align 
with government definition of criminality creates a space of vernacular agency that shapes the 
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dissenting ways in which Florence conducts herself while navigating the border space. This 
vernacular agency controls the channels of her actions more than the official framework 
implemented by state border authorities to control cross-border mobility. On the question 
regarding insecurity and her fears, Florence had the following to say:  
 
“There are many things I fear here, I cannot say I am most afraid of only one thing in particular. 
As a border girl, I have grown up around this place and I know that it is full of many dangers 
for which you need to always shine your eyes for. Obviously, I fear that my business can burn 
down because that is common, but above all I fear traffickers. You should stay away from them 
and avoid messing with their business. If you try, you will get into trouble and even the police 
cannot protect you, so the only way for you to save your life will be to leave this area. Many 
people have had to abandon their businesses and homes here just because they have had some 
run-ins with the traffickers, these guys don’t joke. When you become their target, you start 
hiding like someone who broke out of prison and is avoiding authorities.  
 
DW: “What could make you leave this place and never come back?”  
 
Florence: “Like I said, if you become enemies with the traffickers, because they can actually 
just eliminate you physically and no one would even know or budge. Or if for some reasons the 
government thinks that you are one of the traffickers.”  
 
DW: “So you don’t think the state authorities can protect you here?” 
 
Florence: “The state protects itself here in Mfum, not us, my brother. You have to be very 
careful. If you count on the state, it will let you down. All it cares about is the customs duties it 
collects.” 
 
In her concluding remarks, Florence stressed how there is a clear divergence between her 
understanding of criminality and threats on the one hand, and the official discourse about these 
on the other hand. This is not in itself a novelty, but looking at the behaviour that is determined 
by this understanding reveals the extent to which Florence’s bordering practices are shaped by 
how she makes sense of the border space. This sense-making provides a framework to explain 
the tensions between the two main varieties of borderlanders and the various layers and facets 
of the border as she sees them. This prompts to look at the differences and tension between 
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both mantles borderlanders are likely to wear, so to speak: Border Deniers  and Border 
Acknowledgers.  
 
 Border Acknowledgers and Border Deniers  
 
4.1.2.1 Border Deniers  
 
The dismissal of the border is more prevalent in the narratives of those borderlanders whom I 
have called Border Deniers , i.e. those borderlanders such as Yomi and Eudes who do not see 
their lives through their status as inhabitants of a border space, even though their livelihoods 
are intrinsically related to the existence of the border. For instance, explaining why his border 
village is so sparingly populated, Yomi portrays a geographical imagination more aligned 
towards the Nigerian national than the Cameroon transnational.  
 
Yomi: “Our number hardly grows, not that we don’t have children, but many people send their 
children to Lagos or Port Harcourt or Abuja for school. So only old people are left here and 
very small children most of the time. I used to walk a very long distance when I was little to go 
to primary school. And sometimes it would rain on me either on my way to school, or on my 
way back from school.”  
 
DW: “Why do they send their children to Lagos, Abuja and all those faraway places while they 
can send them to Cameroon nearby or even to Ikom where there are more schools?”  
 
Yomi: “I am not sure how it all started, but we have most of our relatives in big cities instead, 
and people tend to go where there is already someone to welcome them, you see. Every 
household here has children, uncles, aunts in Lagos or Abuja. Many of them are even abroad. 
So if the entire Mkot diaspora was to come back to this village, there wouldn’t be enough space 
for everybody to live.” 
 
It is however worth noting here that, as a Border Denier, Yomi’s sense-making of the different places and 
spatial trajectories of his relatives is neither national, nor transnational. These categories are the ones I used 
in an analytical process of elimination, to arrive at the conclusion that Yomi’s spatial imagination does not 
integrate his otherwise obvious borderness. This is also an insight into his bordering practices as a-statal 
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actorness. As a matter of fact, there are no instances of the term national or nationality in Yomi’s entire 
interview.  His categorisation of space is neither for, nor against the border, it simply lies beyond it, even 
though it may acknowledge the border. This particular mixture of dismissal (with concealed 
acknowledgement) of the border is also evident in the following exchange with Yomi:  
 
  “Yomi:[…]We usually meet at my mum’s village, but sometimes they will come to Nkot in terms of 
business. I have never been to Cameroon, at least not knowingly [laughs].”   
DW: “Why not knowingly?”  
Yomi: “You know, we are here near the border with Cameroon in this forest, or even in Cameroon. In fact, 
nobody knows where the limit with Cameroon really is in this forest, and it does not matter. […]”.  
 
The irrelevance of the border as implied by Yomi reinforces other expressed efforts to place a mental 
distance between himself and the border, despite the geographical proximity. Most importantly, it seeks 
to show that he has control over the border, and not the other way around. In the Cameroon-Gabon-Eq. 
Guinea Border locale, the narrative of Eudes displays the same patterns of dismissal, mental distancing, 
and discursive superiority in relation to the border. In a similar fashion to Yomi above, Eudes describes 
how from a young age, the border meant nothing to him:  
 
“I used to go to Adzap a lot, and at some point, people started saying that Adzap is now Gabon. 
The funniest part is Ebebyin. One day they told you this is Cameroon, the other day they say 
this is Gabon, then they will tell you this is Equatorial Guinea. All of this was very funny to 
me.” 
 
DW: “How did all these changes affect your life and the trip you were doing?”  
 
Eudes: “They did not affect me personally in any way. I could say except for the fact that people 
started speaking Spanish in Ebebeyin, because they were now learning it in school and talking 
it on the radio while I was learning French in school instead. But I never needed to speak 
Spanish anyway, or French for that matter, to anyone I was going to see. They all spoke Ntumu, 
and many of them are related to me in the family anyway.” (Section on language) 
 
DW: “Did these changes not impact your father’s business, in terms of less people coming 
across the border for example, or more people being prevented from coming over, who could 




Eudes: “Well, I don’t think so. There have been a lot of changes, but I don’t see it as related to 
the border. Sometimes people need something, and sometimes they don’t need it anymore 
because they have seen something better. For example, who is going to buy a wooden spoon 
when a plastic one is a lot cheaper and cooler? Even I don’t have a wooden spoon in my house 
anymore. I still go to Kye-Ossi market every time, but I am not able to sell the same items that 
my father and I used to sell there 50 years ago. And this is not because of the border, but 
fashion.”  
 
Eudes refers, at the beginning of the above interview excerpt, to the various changes in border locations 
following low-intensity territorial disputes and demarcation processes involving Gabon, Cameroon and 
Equatorial Guinea after Independence. I asked Eudes as well as several members of the Adzap and Fénété 
communities what they thought the impact of the border was on their livelihoods, especially the farm 
products they sold in local markets. In their responses, they were surprised (and used all facial cues and 
scorning hand gestures to underscore their astonishment) that I should mention the border as having 
anything to do with the products they sell in their local markets. They told me that all the people who visit 
their market are their kin from other villages with whom they speak the same language, so there was 
nothing suggesting that the small quantities they bought were to be sold somewhere else. Yet, when I 
compared the price of the white pepper in Bitam (Gabon) and what is it is being sold for in Fénété, I 
realised that small quantities can actually yield a lot of profit as the same product is almost 10 times more 
expensive in Bitam. The strong verbal emphasis laid on minimising the impact of the border by Eudes 
and his fellow villagers translated the same desire as displayed by Yomi to dismiss the border, and show 
their control over it, in the case of Fénété villagers, through kinship and language. This rejection of, or 
mental distancing from, the border is indicative of an apprehension thereof. Conversations with Border 
Deniers  did not at first make clear the reasons for this rejection or hostility to the notion of the border. 
However, putting together their vernacular conception of the border paces as a natural endowment will 
further clarify it, as well as what they share with Border Acknowledgers.  
 
4.1.2.2 Border Acknowledgers  
 
Souley: “We go together always because she has a role that she plays as a Cameroonian, and 
I also have a role as a Nigerian. Let’s say we complement each other […] I only buy bush meat 
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for the family, there is a lot of stress taking it over the border. You end up paying these border 
people so much that you will always make a loss selling bush meat.  
 
Odette: “The only way is to cook it and cross the border as someone going to Mfum or Ikom to 
sell food […]” 
 
As can be learned from the words of Souley and Odette above, Border Acknowledgers do exactly the 
opposite of what Border Deniers  do. The Border Acknowledger makes explicit references to the border 
as a phenomenon that is materialised in their living space and with which they are bound to interact. The 
following statements are more examples of such acknowledgement.  
 
 “You see he is Gabonese, I am Cameroonian, but we have known each other for more than 30 
years. We look alike. When we were younger, we would cross the border in the night into Kye-
Ossi to chase girls. On the way back, he would always run from the police and the next day I 
would be the one in trouble because we look alike and the border police would always mistake 
him for me.  […] we just call ourselves brothers and sisters, uncles and aunties here because 
we are the same. Two of my sisters live in Bitam. Many of my relatives live in Libreville and 
Port Gentil. I have a brother, uncle, auntie or sister in most places in Equatorial Guinea. 
Everywhere I go in these three countries, I am at home.” Docta (Cameroon- Gabon border) 
 
 “Yes, and when we get to the border, we just say in our mother tongue that we are going for a 
family visit, because we speak the same language both in Gabon and Guinea over there. When 
I am there, you cannot tell whether I am Cameroonian or Gabonese or Guinean. […]When you 
are in Cameroon, you just move a step, you find yourself in Equatorial Guinea. If you turn 
around with another step, you are in Gabon.” (FG – Cameroon-Gabon): 
 
Fiona: “Yes, both in Nigeria and Cameroon. I am based in both countries equally and I feel at 
home in both. 
 
DW: “Where? In Ekok or further afield?” 
 
Fiona: “In Cameroon, I know all the northwest region like the palm of my hand. In Nigeria, I 
know all the Ikom and Mfum LGAs and I also know Onitsha, Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt. 
[…] In Nigeria are most of my in-laws, but also friends I share with my husband and many of 
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my business partners. My family and part of my husband’s family are based in Cameroon.” 
(Fiona, Cameroon-Nigeria Border) 
 
One important observation that emerges out of the statements above and other instances of discursive 
acknowledgement of the border is that, in contrast to Border Deniers  who use verbal expression to 
discursively dismiss or reject the border, Border Acknowledgers like Docta and Fiona use verbal 
expressions to acknowledge the border, yet log on their opposition to the border within the same 
statements. In other terms, acknowledging the border does not mean agreeing with the border. 
 
 Border Deniers  and Border Acknowledgers seem to be on the same wavelength as far as rejecting the 
border goes, but unlike Yomi and Eudes who seem to be concealing their apprehension of the border, 
Odette is very clear about the reasons for oppositional sense-making of the border :  
 
Odette: “[…] they are very rough, and they just want all your money, all of it. And they talk to 
you as if you were trash. They humiliate you so you can fear them and not protest when they 
abuse their authority to take your money for their own pockets. The border can take even your 
family pot if they see it. That’s why they search your body and make you cross the bridge on 
foot”.  
 
Many Border Acknowledgers I have spoken to, including Florence in the sample narrative, 
refer to themselves as “Border Person”, “Border Girl”, “Border Woman”, “Border 
Transporter”, etc. There have also been many occurrences of the phrase “border life” in the 
conversations and interviews. These are borderlanders who verbalise their awareness of how 
the border is involved in, and shapes, their lives. However, this difference from Border Deniers  
cannot be systematised along ontological lines because when I turn to Eudes, who does not see 
himself as a “Border Man” or “Border Boy”, the paradox of his claims is formed in the 
similarity between his life and the lives of those who see themselves as border people and 
whom I have called Border Acknowledgers. Eudes has been labelled earlier under Border 
Deniers , and even though he rejects the term “Border Man”, the description he provides of his 
childhood, and indeed of current life, is startlingly similar to Florence’s. He says:  
 
“BackBack in those days, we had a lot of traditional secret societies, and the mask business 
was very good because of that. They needed masks for their rituals and dances. It was like a 
fashion to own many masks even if one did not belong to a traditional secret society. My father 
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was always very busy with the demand from many customers. I was the delivery person, and I 
would go to Gabon and Equatorial Guinea mostly on foot, but my father bought me a bicycle 
later on, which made my life a lot easier.” 
 
This almost identical description of childhood experiences as compared to Florence’s at the 
Cameroon-Nigeria border as well as patterns of livelihoods activities, curiously through 
contrastive labelling of self-identity in relation to border space, strongly suggests that the 
difference between a Border Acknowledger and Border Denier is perhaps only discursive. This 
is not surprising, given that I have used this seemingly categorisation only to phase my 
understanding of various vernacular patterns of interactions, and definitely not as ontological 
classification.  However, this discursive difference in the imaginations of self is very important 
as we shall see in the diverging performance of the bordering practices, especially as regards 
the ways in which these imaginations of self eventually shape differing conceptualisations of 
the border (Chapter 5). However, before moving on to the bearing of this apparent discursive 
dissonance, it is worth digging further into this differing self-labelling of the borderlanders. By 
contrasting this sense of self to a reality within which Florence (Border Acknowledger) and 
Yomi (Border Denier) describe similar experiences of, and activities across the border, it 
becomes clear that the borderlander is able to embrace and/or fully identify simply based on 
imaginations of self in relation to specific places.  
 
In fact, when considered linguistically, “border persons” are just two random words put 
together; they cover no palpable reality as seen above through the divergent labelling of border 
experiences and self-projections. The question that arises here is “what is the border in border 
person?”, and “what is the person in the phrase border person?”.  The section on hierarchical 
spaces of the border in Locus 2 will provide answers to the question “what is the border in 
border person?” by elaborating on the multiple border spaces produced by vernacular 
hierarchisation of the border. To answer the other question, i.e. and “what is the person in the 
phrase border person?”, we need to focus on the borderlander’s ability to retain the same 
imagination of self across different contexts or produce differing imaginations of self within 
the same contexts, rather than hybridise these imaginations. This shows that the person in the 
“border person” is someone who constructs full identities that can be dismantled and relocated 
across space, yet retain the same imaginary across time. This is what I have referred to as bi-





“I am Cameroonian, and I am also Nigerian like my children”. 
 
One must look at biplacement from a phenomenological dimension as well as from a discursive 
perspective. In terms of discourse, the biographical dimension of the narratives produced by 
both Border Acknowledgers and Border Deniers  tells a story of bi-placement, of people who 
do not only see themselves as belonging to multiple locations, but who actively and deeply 
place themselves in two or more locations across the border. Their social world is not one of 
synthesised or hybridised identities, it is one of where strong rootedness is consciously forged 
in two or more different transborder locations. At the same time, Border Deniers  also confirm 
their placement through the similarity of their experiences and activities with Border 
Acknowledgers. Instead of defeating this logic of bi-placement, the rejection of the “Border 
Person” appellation by Border Deniers  reinforces the notion that the borderlander is able to 
extract themselves from the observable phenomena of the border in order to assert a distinct 
sense of self.  Their exclusion of the official dimension of the border emerges only as a 
verbalisation of their situated imagination of self. These patterns of label rejection, identity 
dislocation/relocation and bi-placed biographies do provide a framework for setting the 
understanding of border communities’ practices, norms and values outside the political 
structuring of the Westphalian common-sense with regard to borders. 
 
On the one hand, they divest the post-colonial border of its assumed ability to singlehandedly 
capture and shape peripheral identities located outside the control of the central state. On the 
other hand, recognising these bi-placed identities as a common thread between the two types 
of borderlanders allows the analysis to escape the temptation of essentialising post-colonial 
border communities as trapped within a sort of primordial tribal solidarity as passive resistance 
against the border. This is why and how the sense of displacement that the border is expected 
to inflict, akin to “borderlands hysteria” as theorised by Rosaldo (2001) seems to have no effect 
on these communities. In an ironical twist therefore, where the static border is invested in the 
terrain of movement, the border community is profusely absent as it follows the stationary logic 
of placement and location wherein the signs and symbols of the border can be reinterpreted 




4.2 Locus 1: The grammar of border signs and symbols 
 
This locus of the chapter on imaginations of space attempts to decipher the border as a spatial 
scene within which the relationship between the borderlander and the state border is 
(re)produced through signs and symbols. It draws mainly from insights from observing official 
border crossing points to examine this relationship. It is nevertheless worth emphasising that 
these official crossing points do not in any way encompass the entirety and the complexity of 
the borderlands studied, but they remain in my modest opinion, sites par excellence of dynamic 
direct encounter and perhaps confrontation between the two main vectors of the postcolonial 
border space, i.e. the vernacular and the official. Most importantly, I envision this as a dialogic 
relationship of effects where each party entangled in the relationship uses an array of 
performance devices to attempt to influence the behaviour of the other. Here, I am mainly 
interested in what the borderlander makes of this relationship, and how the intended effects of 
the state border are interpreted from the borderlander’s standpoint. This section therefore 
curates a few symbolic expressions used at official border crossing points in both border 
locales, to gain insights into how the state border and the borderlanders encode and decode 
these expressions as part of a power struggle over the meaning of the border space. This is not 
yet a full-blown analysis of the geographical imaginations or bordering practices, but assuredly 
it is an effective way of tapping into the nature of the relationship between the border space 
and the borderlander. In order to study this power dialogue between the borderlander and the 
border space, focus is laid on three main categories of symbolic expressions (border semiology, 
linguistic repertoire, and performances), which this section is going to examine.  
 
 Border Signs, Messages and Audiences 
 
As representatives of  “the state”, customs officers and border guards are constant reminders 
of not only the state, but also of the state’s inconsistencies in its inability to discharge its duties, 
yet attempting to jeopardise what borderlanders perceive as an endowment of their 
geographical environment. They are seen by border residents as individual reflections of the 
privilege, greed, and corruption which reverberate in the border space through tyranical border 
control practices. What border communities see as unfair and unjustified harassment of both 
local and nonlocal individuals crossing the border remains largely what in their eyes defines 
the border as to be ignored, rejected or “fought”. As a matter of fact, receipts are not delivered 
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for a great deal of the payments collected. They are therefore unrecorded in the state logbooks 
and go directly into the guards' personal purses. The often long and tedious negotiation of 
bribes between guards and traders, during which time the guards confiscate traders' goods and 
sometimes arrest the traders themselves, frustrates both locals and non-locals alike. This is 
because as much as they recognise their own helplessness, they do not dissociate individual 
border officials’ practices from state norms. “That is the true face of the state” (Personal 
Communication, Nigeria-Cameroon Border, March 2017) as Ekema understood things. From 
the perspectives of the border population therefore, the existence of a government, just as the 
existence of the border in its territorial principle, is not a problem, but its materiality imposes 
hardship on them through border officials, as an extension of the government. 
 
 




Picture  10 - Flags of three countries painted on a road sign at the three-part border 
(Cameroon, Gabon, Eq. Guinea) 
As a site of state performativity, the border mobilises many tools and devices which take on 
different meanings. A host of totemic signs and symbols such as flags, barriers, directions, 
uniforms, and even the road are the various forms which express the power of the official 
border as the projection of the state in the physical realm. As seen in pictures 9 and 10 above, 
a concentration of flags and state emblematic signs can be seen at the official crossing points. 





Picture 11 - Checkpoint, Ikom-Mfum road in Nigeria (“smuggler highway”) 
The direction and audience of these border signs are geared primarily towards the ordinary 
border user, crossing on foot, using a motorcycle or a car. In picture 11 above, the 
road portcullis studded with iron spikes, is normally destined to impede the advance of persons 
trying to forcefully cross the border. However, it is unmissable that thsee pointy iron spikes are 
covered by plastic bottles. In addition, the length of the roadblock is such that it does not occupy 
the whole width of the road, leaving plenty of rooms for pedestrians, motorbikes and even cars. 
Not only would it not be harmful to car tyres to run over it, thanks to the plastic bottles covering 
the iron spikes, the whole mobility control device turns out to have no coercive effect at all, as 
it cannot stop anybody determined to pass.  As a matter of fact, the border guards manning this 
roadblock were already asleep when we arrived at around 8PM - having been delayed because 
our car had broken down. So, we could have easily passed unnoticed, but our driver stopped 
nevertheless and exited the vehicle to go and wake them up. I later asked the driver why we 
did we not simply go through. He said that people gossip a lot around there and the guards, 
who know him very well, would eventually have found out one way or the other.  
 
Two key messages can be drawn from this road device. Firstly, given that its primary function 
of physically stopping people cannot be performed based on the way it is set up, it is fair to 
assume that this is a sign rather than control device. Following from this, it is also clear that 
126 
 
the intended audience for this sign is not an enemy attacking the territorial integrity of the 
country at the border. Instead, this sign is destined to ordinary borderlanders who use this 
border road leading only to the border, especially if when using a vehicle or a motorbike. The 
expression of these signs is therefore directed at the community of border crossers who use the 
border as a median point between two discrete geographical spaces. In addition to targeting 
this specific audience, these signs also constitute semiotic utterances which clearly demarcate 
the official space from the vernacular space across the border area. They act as an extension of 
words beyond the use of language, which the border community uses too, in order to demarcate 
space or interpret such demarcation. At the Cameroon-Nigeria border for example, the frontiers 
between constative and performative uses of language can be seen as blurred in the ability of 
an arrow sign on a border barrack pointing to Nigeria despite the barrack being already located 
on Nigerian territory beyond the border bridge and that road leading nowhere else than Nigeria. 
 
 
Picture 12 – Arrow on the wall – Source : Video frame 
The same could be said of the red inscription “Arrêt Obligatoire” (Compulsory Stop) on picture 
13 below at the Cameroon-Gabon border. It seems to catalyse the same performative function, 
of signalling to the traveller a shift in jurisdiction and consequently an indication of where 






Picture 13 - Cameroon - Gabon border 
In the same vein, the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS) building presents a similar display with 
a red stop sign on its frontal facade, so much so that people coming from afar would be unable 
to see it in the distance (Picture 14 below). Even though this looks like an ordinary road sign 
normally seen at crossroads, this is not the case as there is only straight lane leading onto the 
border bridge at this point. 
 
Picture  14 - NCS building presents a similar display with a red stop sign on its frontal façade 
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How the target audience of these signs, again, appears to be ordinary border users is illustrated 
by a particular scene I witnessed at the Nigeria-Cameroon border. In this incident, a pole 
hoisting the Cameroonian flag had broken and fallen down. Border officials enlisted the help 
of all bystanders to put the broken pole back up. All bystanders and some people who were 
waiting to cross the border obliged, including me. Apart from this instantaneous and dutiful 
cooperation which spoke volumes about the power dynamics at play here (I shall return to this 
in Chapter 5), the purpose and audience of the flag emerged more neatly as we helped hoist it 
back up. In this occurrence, and as directed by border officials, the discussions amongst those 
who were trying to put the flag back up revolved on what the best place to position the flag 
would be. The border officials were insisting on the fact that the flag should be clearly visible. 
 
 However, there was no doubt as to whether or not the flag should be seen from above, say 
from a helicopter, or from afar by someone in a car for instance. Instead, the question at stake 
was whether it was close enough (and not too close) to the main road so that border crossers, 
whether on foot or in cars, could see that this is where “Cameroon begins…and Nigeria ends”, 
as one border official made it clear. The barriers or gates are also merely symbolic in the sense 
that they cannot physically prevent anyone from crossing if they really wanted to force their 
way through the border. For example, in the sense of an invasion or a hostile takeover of the 
border, there is really nothing the border’s physical infrastructures can do to prevent or stop it. 
In terms of this symbolism therefore, we can say that all the totemic utterances of the land 
border are based on a grammar of power and convey a message around a call to allegiance to 
which border communities will respond in varying forms.  
 
 Performances at the border crossing point 
 
In order to fully grasp the various performances at the border, it is useful to remind ourselves 
of the Critical Border Studies (CBS) approach invoked in the preceding chapter, and which 
examines the border in terms of diverse bordering practices and the relationship between these practices 
and  performance (Parker & Vaughan-Williams, 2012, p. 729). Furthermore, I draw on a synthesis 
between Butler’s analysis of gender as performative and Goffman’s dramaturgical analysis of 
performance as social interaction. This synthesis is conceptualised by Brickell as a 
performativity framework within which individuals are “reflexive, acting subjects” (2005, p. 
29). So, if we replace gender identity with border identity within this conceptual framework, 
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the constructed responses of the borderlander to the signs and symbols described above can be 
seen as actions within ‘the context of possibilities permitted within the culture’ (2005, p. 31). 
As seen above therefore, state border agents as well as symbols essentially constitute both 
bordering practices and performance of state functions. Border communities on their part, 
through ways of talking, walking, sitting, dressing or even standing still, also perform their 
own meaningful bordering practices. Border crossing points become key junctions of time and 
space wherein these performances often come into dialogic interaction from the official to the 
vernacular, and vice-versa.  
 
Building on from this CBS conceptualisation of actors at the border crossing points aids the 
understanding of this symbolic dichotomy that opposes the two sides on the border site. This 
separation can be expressed in terms of the urban versus rural, the centre versus the periphery, 
the educated versus the non-formally educated, the steady income versus the unpredictable 
livelihoods, etc. In fact, border officials typically wear their clean and well-pressed uniforms, 
speak mostly English (Nigeria-Cameroon), French (Cameroon-Gabon), or Spanish (Equatorial 
Guinea) as they originate from diverse ethnic linguistic backgrounds from within their 
countries and cannot always understand the local languages.  Indeed, when border officials 
understand one native language, they tend to start the conversation in the applicable official 
language, even when they are being spoken to in that native language. In stark contrast, all 
those who use the border dress mostly in shabby clothes, speak Pidgin English (Nigeria-
Cameroon), broken French (Cameroon-Gabon), or their African mother tongues. In their 
interactions, the border crosser can be seen to be the one who always uses a lot of hand gestures, 
sometimes bodily contortions to complement statements, all without looking the border official 
in the eye. In the meantime, the border official tends to always remain calm, composed and 
speaks while looking the border user in the eye.   
 
This divide is aptly summed up through in this statement by Ruth below:  
 
 “We do not mix with the NCIၕ24 people. We do not have any hate for them but, they are not our 




24 Nigerian Customs and Immigration 
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Pidgin amongst ourselves. You see, we are not cut from the same cloth. We are not on the same 
path. There is no war, but you see…” – Fiona (Nigeria – Cameroon Border)  
 
Bearing in mind the contrast with the living conditions, source of income and physical attire of 
the rest of the border population, border officials display the performance not only of the 
authoritative state dimension of the border, but also of the economic and educational privileges 
of the political centre as compared to the periphery. Another dimension of this divide is that, it 
is not intended to be a separation between equals. The subservience of the borderlander towards 
the state border is expected, as we shall see in the following two examples. However, this 
subservience is also a window into the blurred lines of this border divide and the performed 
dimension of this symbolic demarcation.   
 
Example 1: The small grocery shops near border posts align their supplies with the needs and 
preferences of these border officials. Even the type of music played during business time in the 
nearby shops must please them.  
 
Example 2: The common practice in both border locales is for people crossing the border to be 
ordered out of the vehicles by border officials. They are told to leave all their belongings in the 
car, including their shoes. They are only allowed to carry with them their ID documents and 
therefore must cross the border barefoot, after sometimes undergoing physical body searches.  
 
The mere act of being body-searched and of physically walking across the land border without 
shoes is interpreted by borderlanders as an unnecessary humiliation and in fact, as a usurpation 
on the part of the guards. Berita, who shared the same car with me on several crossings, told 
me that although she crosses the border regularly and is known to the border officials, there is 
no exception for her. She complained that,  
 
 “[…] they make me born again every time”, 
 
The phrase “born again” deserves attention in understanding the performance of subservience. 
This phrase has become associated with walking barefoot across the border. It is borrowed from 
the parlance of Pentecostal Christianity that is very vibrant in the South of Nigeria, as well as 
in Cameroon. I had observed that religious linguistic references are deeply ingrained in much 
of the way borderlanders relate to their social world. In the drinking parlours, bars, markets 
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and cars around Ikom and Ekok (Cameroon-Nigeria border), it is not uncommon for someone 
to come up to you and suggest that you should consider joining their church by “accepting 
Jesus as your Lord and Saviour”. If you do, you will be known as being “born again”. In one 
church service I attended in Ikom, the Pastor explained to new converts that:  
 
“To be born again means to abandon everything bad behind you, every sin, every bad company, 
and follow the light of Jesus for the rest of your life”.  
 
Hence, the powerful symbolism of leaving everything behind (in the car), including shoes and 
crossing the border barefooted forcefully portrays the notion of depriving and surrendering to 
a higher being, a deference to a superior moral authority. As we shall see below, this display of 
power (imbalance) does not sit well with the borderlanders’ interpretation of the expected 
subservient response.  Most importantly, the allegory of being “born again” is substantiated as 
pure performance because, just like the pastor complained that new and enthusiastic converts 
still go back to their old ways, everything that is left behind in the cars are eventually picked 
up by their owners who do not continue their journey as barefooted as they crossed the border. 
This shows the extent to which this subservience conceals a high degree of hypocrisy or 
subversion on the part of the border crossers.  
 
Picture 15 - Police searching travellers who stepped out the vehicle to cross on foot as directed 
From a prosaic observation, one could be tempted to infer subservience based on the 
borderlander’s submission to the searches. The compliance with instructions to walk 
barefooted across the border seem to signify their confirmation that they have understood and 
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are aligning with the message conveyed by official border signs, symbols and performances. 
This observation can even be reinforced by the fact that borderlanders promptly exit the vehicle 
even before being ordered to do so or prepare their documentation such as IDs when 
approaching the point where this could be required, or instantly raise their hands to submit to 
body-searches. However, as shall be discussed in Chapter 5 on mobility and negotiation 
strategies, behind this apparent conformity, borderlanders actively contest the legitimacy of 
those demanding such subservience and subvert the border by converting such performance of 
theirs into instrumental resources. They do this through clothing, code-switching, money, 
official documents and most importantly, other members of the border community. 
Borderlanders as much as border officials mobilise their respective semiotic resources to 
engage a dialogic performance of the border through certain behaviours expected by the state 
border at a specific time on the specific site of the border.  
 
4.3 Locus 2: How borderlanders create vernacular space within, across and beyond the 
physical border  
 
This section discusses the spaces produced and navigated by borderlanders. When we look at 
the implications of the imbalance of power in the dynamics shaping the border space, a set of 
essential questions arise. The questions are: what are the complexities of the spatial 
organisation of the borderland, beyond the vernacular/official divide? In other words, what 
other spaces are produced by the performativity thus established and what relationships are 
there between these spaces? In order to attend to these questions, this first part draws on the 
data to analyse how the vernacular relation to the border space can lead to a situation where 
one layer of the border superimposes itself on and/or subsumes the other. It distinguishes 
between fixed and shifting layers of the border space from the borderlander’s perspective. The 
second part of the section then further problematises the notion of border layers, by probing 
into the ways in which borderlanders have spatialised their border world into contiguous and 
hierarchical frames of action.  
 
The “Border Bridge Closed” video described in Chapter 1, shows how the vernacular 
dimension of the border can be subsumed under the official performance of the state border. In 
that specific case, because of tensions between two countries (Nigeria and Cameroon), the 
official crossing point is simply closed, consequently shutting down all activities for the 
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borderlanders who would have relied on this crossing point to return home or go about their 
daily activities. Most importantly, it is the fact that despite the tension, transnational 
interactions can continue, that which makes us realise that there are diverging ways of relating 
to the border space. While I was doing fieldwork in 2017, what is dubbed in Cameroon the 
“anglophone crisis” was in its early stages with separatist activists fleeing into Nigeria. There 
would be announcements on the radio that the border had been closed between the two 
countries, yet one could still hear people saying, “I am going to Cameroon”. just as 
unassumingly as those saying, “I have just arrived from Cameroon”. Another particularly 
telling example of this vernacular dimension of the border diverging from the official border 
can be found in the words of Docta, who had this to say when I asked him if he would feel 
safer should the border close. 
 
DW: “Would you feel safer if they closed the border?” 
Docta: “It is not necessary. The few times, they have closed the borders, things have instead 
become worse.”  
DW: [“Probe.] Really? How?” 
Docta: “For example, when the border was closed because of the Ebola thing, people 
continued to cross but unofficially, paying high prices for bribes. These could have been people 
actually having the disease. People like us were left without a job, while criminals were using 
other contraband routes to get people in and out of Gabon.”  
DW: “Where are these contraband routes? The way I see the river between Cameroon and 
Gabon, I don’t think there can be any other way to cross apart from the bridge?!” 
Docta: “No, there are many other ways of crossing not necessarily here, but these are very 
dangerous because they are used only by drug traffickers and people like that. If they see you 
there and you are not one of them, your life is in danger. They create the routes and use them.” 
 
The official announcement of border closure therefore has no direct bearing on the reality on 
the ground. It is to some extent an empty performance of the state technologies of power at the 
border, in the sense that this official closure does not mean that people can actually be prevented 
from travelling across the border. As the dominant narrative about the border, this creates two 
potentially dangerous situations that the knowledge of the vernacular narrative can help 
contain. Firstly, as Docta says in his statement, there is a risk of people effectively carrying 
Ebola to cross the border and spread it. Secondly, the lack of accurate information also creates 
a situation whereby those whose understanding of the border is shaped only by the official 
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narrative of the border make the wrong decisions. This is illustrated by what Josiane, a young 
borderlander at the same Cameroon-Gabon border thinks was “a serious problem”. 
 
DW: “Describe what happened.” 
Josiane: “During the Ebola crisis, there were many people here who could not cross the border, 
the place was overcrowded, and we kept thinking what if we have a case of Ebola here?”  
DW: “Who did you report it to in the first place? Why?”  
Josiane: “The security people were overwhelmed too, because people kept arriving for almost 
a week, thinking that they will be let through and the situation was really out of hands. We 
started experiencing food shortages and people were defecating anyhow in the bushes, so there 
was a real risk in case somebody had Ebola. We told the officers, but there was nothing they 
could do about it. Many people had come from far away, did not have money or anywhere else 
to go, apart from just finishing their journey.”  
 
The people Josiane refers to here as being trapped are those whose knowledge would have 
been informed only by this official dimension of the border. These examples and testimonies 
point to the fact that even labelling a video clip “border closed” to refer to the official border 
crossing point being suspended is either a misreading of the actual dynamics on the ground or 
the triumph of the official border in shaping narratives about the border space. In any case, the 
diverging trajectories of mobility across the border reveal the existence of two layers of the 
border, or two spaces that are superimposed, with the official border on top of the vernacular. 
More often than not, the vernacular border space is subsumed into the official border space, 
thereby bringing forms of vernacular spatialisation that relate to the official border in terms of 
layers. That is going to be the topic of the following section.  
 
 Shifting layers - Revolving border 
 
As a response to the rigid and dominant nature of the official border, borderlanders established 
a “blown-up” relation to the state border by organising it into layers. In other words, instead of 
just accepting the border as wedging a rigid line across space and time, they have unpicked its 
constituent parts so as to be able to navigate them easily. For example, as shown in the figure 
below, the official border is seen as singular in its function from a state perspective but is 






Figure 1 – Border layers 
Areas such as nationality and country of residence are seen both through the fixed layer of the 
state border and the shifting layers of borderlanders’ gaze. The forms of spatialisation imposed 
by the state border are thus reconfigured by the borderlanders to signify plurality in areas where 
they are seen as interfering with usual modes of livelihoods. For example, the fixed layer of 
the border checks nationality at the Nigeria-Cameroon border in binary terms and as exclusive 
categories: either Nigerian or Cameroonian. You cannot be both, and even if you do not have 
any ID documents, the type of vaccination scars you have (shoulders for Nigerians; biceps for 
Cameroonians) will determine an exclusive. Depending on which nationality you are assigned, 
you will be disadvantaged either on your way out or on your way into the country. However, 
borderlanders manage to escape these rigid categorisations through shifting layers of the border 
space. As we can see in the shifting layer column as per table 3 below, borderlanders can shift 
their identity based on ancestry or family ties, and the resources range from documentation to 
body scars. To illustrate this, health policy in Nigeria provides that vaccinations against 
tuberculosis and smallpox are carried out on the shoulder, meanwhile Cameroonian health 
authorities have a policy of performing these vaccinations on the biceps. The scars left by these 
vaccinations are quite distinctive and literally separate Cameroonian bodies from Nigerian 
bodies. This can therefore be used as a rigid bordering practice, a fixed layer of identity through 
State border (Function)
Fixed layers (Exclusive 
categories) 
Shifting layers 
(Borderlander ability to 




an exclusive nationality marker. However, many Cameroonians who were born before 1961 or 
shortly thereafter might have the “Nigerian” scars, because English-speaking Cameroon was 
then an integral part of Nigeria/British colonies. This introduces the shifting layer to the identity 
category of bordering based on body scars because one can have Nigerian scar and hold a 
Cameroonian ID document, and vice-versa.  
 
The table below recapitulates how the rigid dimension of state border encounters shifting layers 
of the borderlanders’ world. The shifting layers of the border as understood by borderlanders 
convey a strong point on the ontological dimension of the vernacular border. They underscore 
the capacity of such borders to accommodate multiple dimensions of complex spatial form and 
their ability to quickly integrate new geographical imaginations. This ontological implication 
can also be analysed as providing factual evidence of a pattern ingrained in the African 
borderlander since the colonial mapping process, which has since made the physicality of the 
state border a transient spatial phenomenon. It is consequently no surprise that, concurring with 
archival information about the shifting location of borders, the insights from fieldwork indicate 
that borderlanders relate to their spatial environment as one that is constantly subject to 













Table 3 - Fixed and Shifting layers of the border 
  Fixed layer  Shifting Layer  Comments& Examples 





Country Border village  Shifting borders, inaccurate borders, land 
disputes, “fighting the border” 
Econom
y 
Business Type of business Currency fluctuations, seasonal products, 
changing needs, changing policies, new 
opportunities  
Social 
capital   




removing packaging to avoid customs, 
telling through ancestry,   
Authorit
y 
State  Mediators, 
community rulers, 
A-statal actorness  
Values  Legal  Lawful/legitimate Oil vs drugs/ Child trafficking 
 
Nevertheless, a critical reflection on the ontological basis of spatial identity of the borderlander 
also requires an exploration of the border communities in question in a relational approach, i.e. 
as a performative network of human relations acted out in spatial practices. In other words, 
what do the different types of a borderlander’s pursuits tell us about actual vernacular spatial 
hierarchy and organisation? Of course, this does not cancel the fact that the border as a 
geographical feature is place-based, nor does it diminish its investment in movement rather 
than immobility, even though its own performativity can be abstract or perceived in the 
practices of border communities.  This only implies the necessity to shift the focus from where 
community and social cohesion are performed to how the community taps into an eclectic 
social capital to cater for its changing needs within a given space, and to eventually deal with 
perceived impediments to their material fulfilment. Having earlier established that the most 
significant demarcation in the two border locales is not the division between neighbouring 
states, but rather between the border communities and the border itself, this section on shifting 
layers has introduced us to the abstract yet pregnant spheres that intersect around the border. 
From the vantage point of this plurality of spaces across the border area, I will now group 






 Spaces within and beyond the border space: community, legitimacy and money. 
 
By grouping various socioeconomic activities according to the ways in which they are 
performed as bordering practices by borderlanders, it emerges that these activities are in fact 
rooted in different spheres of the vernarcular border. Insights from the ethnographic 
observation of borderlanders conducting various livelihoods and sociocultural activities 
suggest that borderlanders operate mainly across three different bounded spaces, which often 
overlap or intersect. These spaces are not necessarily physical spaces or exclusively abstract, 
but through their performance, borderlanders create specific realms of meaning across the 
physical border space. It is in fact not extraordinary that people change their behaviour and 
types of social interactions depending on the place where they find themselves. Human 
Geographers have indeed theorised the distinction between subjective and objective spaces as 
well as the meanings attached to places as sites containing different aspects within themselves 
(J. A. Agnew, 2014; Copans, 2019; Entrikin, 2011). However, beyond this spatially produced 
meaning (Hubbard P., Kitchin R., 2004), two main elements stand out as meanings are 
constructed and mobilised by borderlanders.  
 
Firstly, all spaces created by borderlanders are rooted in values outside the realm of the border 
and extend beyond the physical space of the state border. Secondly, it is interesting to note how, 
within the border space itself, the performance of vernacular bordering practices provides 
several discrete “betweenness of places”, i.e. a point of encounter between objective and 
subjective spaces.  In this sense, what borderlanders do to circumscribe the limits of these 
bounded spaces through performance not only reflects the different scales of their identity as 
borderlanders, but also their value system as socially situated beings not exclusively defined 
by the border. In the examination of these spaces below, I refer to each type in plural form 
because of their discrete distribution across physical space, abstract space and time as well as 
the plurality of the same type space in several physical locations across the border area.  
 
As illustrated in the figure below, the first one is spaces of community, which encompass the 
performances and discursive constructions by border communities aiming at fulfilling specific 
social functions across the border space. Spaces of legitimacy relate to the moral economy of 
the border as segmented by borderlanders along the lines of morality and legitimacy, instead 
of legality and regulation. The third type of spaces is spaces of money, which relates to both 
physical and abstract contexts within which the conditions for ensuring livelihoods are created. 
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It however worth noting that the spaces are not rigidly divided as shown in this schema and 
that these do not constitute an exhaustive listing of all the spaces vernacularly produced in 
relation to the state border.  
 
 
Figure 2 - Borderland spaces 
4.3.2.1 Spaces of community 
 
Spaces of community are multiple and varied, but we can mainly look at them as both physical 
spaces and abstract spaces. One example of physical space of community can be seen in how 
Chief Ossaji, a local customary leader in a Nigerian border village25, liaises with other chiefs 
in border villages to distribute land and settle disputes in “grey areas”, i.e. land whose 
ownership is not clear and upon which many people can lay claim at the same time. 
 
Chief Ossaji: “You know, when the white man came and said that from now on, this is a border, 
some people just left their land, never to come back. Many generations later, we do not know 














land now. It should belong to one of us still, but not because he is Cameroonian or Nigeria. 
Just because he is our son.” 
Another example of physical spaces of community can also be seen in the ways in which 
borderlanders mesh the border space with a web of family ties across time and space. This is 
very obvious in the following segment of the FG discussion at the Cameroon-Gabon border 
during which an elder (Padday, 80 years old) tells me about their transnational community:  
 
Lamel: “Yes, like us here, we are “Sandons”, we have meetings following the rituals of our 
ancestral practices.” 
DW: “Are the sandons like a tribe or an ethnic group?” 
Lamel: “It is like saying a family, under the ntoumou ethnic group.” 
DW: So, what do you do when you meet for your traditional rituals and family gatherings?  
Padday: For exampe, this year again, we have already received the invitations with the dates, 
we are going to go to Gabon, Cameroon and Guinea for three days. We do this every year.”  
DW: “And what do you do during these three days? What do you talk about?”  
Padday: “As a family, we talk about our ancestral traditions and solve problems that have 
arisen in the family. If there is a problem in the family in Equatorial Guinea, they call me and 
I go there and solve it. And whatever I say they listen to me, if I say the problem is finished, it 
is finished for the family.  I have done the same in Gabon. I am a peacemaker and they respect 
me everywhere.”  
 
Apart from creating discrete physical spaces of community across the border, borderlanders 
are also involved in more ethereal spaces of community, which are not necessarily anchored in 
physical spaces but are expressed as abstract bounds of specific practices, shared values and 
norms in relation to the borderland. These spaces comprise various formal and informal 
solidarity networks across the border. Such formal solidarity networks include the “Border 
Driver Association” for example, at the Cameroon-Nigerian border or the “Association des 
Femmes Bayam Salam” at the Cameroon-Gabon border. Informal solidarity networks bring 
together, for instance, travellers who form a community of their own, but I argue that this 
belonging is not imagined. 
 
Anderson's (1991, p.6) classical theorisation of nationalism elucidates that, in essence, a nation 
is an ‘imagined political community’, since the individuals of a nation will not personally be 
acquainted with most of their fellow members but on a level of consciousness, conceive 
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themselves as all belonging to the same community. The unstated assumption in this theory 
however remains that such a community should first be decreed, recognised or asserted. By 
applying Anderson’s theory to the border community instead of a specific nation, some 
peculiarities tend to reinforce the notion of unimagined communities, i.e. those who might not 
see themselves as belonging together, yet are locked together into shared practices and 
representations. The relationship between members of the border community is not always that 
of solidarity or cohesion. In fact, tensions occur for example during land disputes in poorly 
demarcated border areas, where national identities, and even national pride, tend to supersede 
ethnic belonging or cross-border solidarity. Nevertheless, my observation of the two border 
communities allowed me to conclude that despite multiple identities and tension woven as 
undercurrent of relationship dynamics amongst members of the border community, there is a 
distinct sense of belonging related to territorial placement of individuals rather than their 
relationship with one another. Spaces of community thus evidence an aspect of belonging, 
which is belonging without imagining.  
 
4.3.2.2 Spaces of money 
 
The most obvious spaces of money across the border are marketplaces. The driving factor of 
all interactions in places like Marché Mondial at the Cameroon-Gabon border is money. The 
quest for money here seems to supersede all other activities in relation to the border. Spaces of 
money are also literally epitomised at the Cameroon-Nigeria border by currency exchange 
activities where many individuals engage in currency exchange at the border with the clear 
objective of taking advantage of the currency differentials and economic fluctuations. These 
are spaces of money because money in cash is the most obvious pursuit in these physical 
spaces, which are nonetheless generated by two macro-economic systems coming into contact 
precisely at these specific spaces like no other border spaces. Another example of spaces of 
money is how borderlanders demarcate where they can directly make money from where the 
state can make money on the border space. In fact, when traffic on certain unofficial cross-
border routes increases noticeably, thereby prompting patrols by border guards in those areas, 
borderlanders move to set up their “community development” roadblocks on alternative cross-




Interestingly, borderlanders leave the roadblocks behind when they move to another location 
and border officers just literally come and begin to man the same checkpoints set up by 
borderlanders. When eventually the traffic goes down because it has been yet again diverted to 
the “new” routes, border officials either go to these next places or return to their original border 
post. This illustrates a tacit collaboration between borderlanders and border officials as part of 
a process of creating vernacular spaces of money far from state spaces of money across the 
same border area, using the same methods. These checkpoints are therefore physical spaces of 
money within their own bounds wherein both ordinary borderlanders and border officials insert 
themselves for the same purpose. The mobility of both borderlanders and border officials 
across different checkpoints also indicate that spaces of money are not limited physically either. 
In the same vein, many borderlanders travel with both currencies and while travelling, they 
offer exchange services to other travellers in exchange for small fees. As Florence says:  
 
“Once I have tied my scarf like this, I am in business mode, no sister, no family, no friend. My 
day must pay me. Full stop.” 
 
This statement summarises the psychological disposition or mental spaces that are not 
necessarily rooted in physical space, and which I have included in spaces of money for 
classification and analysis. The same concrete-abstract duality can be observed in spaces of 
legitimacy.  
 
4.3.2.3 Spaces of legitimacy (moral economy) 
 
By spaces of legitimacy, I refer to borderland practices, shared values and norms that sequence 
the borderland both virtually and physically in terms of what/where is a crime or not. In other 
words, based on a specific vernacular nomenclature, as can be seen in the table below, what is 
illegal might be seen as legitimate by borderlanders and vice-versa, and therefore falling 
outside or inside vernacular spaces of legitimacy depending on borderlanders’ view. 
Conversely, what is seen by borderlanders as a criminal transgression might not have a signifier 
in legal official discourse due to lack of relevance. Spaces of legitimacy can also be physical. 
Examples include back roads which borderlanders did not want to show me or topics they did 
not want to get involved with, for fear of “Wahala [getting into trouble]”. Based on this shifting 
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normative frameworks for defining what is acceptable or not, the table below illustrates a range 
of issues and the ways in which these are considered a crime by some, and not by others.  
 
Table 4 - What is criminal? 
Criminal? Borderlanders Official state position 
Human trafficking Not always Yes 
Informing on contraband Yes  No 
Smuggling No Yes 
Smuggling Drugs & Armsၕ Mostly Yes  Yes  
Fake IDs  No  Yes 
Community roadblocks No Irrelevant 
Trespassing shrine Yes  Irrelevant 




To conclude, this chapter on the semiotics of the border and its spatialisation delineates the performative 
relationships between borderlanders and the border space, and especially how imaginations of the border 
space are built on the grammar of border signs and symbols. However, this chapter has in the first instance 
introduced the borderlanders before proceeding to conceptualise the dynamic relationship between 
vernacular gaze and the official expression of the border. This examination cuts across a normative 
dichotomy or tension between the vernacular and the official border. Beyond this almost Manichean view 
of border dynamics, the interactions of plural vernacular spaces in the postcolonial context reveals that the 
dynamics in borderlands are too complex to be grasped from a two-level analysis of the border only, nor 
even from the centre-periphery perspective. The border performativity involving the vernacular and the 
official results in the production of many other distinct vernacular spaces that structure a form of spatial 
hierarchy.   
 
A historical hindsight tells us that by becoming borderlanders, pre-colonial inhabitants of 
territorial spaces that morphed almost overnight into border spaces, did more than 
reconfiguring their relationship to territoriality. They also adjusted their relationship to 
authority and hierarchy in their (postcolonial) border living space that had a postcolonial border 
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space, amongst other things. This is indicative of a trajectory of resilience alongside the 
inception and development of the colonial border. As gleaned from the insights generated 
during my fieldwork, this reconfiguration of the borderlander’s imaginations of space does not 
result only in a dichotomy between the vernacular border and the official border. Nor does it 
suppress vernacular socio-spatial dynamics. Instead, border “layers” and spaces are produced, 
even though these are epistemically silenced by the discursive dominance of the official border 
as dictated by its functions, a solid component of the nation-state. Consequently, apart from 
essentialising and/or excluding the other layers and spaces of the border, the misrepresentation 
of power in the border space has limited our understanding of these dynamic vernacular modes 
of organising space.  
 
It is worth noting however, that the bounders between the spaces imagined and produced by borderlanders 
are not as rigid as their above classifications may imply. As I have found out, these vernacular spaces, 
both physical and abstract, are not limited to interhuman relationships. They can also be defined 
by the specific pursuits, such as money or land acquisition through community belonging. 
Navigating these spaces can also occur simultaneously, as one can be grappling with different issues and 
relationships at the same time. To sum this up, I have generated below a framework for analysing when 
and how various actors rooted in different vernacular spaces influence mobility in terms of power 
differentials. This is based on ethnographic observation rather than statistical analysis, but it robustly 
reflects the hierarchical structure of actors that allows the borderlander to make rational choices about 
mobility and resources. This is also an illustration of how the “betweenness of places” operates in the 
vernacular dynamics of the borderlands. As summed up in the table below and the following pie chart, I 
have linked actors to spaces and the hierarchy is established by determining the weight of particular 
vernacular spaces on the ability to influence mobility across the border in terms of facilitating, 








Table 5 - Potential of Border Actors to Influence Mobility 
 
 
Figure 3 - Potential of border actors to influence mobility 
 
Potential to influence someone else’s mobility 
Travellers Go-between Traders Transporters Immigration officials
Actors  Description / vernacular space of influence  Potential to 
influence someone 
else’s mobility (1 
to 5) 
Travellers  Individuals seeking to cross the border for social 
reasons (space of community) 
1 
Go-between  Unofficial role but is recognised in the border area and 
wields a considerable amount of power. Sometimes a 
relative of a powerful official or a friend (spaces of 
money/spaces of community/spaces of legitimacy) 
5 
Traders  Economic operators who buy things from one side of 
the border to sell on the other side (spaces of 
money/spaces of legitimacy) 
3 
Transporters  Those who carry passengers and goods from one side 










In the same manner that the divide between the official border and the vernacular border provides for 
passageways, the essentially conflicting nature of links between all these spaces also intersect, instead of 
opposing one another. The same holds true with the distinction between Border Deniers  and Border 
Acknowledgers. Like in any battle therefore, there are safe zones as well as cease-fires, and open 
lines of communication between warring factions. This analogy, for lack of better images, 
perfectly depicts the fluidity of these bounds across time and space. Borderlands are thus 
effectively a transition zone or a hybrid space in which authority, loyalties and affiliations are not clear-cut 
(D. Newman, 2012; Schomerus & de Vries, 2014). However, as I argue in the next chapter with 
regards to the distinction between Border Deniers  and Border Acknowledgers, there has 
usually been a confusion between this hybridisation of the border space and the bi-placed 
identities of borderlanders in their imaginations of self. The border being just one hurdle amongst 
many others along the way, this reflection on identity dislocation and bi-placed biographies offers a 
theoretical ground for categorising a type of social actor in the transnational space; an actor, who is able 
to  produce meaning for places and strategically shape their environment beyond (and independently 
from) the state paradigm. These actors operate within the paradigm of what I have called a-statal 
actorness.   
 
The question the next chapter will attend to therefore is, how does such a paradigm articulate with the 
discursive landscape of borderlanders’ identities to respond to the vital need of making sense 
of the spatial environment within which they operate? As mobilised discursively, the bi-
placement or multiple rootedness of a-statal actorness link to how border communities 
conceptualise or perform the border, depending on whether they are denying or acknowledging 
the border. In other words, these spatial imaginations will be enacted through the ways in which 
borderlanders convey a combination between a performance of spatialisation and imaginations 
of self. These enactments, otherwise known as bordering practices, can be observed through 










5 Chapter 5 – Vernacular bordering practices: negotiating (im)mobility 
and mobilisation of resources across the borderland 
 
This chapter uncovers how border communities invent and constitute themselves to invest in 
their spatial environment. It seeks to answer the research question 2, namely: Which 
vernacular practices are engaged by border communities to navigate the border, mobilise 
resources and maintain social trajectories across the border? The multiple spaces of the 
vernacular border as uncovered in the preceding chapter are also a theatre for studying the 
various ways in which borderlanders navigate across them and give them meaning. The 
plurality of these spaces even from the borderlander’s perspective could vindicate Gupta and 
Ferguson’s definition of the borderland as an “interstitial zone of displacement and 
deterritorialisation that shapes the identity of hybridised subject” (1992, p. 18). It is a 
conceptualisation supported by Martinez who argues that, “the determining influence of the 
border makes the lives of border people functionally similar irrespective of location, 
nationality, ethnicity, culture, and language” (1994, p. 18). Hybridity has thus been presented 
as a universal identity marker for borderlanders all over the world. Their geographical 
positioning is assumed to be fated with displacement and deterritorialisation. It is therefore an 
identity marked by dispossession and disconnection. However, using the concept of 
biplacement, instead of displacement, this chapter will argue that, conceptualising the identity 
of the borderlanders as hybrid seems to lend more credence to facile essentialisation of the 
postcolonial border subject as this reinforces the notion of deterministic identities as well as 
linear bordering practices. This blanket characterisation of borderlanders to some extent echoes 
the territoriality-related arguments about African spatiality in general, and African border 
communities in particular. 
 
In the following lines, I provide comments to several statements by borderlanders who create 
a narrative of bi-placed biographies referring to themselves as deeply placed in two or more 
locations even though they produce diverging performances of the border. The chapter is 
divided into three sections. In the first part, it looks at how underneath, above and beyond the 
permanence of the state border, diverging imaginations of self and space produce different 
performances by borderlanders, who can be fluid between two main sets of behaviours. This is 
biplacement. The second section of this chapter highlights these ambiguities and tensions that 
show the difficulty to confine the borderlander to a specific category. Building upon this, the 
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third section now explores how such a “biplaced” borderlander negotiates mobility and 
mobilisations of resources across the border space.  
 
5.1 Diverging border performances 
 
 Acknowledging the border  
 
The personification of the border by most Border Acknowledgers who discursively bestow the 
border with human attributes is indicative of a sense-making that recognises the existence of 
the border, including its agency as distinct. Analysis of casual conversations and semi-
structured interview transcripts from my fieldwork reveals that borderlanders have come to see 
the border as a (anti)social being, using personalising adjectives to refer to the border. Such 
descriptions of the border include characterisations such as:   
 
 “He [the border] is smaller than you” Aliou, Cameroon-Gabon border 
 
“Sometimes, it behaves well, sometimes not. Some years, the border is a blessing, for example 
if you are selling this from Nigeria when the Naira is high”. Fiona, Cameroon-Nigeria Border  
 
“You should know how to fight the border, because it always fights back and you must always 
be prepared” Docta, Cameroon-Gabon Border 
 
“The border should always listen to us, rather than us listening to the border” Odette, 
Cameroon-Nigeria Border   
 
This personification of the border by border communities underscores their perceived 
axiomatic ontology of the border whose various functionalities across time and space are part 
and parcel of the same way of being. Much of the analysis of the border dynamics has been 
based on these varying functionalities of the border. Shifts in policies only reflecting these very 
changes in border functionalities. Hence, the conceptualisation of the Border Acknowledger is 
not dynamic in terms of the existence of the border, because the border is fixed in its purpose 
even though its functions can be multifaceted and constantly changing. The language used 
mainly by Border Acknowledgers conveys a sense of habit to the border. Border Acknowledgers 
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therefore view their relational engagement with the border through the border’s human 
attributes as reflected for instance in Aliou’s use of pronouns and the verb “quarrel” below: 
 
“If you want to use the border, you must know that he does nothing for free, my friend. He does 
not call you to come, but if you come to him, it is your choice. You can also choose to go 
through other routes, but it would take you days to reach the other side and you are not safe. 
[…] He is smaller than you, he can't force you, but if you come to him, you have to pay. That's 
the rule, if you respect that, you guys will never quarrel.”  
 
This personification of the border by Aliou echoes Lamel (Focus Group, Cameroon-Gabon), 
who mixes the border and the actions of random actors, perhaps to show that the extent of 
entanglement is such that the particular border layer or border space activated by an individual 
take on the characteristics of the said individual.   
 
Lamel : “Yes, but the border stands in your ways only until you give him money. Then he 
becomes the Canoe man, who is there only to work his money. As long as he receives his 500 
or 1000 CFA francs, he couldn’t care less whether it is a criminal crossing or a saint, where 
you are coming from and where you are headed to. That's what the border does to your 
brain.”26  
 
The personification of the border that conflates the canoe man and the border itself, establishes 
the relational levelled playing field where, whenever necessary, the borderlander and border 
can meet and engage relationally as equals. Attributing agential ability to the border akin to 
human capabilities by members of the border community can also be found in the common 
expression “fighting the border”, which travellers use to refer to their dealings with border 
officials. This expression supposes that the border is able to engage in a confrontational 




26 Personal communication. Cameroon-Gabon Border, November 2017.  
This particular statement was made in the context of a focus group discussion when I was asking questions about 
insecurity in the border area between Cameroon and Gabon, and the role played by Canoe man in helping fugitives 




occurs at the official crossing point. This is certainly why Florence also conflates the border 
and border officials into a single person when she says: “The border can steal even your family 
potၕ29 if they see it.”    Border personification of the is found mostly throughout the narratives 
of Border Acknowledgers, and not in those of the Border Deniers . This is especially consistent 
with the fact that, as suggested by Aliou’s statement above and reinforced by Odette and 
Souley’s words below, engaging the border is a rational relationship not only to the official 
border, but also to other vernacular spaces of the borderland.  
 
DW: “Why do you not use other crossing points since the border guys here seem to annoy you 
than much?”  
 
Odette: “If you are carrying large quantities of goods like we do, it is very difficult to use those 
shortcuts, because you will always need a car and the state of the road is not always the best. 
You will waste a lot of time there in the bush and time is money for me. I sometimes do two 
trips over the border in one day.” 
Souley: “Also, it is not always safe there especially if you have a lot of things to carry and 
people know that you are carrying money.”   
 
Odette: “Here, we have our regular drivers whom we trust and who can pick us from home 
and drop us immediately at destination in Nigeria.”  
 
The border they refer to here is the official crossing point, and not the line of demarcation on 
the ground. It is also understandable why Aliou is persuaded that “the border is smaller than 
you”, because it may well be that a “border person” is only the dimension of the border resident 
that engages the border, the personified border. This personification is also that of all the layers 
and hierarchical spaces into which the borderlander has subdivided its space. In this regard, 
attributing human traits to the border is indicative of the multivocal relationship with the border 
space, within which the statist dimension of the border is engaged by the borderlander as one 
of the many ‘individuals’ in their social worlds comprised of many other spaces. As in normal 
human relationships therefore, (dis)engaging is normally a rational choice governed by 
freewill, even though underpinned by the tension between values and interests. Put differently, 
a border person simply refers to the skillset necessary to deal with the constraints of the official 
border or any other spatialised hierarchy of the border that Border Acknowledgers choose to 
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engage with. This can be illustrated by the engagement of the border as space of community 
by travellers.  
 
The community of travellers crossing the border always took shape as we approached the first 
border checkpoints. At this particular time, long distance travellers too would usually be told 
by fellow passengers on the bus or in taxis how to behave and what to say in order to avoid 
being “fleeced” by the border. Advice was given on how to package the bags, speak to border 
officials, carry oneself, and tell stories about origins and destinations. Once the border is 
crossed, these same passengers take different destinations and enter diverse worlds, different 
spaces. We can infer from this observation that such a solidarity is not place-based and will 
therefore be wrongly described as border solidarity. Given that the border would be too weak 
an identity marker, it seems appropriate to view this as a space produced by the border, and a 
virtual space within which the community of travellers come together to mutually facilitate 
their mobility.  
 
The same holds true for the microtrade links among marketwomen, tradesmen, transporters, 
fellow passengers who forge a solidarity not based on their border identity, but for the purpose 
of maximising their mobility in that corridor of opportunities. Associations such as the “Border 
Transporter Association” at the Cameroon-Nigeria border, or the “Solidarité Bayam Salam” at 
the Cameroon-Gabon border are more permanent and formalised communities of 
borderlanders. Just as the community of travellers, they are formed in response to the border’s 
likelihood to threaten their interests. They therefore discursively position themselves not as 
international traders, but as free movement petitioners who are concerned with the restrictions 
being posed on their rights to interact within their community, comprised of a cluster of border 
villages. This discursive construction of bi-placement in the spaces of community situates 
mobility for the purposes of marriage, visiting kin and friends, attending ceremonial activities, 
or for local distribution and consumption of “small things”. By refusing to enter the mould of 
the international, mobility is performed by way of a minimalist acknowledgment of the border 
through an engagement of community spaces. The common thread to this performance remains 
bi-placed identities, which borderlanders perform in a way that their displacements look as if 
they were not any form of mobility.  In order to cross the state border, the bi-locational status 
is mobilised by those who have to “fight” their way through the border. The following story 
recounted to me by Josiane (a bartender in Kye-Ossi), exemplifies an important way in which 
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border users’ discursive representation of their bi-placement ensures that vernacular 
governance dominates official border governance: 
 
“Last month, my friends and I went to Guinea. It was just for sightseeing, but they wanted us 
to pay before we cross. My friend has a fake Guinean ID which she showed, and said that we 
were together.  When she was taking the ID out her wallet, her Cameroonian ID also fell down. 
They first said that her ID is fake, and that even if it was a real one she is not entitled to have 
two IDs and that we could not prove that we live nearby. How could they verify? They 
themselves could not speak ntoumou. So we argued over all those things for about thirty 
minutes, but they eventually let us through.” Josiane, Cameroon-Gabon Border 
 
Because this bi-placement is not clear-cut on paper, clarifications are always needed and that 
is why border officials have to ask many questions, thus venturing into a discursive territory 
over which they have very little control. In fact, everyone with some local knowledge can claim 
to be Nigerian, Cameroonian or Gabonese and these border officials would not always be able 
to ascertain the validity of the claim. Everyone can also establish the extent to which they 
belong, knowing that this only serves to reduce the effect of the border. Josiane added that,  
 
“You don’t always have to have documents, and not having documents does not mean that you 
don’t belong where you say you belong. They will still let you through if you can convince 
them”.  
 
Border officers themselves open the way for this discursive construction of bi-placement when 
they ask for more details, and where state inconsistencies mean that there is no written law for 
every scenario that might arise. Fittingly, borderlanders are all too aware of this.  In their use 
of bi-placed identities to perform their mobility as meaningless, long distance travellers and 
borderlanders who cross the border almost on a daily basis use their bi-locational ability to 
maximise their mobility opportunities across the border area. These Border Acknowledgers 
navigate the border space with the full awareness that it is an exceptional corridor of 
opportunities straddling two distinct spaces. However, it is equally their understanding that 
their bi-placed identities and the discursive constructions thereof will ensure their mobility as 
well as limit the negative impact of the border on the end-goals of their pursuits, be it social or 
economic. They therefore execute their mobility from the standpoint of their bi-placed identity, 
which they seek to rationalise as meaning that the border has no jurisdiction over their bodies. 
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Their main objective remains to maintain the necessary freedom of movement across and 
around the border, by presenting themselves as not moving at all. To put it in another way, the 
notion of bi-placement makes highly purposive mobility look like meaningless movement, one 
that is not worthy of state border attention. For example, at the official Nigeria-Cameroon 
border crossing point, when negotiations were stalling with border officials and heated 
arguments erupted, the traveller would made the following exclamation, with all the gestures 
that indicated surprise and outrage:  
 
“I am going home, and you want me to pay to go to my own house? This is unbelievable!”  
 
Border officers usually give in to this theatricalisation of bi-placed identities, once it is 
confirmed that the individual does in fact live in the vicinity of the border. Many a time 
however, long distance travellers who know these tricks and put up the right performance can 
also be let through the border.  As a matter of fact, minimising the international significance of 
their movement across state borders also takes the form of actually confronting the official 
crossing point as seen in the first example above. As illustrated by the “I am going home, and 
you want me to pay to go to my own house? This is unbelievable!” statement, borderlanders 
tend to discursively subsume the interstitial border world within their bi-placement. By 
depriving their mobility of its international character, borderlanders succeed in negating or 
mitigating the power of the state border itself. This comes through clearly in the statement 
below: 
 
“Sometimes, you have to look them in the eye and tell them who you are. And they know it, even 
when they pretend, they don’t know the rules. They just want to see how far they can push you. 
And if you are weak, they abuse your rights. Even when you give them a small something, you 
have to make sure they understand that you are just giving them, not because they threatened 
you. If they see fear in your eyes, you are finished” - Fiona, Cameroon-Nigeria Border 
 
Another illustration of this link between deep roots within a vernacular space of community 
connected to bi-placed identity across borders could be found in a land dispute I witnessed in 
Baleete. This village is located at the border between Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. The 
place is far from the official crossing point and where the border demarcation has not been 
precise since independence. A local convention amongst villagers has placed the international 
border “somewhere after the big trees over there”, as I was told. However, a dispute arose when 
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one Cameroonian decided to clear a vast swathe of the area to use for farming. Some villagers 
on the Eq. Guinea side estimated that this encroached on their land and moved to stop the 
clearing. Mbanga (the Cameroonian) asked: “Are you saying that this is Equatorial Guinea, or 
are you claiming that I have taken your land?” As he explained to the elders who were trying 
to solve the dispute, “the land might bear the name of the country, but our forefathers gave it 
to us, not to a country”. After listening to him, the elders concurred with his reasoning and 
decided that he had the right to farm across the border even as a Cameroonian. Not because of 
some sort of property rights guaranteed by the state, but because the land had belonged to his 
ancestors and had been passed down from generations to generations, long before the state ever 
existed.  
 
In a result similar to the one sought by Border Deniers , the confrontation between state 
controls over the border crossing points, and the borderlander’s desire to move across and 
around the international border occurs not in official terms, but in vernacular terms. Of course, 
the border official still embodies the state during these interactions (language, uniform, rules 
and regulations), but the borderlander considers all of this as “le prix taxéၕ30”, as they refer to 
the demands of border officials. In other words, everything is negotiable, from visa fees to 
customs duties to the veracity of documents presented. They know that their bi-placed 
positionality provides them with avenues for manipulating the border and eventually reducing 
the demands and constraints it attempts to place upon them. Here again, the notion of 
ungoverned space takes a slightly different meaning as border governance is eventually overrun 
by vernacular governance of the border, exactly what Border Deniers  themselves seek to 
achieve.  Border Acknowledgers accordingly ensure their mobility by dislocating their 
identities in sequence from one discrete space to another while consistently demonstrating that 
they belong to each of the spaces, so as to deny the border the faculty to regard their mobility 
as transnational. As such, just about anybody can tap into this repertoire of bi-placed identities 
to negotiate mobility. And when just about anybody crossing the border can use it, bi-placement 
becomes a frame of reference for assumed legitimacy and inalienable rights to uninhibited 
movement across the border.  In so doing, the borderlander articulates their bi-placed identity 
not in a bid to relate to the border, but rather to bring the border into their own world as a 
subordinated feature, by collapsing it into their plural geographical imaginations. Just like 
Border Acknowledgers thus use the bi-placement related to spaces of community to minimise 
the effect of the border, Border Deniers  also refer to deep roots related to spaces of legitimacy 
in their performative denial of the state border.  
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 Denying the border through deep roots  
 
For some neighbouring villages along the three-part border between Cameroon, Equatorial 
Guinea and Gabon, the distance between the villages through the official border crossing point 
is far shorter thanks to tarred roads and automobile practicability, as compared to the tortuous 
footpaths through the forest and sometimes sloppy riverbanks. The same observation has been 
made about the Ekang crossing point at the Nigeria-Cameroon border. Yet, inhabitants of these 
villages still prefer using cultural crossing points.  
 
“If we were passing through Mfum like this, we would be international travellers, but here we 
are just going from one village to the other, even from one farm to another.” -  Yomi  
  
Hence, Border Deniers  not only reject the rationality of the border post as the ideal crossing 
point into the other country, they also align their mobility with their geographical imaginations 
of the border space. Their understanding of their geographical world specifically has not 
integrated spatial organisation in terms of countries. The case of physically avoiding the official 
border crossing point or ignore the state must not, however, be overstated. Among the multiple 
framings of their space provided by Border Deniers ’ narratives, is the proposition that their 
space is safe and secure and does not need government intervention. In other words, based on 
the vernacular spatial nomenclature, Border Deniers  see their immediate physical environment 
as spaces of legitimacy and it is based on this rationale that it supersedes the State.  Eudes 
emphasised to me that,  
 
“No sous-préfet has ever set foot on this area. I don’t think the government has any business 
here. Why would they come here? For a hospital? Their tarred road? There are no boko haram 
here, no armed robbers. Nothing. Why would they start changing things here now? Who 
complained? We don’t complain. All these pathways you see here were built by our parents, 
even before Independence and these were not to link to countries, but just to move from one 
village to another”.  
 
Eudes also insists on the intrinsic virtue of their transborder space and how it keeps them away 




 “When people were trying to pass through here to go to Equatorial Guinea for a coup d’état, 
we helped the authorities to identify them. We did it all, there was no distinction, and no one 
would say oh I am Cameroonian, so this does not concern me, or I am Gabonese, that’s none 
of my business. We were all in it together. Why? Because this place is a sacred place, our 
ancestors loved peace and the Ntoumou people love peace above everything else. We cannot 
follow greed.”  
 
This representation of their territorial space as safe and the people navigating within it as 
morally upright amounts to a discursive construction whose final goal is to support the reason 
why this area should be left alone. Yomi’s statement echoes Eudes’:  
 
“I don’t need to take part in any illegal activities like smuggling weapons or drugs or trafficking 
children through this forest. I am happy with what the forest gives me. But if they continue to 
ban us from harvesting certain products because they want to sell it to big drug companies, 
many people will have no choice than doing what is illegal. Now you will hear that some forest 
guards fell in a trap that was set for animals, why do we not fall in those traps? Because it is 
our place, we know the place like the palm our hands. They are now moving around the forest 
here with guns, entering even sacred places with guns, stepping foot in shrines where they are 
not supposed to go. Why are they bring all this wahala?” 
 
Border Deniers  like Eudes and Yomi here present the government as attracted by those who 
“follow greed” and those who do negative things. Presenting their living space as a peaceful 
one that seeks nothing negative, they discursively restrict the presence of the government 
especially because of the absence of those things that could serve as a pretext for government 
presence in their area.  
 
“This forest is our true supporter and redeemer. It feeds us, gives us money and alleviates our 
suffering in a way that neither the church nor the government can ever do. You see, the variety 
of products you can find in the forest can help your household in many ways, for food, medicine, 
building your house and earning money. That is why I don’t understand those who cling to the 
cities even when they are jobless there or living a miserable life with little money”. (who?) 
 
As a matter of fact, the forest is a space where households directly sustain their livelihood in 
at least four key areas: food security, health improvement, income generation, reduced 
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vulnerability. Yomi told me that over 700 different useful forest products can be harvested from 
the forest area that we visited. He specialises in bush meat, wrapping leaves, forest food, 
medicinal plants, canes, chewing stick, building materials, pestle, sponge fibres, mushrooms, 
fruits and nuts, leafy vegetable etc. This study did not collect much data on other livelihoods 
activities in the transborder space such as farming or grazing. However, casual observations 
established that the interstitial spaces between two countries were also more conducive for 
farming and cattle grazing, because “the place belongs to no one” as I was told. In addition to 
cognitively marking their territory as special, Border Deniers  stress the vital importance of 
that border space to their livelihoods and, above all, link everything to their ancestral lineage 
as territorially rooted. The vital importance of the border space to borderlanders is therefore 
not just in terms of the resources or commodities it represents, but because it is first and 
foremost ancestral land. 
 
Yomi: “That is impossible when I am alive. When I am dead, obviously, I will leave not only 
this place, but the world. But as we speak nothing can me make me abandon the land of my 
ancestors. Nothing. My life is here. Even if my children go away, no matter how far they go, 
they know that they will still come back here. Mkot is our homeland. Our ancestors gave it to 
us, and therefore we cannot abandon it.  Why do you ask that question?”  
 
In fact, one key difference between Border Deniers  and Border Acknowledgers is that the 
former almost all stated that they would continue to live in the area even if the border closed 
forever and even if economic activities were reduced to nil for one reason or another. Their 
claim of legitimacy is in greater part rooted in this sense of deep territorialisation, which they 
use to construct the border space and its content as a natural endowment to them. The rare 
instances of references to the border are those where Border Deniers  like Eudes explain why 
they see their relationship to border space as superseding their relationship to the international 
border, like in the statement below:   
 
“The international border falling here is our luck as it could have been our bad luck if it was a 
disaster like lake Nyos in Cameroon a few years ago. Nobody came to say that they should be 
spared. It is our place first, and the border second.”  
 
In the same vein, when Fiona says: “I am Cameroonian, and I am also Nigerian like my 
children”, she does not only see this bi-placement as generating an entitlement, but most 
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importantly, as a legitimate entitlement which the border does not supersede. Instead, it is the 
other way around: their legitimacy is derived from a border layer that predates state border in 
time, and physically extends beyond the state borderline. Fiona therefore expects the border to 
adapt to this natural state of things, and would therefore express frustration if it does not, as 
seen below:  
 
“The border should always listen to us, rather than us listening to the border”, she says, 
“because we were here before the border and everybody who is sent here to work at the border 
comes and meets us here, then leaves us still here when they go. I know things about the border 
that even the government does not know. I know places where people call Cameroon, while it’s 
Gabon, and I know places that people call Equatorial Guinea while it is Cameroon. I did not 
attend any school to learn this, and no one pays me to know all this. So, when I show up at the 
border, they better respect that knowledge. And I tell them that all the time. They already know 
me anyway, even when I go up there for negotiations on behalf of someone. They deal with me 
quickly.”  
 
Hence, imaginations of self as a legitimately rooted in a territorial space lead to performance 
of the border as superseded by this legitimacy based on imaginations of the border space as a 
natural endowment for the borderlanders. Imaginations of self in the borderland can therefore 
hardly be dissociated from the thinking that structures the perceived importance of the 
borderland to those who inhabit it, either continually or transiently.  
 
The following conversation with Yomi during an interview summarises this sense of border as 
natural endowment based on territorial legitimacy that supersedes the international border:  
 
“Yomi: (talking about the forest) It’s God’s gift to our people and nobody should be monitoring 
us like forest guards tend to do […]”  
 
DW: “What could make you leave this place and never come back? 
  
Yomi: That is impossible when I am alive. When I am dead, obviously, I will leave not only this 
place, but the world.  nothing can me make me abandon the land of my ancestors. Nothing. My 
life is here. Even if my children go away, no matter how far they go, they know that they will 
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still come back here. Mkot is our homeland. Our ancestors gave it to us, and therefore we 
cannot abandon it.  Why do you ask that question?”  
 
Understandably, this can be seen as a performative dissidence since Border Deniers  very much 
disagree with state spatialisation practices in their living environments and consider state 
actions as an intrusion or attack on their livelihoods and sacred places. In order to express these 
disagreements, they utilise various strategies to “erase” the border and protect their spatial 
environment as a vital resource which the material manifestation of the international can 
jeopardise. The excerpt below is drawn from a story which Eudes told me. It illustrates very 
well some of the techniques used by these communities to demonstrate their hostility to other 
spatialisation of what they consider to be their natural endowment.   
 
Eudes: “One day, a Cameroonian general came here with the press and many soldiers, because 
they had reported to them that Equatorial Guinea was taking part of the Cameroonian territory 
in this area. When they arrived with their old maps and asked people in the communities where 
the locations were, we showed them different places, and did the same when the Guinean army 
people arrived. They went to separate locations and established that their territory was not 
being infringed upon. They were satisfied that they know the border.”  
 
DW: “But why did you do that?”  
 
Eudes: “Well because you know, if they had met in the same place, there could be confrontation 
and when elephants fight, plants suffer the most you know. Even if they don’t fight, that might 
encourage Equatorial Guinea to build the wall they wanted to build at the border. And if they 
build a wall, that will create a lot of problems for us. For example, if you have your farm on 
the other side of the wall, you will now be obliged to carry every and go all the way where 
there is a gate or something like that to cross, and crossing will probably not be free. Why must 
we suffer like that?”  
 
This tactic not only ensured that all potential disruptions are contained and kept out of their 
way, it also discouraged these outsiders from further attempts. As clear delineation between 
physical spaces of community and virtual spaces of crime, a strong resonance of this story is 
found in Yomi’s explanation about the tens of traps we visited as I shadowed him during one of 
his forest harvesting tours. Although Yomi did not make it specifically clear in his statements, 
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for obvious reasons, it transpires from the double-entendre fashion he spoke about the traps set 
across the transnational forest, that some of them were intentionally arranged to either harm or 
dissuade forest guards. Yomi insisted, in particular, on traps around the shrines in the forest 
while the conversation between the two of us continued as follows:  
 
“DW: Why are there so many large traps around the shrines? 
   
 Yomi: “Well, it is to protect the shrine, you know…people do their sacrifices here…and wild 
animals…they come to eat the meat sacrificed to the gods, it is not their meat (laughs), they 
should go and hunt their own and leave our ancestors alone. These traps sometimes catch even 
domestic animals like dogs and cats. You see they come all the way from the village just to eat 
free meat here (laughs) because the smell attracts them, but they are animals you know, they 
forget they are meat too (laughs) if they don’t want to go and hunt, they become prey here.  
 
DW: But why make them so big, they can catch human beings? 
 
Yomi: Well if you are a human being and you behave like an animal, coming here to stick your 
nose into the meat in our shrine, then you will be treated like prey. ….or a naughty 
dog…(laughs). But it cannot kill a human being, you see. It can only teach them a lesson.  
 
DW: Which lesson? 
 
Yomi: That you should respect people’s place. That’s all.  
 
DW: How would someone going around in the forest here know where every shrine is, and 
possibly where every trap is? 
 
Yomi: Why would that someone be going around here in the first place? It means you should 
not be coming in here alone if you don’t belong here. And if you don’t belong here you have no 
business doing here that you need to know where all the traps are. When people need something 
from this forest, they talk to us the forest gatekeepers and we get it for them. If it is not the right 
time or the right type, or even if it is there but not available, then we will tell them. See for 






Yomi: Has a trap seized your legs? (Laughs) 
 
DW: No.  
 
Yomi: You see!  
 
I could not help being particularly impressed by, and report here, the amount of laughter and 
malicious facial expressions produced by Yomi when he talked about these giant traps, which 
could actually maim a human being as far as I could tell. It became clear that he was 
metaphorically referring to forest guards when he said,  
 
“Well if you are a human being and you behave like an animal, coming here to stick your nose 
into the meat in our shrine, then you will be treated like prey” 
 
In fact, this resonates with all the resentment expressed by Yomi and fellow villagers against 
forest guards who are government agents, but not recruited from their community. It appears 
to me that “naughty dog” is none other than a pejorative representation of forest rangers, who 
go around the forest. However, this could also mean anybody who in Yomi’s eyes does not have 
the legitimacy to probe into the forest.  
 
Although this warning had been very subtle in the way Yomi presented it to me, he was very 
blunt when he forbade me to enter the forest with electronic equipment (like a camera or phone, 
etc.). He told me in no uncertain terms that I would not be an exception, adding that forest 
guards too have a lot of stories to tell about the electronic equipment they have “infiltrated into 
our forest” (Yomi’s words, bold emphasis, mine). At this point, I was not sure whether Yomi 
referred to the supernatural belief that the electronic equipment would break down or the idea 
that they physically sabotage such equipment. In any case, this is in parallel to the reports of 
similar activities on the Cameroon-Gabon-Guinea three-part border. As part of casual 
conversations I had with members of the border villages, I was told that one borderlander was 
not too happy about being called a Cameroonian, so he located two boundary markers probably 
dating back from the colonial period, uprooted them and planted them somewhere else, in such 
a way that his village would de facto fall within Gabon. Later on, some of his neighbours did 
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not like the idea, and proceeded to do the same thing. This resulted in them finding themselves 
under the jurisdiction of Equatorial Guinea. Eventually, as the story goes, the border markers 
were uprooted all together one night by unknown individuals, so that there is no telling today 
which village is in which of the three countries, even though maps would suggest otherwise.  
 
A final example of this is performative dissidence by Border Deniers. Looking at the farming 
practices of Cameroon-Gabon borderlanders, I observed a common pattern especially amongst 
the younger generation of agricultural entrepreneurs. They leave vast swathes of bushes 
untouched in the interior on either side of the border, to create farms exactly “on top of” the 
international border. In this way, their farms always stretch from one country to another.  
Instead of the rows of cultivation being parallel to the imaginary borderline, these youths 
purposefully make them perpendicular such that there is no break, even though the farm 
technically straddles two countries. The common explanation I received was that this helps 
them evade fiscal controls as they claim to belong to the other country when inspectors from 
one country arrive, and vice-versa. This explanation does not hold much water because access 
to these areas is so difficult that inspections rarely ever take place, added to the likelihood that 
there will be nobody on the farm on that specific day. Another explanation received was that 
all the land in the interior of the country already belongs to someone, so the youth come to 
these stretches of no-man’s land to invest in agriculture.  
 
In any case, conversations with borderlanders here have thus suggested a persisting sense of 
continuity in spite of state borders. This sense is rooted in how they perceive themselves as 
being connected by something more powerful than nations; by a shared history and most 
importantly by an active solidarity in dealing with the border as an aspect of their spatial 
















Picture  17 - Position of lines of cultivation across the border 
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The expression of deep roots thus performed by Border Deniers  are in fact a meaning of deeply 
rooted across the transborder space. It is however noteworthy that this performative dissidence 
in spatial practices of Border Deniers  are in fact also a tacit acknowledgement of the state 
border. The only difference with Border Acknowledgers being that Border Deniers  choose not 
to engage the border, while the former engage it albeit still in contested forms. In this sense, 
the will to maintain freedom of movement and the expressed control over their interstitial 
territorial space underlies both the concealed apprehension of the border by Border Deniers  
like Yomi, and the openly expressed desire of Border Acknowledgers like Fiona to reduce the 
border to its simplest expression. The dimensions of their interstitial positioning that they 
embrace are those which ensure their control over the transborder territorial space as well as 
freedom of movement in order to fulfil economic or sociocultural needs. 
 
5.2 The ambiguities, tensions, and intersections of vernacular bordering practices 
 
“Well, if you are a human being and you behave like an animal, coming here to stick your nose 
into the meat in our shrine, then you will be treated like prey.” – (Yomi, personal 
communication, March 2017 in the forest area, Cameroon-Nigeria border) 
 
A cursory look at the diverging border performances leaves the impression that where Border 
Deniers  seek to dismiss the border while downplaying and/or concealing their apprehension thereof, 
Border Acknowledgers seek to actively crush or erase the border while understating the contribution of 
the border to their livelihoods. Unlike in the case of Border Acknowledgers, the relationship 
between Border Deniers  and their territorial space is not one structured around mobility. It is 
a land-based relationship which, owing to the strategic engagement of the border as explained 
above, can be understood as a discourse of rooted placement and a performative divergence 
from the official state border. However, the performance of the vernacular right to uninhibited 
movement across the border area perfectly aligns with the understanding which conceives of a 
forest straddling across the border as “a gift from God”. In any case, both types of borderlanders 
similarly articulate their conceived rights to movement and control over the border space 
because they see the legitimacy of their entitlement as originating from a realm over which the 
state is not entitled to interfere. Hence, the apparent identity contrast between Eudes and 
Florence instead underscores the borderlander’s ability to withdraw or dislocate depending on 
the border constraints at hand, and how the borderlander rationalises their situation in relation 
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to the border. And this rationalisation of how one situates oneself in relation to the border takes 
shape in the border dismissal as expressed by many Border Deniers and border engagement by 
Border Acknowledgers. There is a clear distinction between their performances, but a profound 
ambiguity or tension over the discursive finality of these performances.  
   
As an example, borderlanders who control the movement of others and wedge themselves 
between unofficial crossing points and the state to make both ends meet, can simultaneously 
be labelled as Acknowledgers and Deniers, simply because they mobilise both dimensions of 
the borderlander performance. The youths who stopped me from crossing the river without 
payment, claimed their legitimacy in the following terms: 
 
 “We are the people who look after this place. Your payment is your contribution”. 
 
The tension lies in the legitimate control over territory they claim based on their deep-rooted 
identity, and their acknowledgment of the border which warrants a payment. They are known 
to involve border officials if illegal migrants do not give them money. These youths are the 
same who could help negotiate a cheap border crossing for an illegal immigrant, by resorting 
to the repertoire of bi-placed identity. This represents tension as Border Deniers do not 
normally involve themselves at all with issues of mobility across the border. There are also 
similarities between the ways in which Border Deniers seek to deny the materiality of the 
international border and the ways in which the Border Acknowledgers proceed to mitigate it. 
Of particular significance is the convergent tendency for both categories to rationalise the same 
contentious border space, either as an abstract commodity, or as a concrete resource they are 
entitled to benefit from, and whose ultimate value is enhanced by its liminal localisation.  
 
Another inescapable similarity is the conflicting relationship between their contentious 
geographical imaginations on the border and their actions. The only variation being that Border 
Acknowledgers actively engage the physical border in order to discursively neutralise its effects 
on their mobility, whereas Border Deniers  actively silence the border even though their 
discourse on the border provide a hidden transcript of engagement. This suggests that rather 
than confronting the border in a bid to reject it altogether, borderlanders simply centralise their 
marginality to draw full benefit from their peripheral position at the edges of the state, so to 
speak. In the same vein, Border Acknowledgers would consistently emphasise their bi-placed 
legitimacy as a natural right that should protect them from the border. Marriages, residence, 
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the choice of which family ties to revive, and livelihoods choices are therefore not just 
economic strategies or efforts to conform with immigration officials. They are actual 
embodiments of a dual rootedness across the border, which holders thereof expect to be seen 
as entitlements directly flowing from their rights in the borderland as a natural endowment to 
them. In the same way as Border Acknowledgers, Border Deniers are themselves sometimes 
conflicted in the process of expressing their imagination of space. At one time they argue that 
there is no border, or no need for a border, or that the border is disruptive. At another time, they 
would acknowledge the border, for instance, in assigning value and price to the commodities 
extracted from the border space. Yomi and Odette’s commercial encounters epitomise this 
tension. Yomi (Denier) sells forest products to Odette (Acknowledger), and both participate in 
the border trade with the full understanding of the ways in which the border enhances their 
business.  
 
Yomi:  “Yes, I know that they think that the products come from Cameroon, and that now, even 
if there was a shorter way to get to the products out of the forest from the Nigerian side, I think 
nobody would use it. I wouldn’t, because the same product would be sold for lesser money than 
those which come from the Cameroonian. side”  
 
WD: “Just because they go round and cross the border before returning to Nigeria?” 
 
YOMI: “Of course, this drives the price up! That is what people want to hear. They want to be 
reassured that it is coming from Cameroon. As far as I am concerned, If you say that these 
products come from Cameroon, you are right. If you say that they come from Nigeria, you are 
not wrong either. (Laughs) There is no harm in telling their customers that! And they are not 
lying because they actually cross the border from Cameroon to sell the products. I don’t see 
any problem with that. It does not change the fact that I myself do not know whether these 
products come from Cameroon or from Nigeria. We know which village is Nigeria and which 
is Cameroon, but in the forest, how would you know?”  
 
In the private land dispute I witnessed in Baleete and referred to in 5.1.1 above, I also observed 
that the protagonists were not only aware of the unclear official demarcation, but were also 
pitching their argument with careful reference to the temporality of events as well as ancestral 
lineage. Ownership of land was being claimed using a combination of de facto state authority 
and ancestry rights over the area. Again, a conflicting encounter between acknowledgment and 
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denial of the state border. Those using the border and claiming this spatial legitimacy conceive 
of members of their communities flanking either side of the border as being each entitled to 
natural rights which trump or extend beyond the border itself as much as they predate that 
border. It is in this sense, that those communities rely on imagined spaces to “conquer” the 
border as part of their spatial representation, instead of, strictly speaking, accepting border-
specific relational dynamic. The relationship between borderlanders and the materiality of the 
border space reveals itself as not only filled with tension, but most importantly it is understood 
as rife with ambiguities and conflicts between rejecting the border and taking advantage from 
it.  
 
In a nutshell, it is observed in performance and discourse that Border Deniers deploy a 
contentious agency over territoriality, which seeks to mitigate the significance of the 
international border. They utilise a mix of strategies to promote their particular imaginations 
of the border space, which they rationalise into socioeconomic spaces that should be protected 
from the official functions of the state borders. They achieve this through a discourse of rooted 
placement which carves their transborder geographical unit away from spaces of crime. 
Furthermore, they position themselves as moral and legitimate agents who are better placed to 
decide what can be done for the best interest of their communities, especially given that the 
state has “no business there”. Apart from this discursive and performative rendering of their 
geographical imaginations, Border Deniers physically transcribe their dissidence with official 
spatial organisation through various actions. All these actions translate their hostility towards 
the state dimension of the border, but such a hostility should not be overstated even if they 
would not admit their reliance on the state border to maximise the value of their geographical 
space. This is an example of dynamics and processes indicating when and how contentious 
agency can slow down or reverse the expansion of state presence in the border space. Their 
geographical imaginations and performances are consistent with centralising marginality, as is 
the case with Border Acknowledgers. We can nevertheless take away that in the same manner 
that by emphasizing their shared interest in “fighting the border”, both strands of borderlanders 
can be seen as united in some of their strategies.  In the next section, I outline ways in which 
these performances are combined with linguistic and semiotic devices to negotiate mobility 






5.3 Negotiating the mobility  
 
“If you are not flexible, you can’t succeed here [doing business in the border area]. You must 
be quick on your feet when things change. We moved back to Cameroon at some point because 
we needed an early trip into Nigeria every morning from Cameroon”. (Fiona, Nigeria) 
  
My field observations and the analysis of interviews shed light on the links between 
imaginations of self as well as spatial representations on the one hand, and agency strategies 
on the other hand. Put simply, the ways in which borderlanders conceive of themselves in their 
particular spatial environment determine the strategies they are likely to use to negotiate 
mobility, livelihoods and other social pursuits across the border space. These links also suggest 
for instance that mobility practices that appear to only take advantage of state inconsistencies 
(corruption, lack of infrastructures, proliferation of fake/illegal documents) actually draw upon 
a much more complex web of imaginations. In this section on negotiating mobility, we explore 
the links between these imaginations and how they shape various forms of negotiations that 
pertain to crossing the border. These links pull together bi-placed identities, imaginations of 
self and the constructed legitimacy that subsumes the state border through vernacular spaces. 
They are expressed as performances within the interplay between various spaces (legitimacy, 
community, money) and livelihoods strategies. This examination of how mobility is negotiated 
will focus mainly on making sense of the tension that arises from the ambiguities, 
inconsistencies and conflicts in the relationships between borderlanders and their imaginations 
of self and border space.  
 
This tension in the relationship between the official dimension of the border and Border 
Acknowledgers arises mainly from the divergence between bi-placement as frame of reference 
for local mobility and the materiality of the international border as controlling movement 
across space. The following statement illustrates how and why borderlanders do not necessarily 
see themselves as negative.  
 
“Kalu: We know that they have their role to play. I am not saying that the border is necessarily 
a bad thing. I am only saying that they should mind their own business.  And we mind our own 
business. Normally, the border is there to say that one country is not taking another country’s 
land. But where is the wahala now? Has one country invaded the other one? So why would 
they complain? They normally have no rights to be after us. They should normally collect their 
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taxes from those big trucks. Because they are international. Not from us. We are locals, you 
see. Those who should pay are the government big people who pass here every day from one 
country to another, without even being searched. Nobody asked them any question. They just 
show their papers. I am general this, I am colonel that. I am director of this and that, and those 
three cars are mine (changing voice to speak with a deep tone and raising shoulders to mimic 
an important personality). So, if those people who are actual doing the international stuff can 
cross free, why do we have to pay? But just to avoid unnecessary wahala, we just give them 
what we can just to say that baba, we know you are there too, and you protect us too. But we 
give because we know how to get it back […]”. 
 
DW: “How do you get back what you give the border?”  
 
Kalu: “There are plenty of ways, my brother. I can tell you some of them, but I can’t tell you 
everything, you know. For example, when I am going to visit my brother in Cameroon, how can 
you tell whether what I am carrying with me is for sale or just for my personal use over there? 
You can’t tax that! Even if I have a whole lorry, I can still give them a small thing and they 
write down that it was a basket. (laughs)” 
 
Based on the geographical imagination inspired by the processes of dislocating and relocating 
identities in discrete spaces, these borderlanders see the official border as unfairly interfering 
with their vernacular spaces. They believe that because they are moral agents in navigating 
spaces of legitimacy, community and money within a cluster of border villages, state control 
over them should be minimal. Even this minimal control is only to the extent that crime and 
insecurity are under the direct responsibility of the state. In their sense, the bribes and other 
fees they pay, including the agreement to being searched, constitute a performative proof of 
good faith and their own way of acknowledging the state action as concerns crime and 
insecurity. Yet, their discursive engagement with the border highlights the inability of the state 
to discharge its border duties in these areas. This further strengthens their confidence that 
border officials are not allowed to demand anything from them. 
 
Kalu: “We are not criminals, you know. Those they should be looking for are ritualists, child 




As regards bi-placement, the assumption of virtue exercised by border communities in areas of 
cultural crossings covers different realities. Border Acknowledgers manipulate this relaxed 
monitoring in crossing the border, by exploiting local petty trade or social visits as a screen for 
participating in smuggling, long-distance trade or travel. Thanks to their deep sense of dual or 
sometimes triple territorialisation, some of them have constructed a vernacular institutional 
mandate to control the movement of others across the border. By others here, I refer to non-
local travellers who do not regularly cross the border and are usually travelling further to the 
interior of the country for various reasons. These “others” also include undocumented migrants 
who seek to cross the border into Gabon or Equatorial Guinea on the one border area, or into 
Nigeria on the other border area. But they also include those smuggling contraband through 
non-official crossing points.  
 
Border Acknowledgers, have expressed the view that they perceive themselves as constituting 
the “border”, based on their claim to a right to move freely throughout their living space. This 
entitlement, in their opinion also extends to controlling all movements and exchanges in their 
communities that do not go through official crossing points. An entitlement also paradoxically 
claimed by many Border Deniers, since they define the border space as “belongs to us, and we 
belong to the border area”. This determines them to assert their right to engage in the passage 
of goods and people in their midst. In this understanding, whoever does not seek their 
cooperation and mediation should not be allowed to pass or carry anything through their 
communities, from one side of their transnational living space to the other. Only their explicit 
involvement and agreement guarantees a seamless passage. In order to meet these exigencies, 
undocumented migrants from Cameroon and many other West African countries work in the 
border area for many months, and sometimes years, saving money for their onward journey to 
the interior of Gabon or Equatorial Guinea. These wayfarers have to rely on local borderlanders 
to aid their emigration project. The same has been observed at the Cameroon-Nigeria border, 
even though the dynamics are somewhat different in terms of waiting times. In any case, the 
illegal border crosser relies on the local borderlander to guide them and protect them through 
back routes that are not monitored; to speak on their behalf where necessary before authorities, 
and most importantly, to abstain from alerting the authorities. This is a task that many border 
residents invest in, taking advantage of their knowledge of the area and unofficial relationships 
with immigration officials. 
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Yet, an aspect of the tension is that apart from juggling with two national IDs (even though 
illegal), these borderlanders extend the interpretation of their mobility to mean that it does not 
in any way or form infringe the spaces where state control should be exercised. Every move is 
pretext to a much more hidden transcript of their geographical imagination. For example, 
showing an ID is not destined to fulfil the administrative requirement of identifying oneself 
before crossing an international border; it a pretext for a discursive demonstration that the 
holder of that ID should not be subjected to the rigour of international mobility. As detailed 
above, the assumed virtue of bi-placed local identities is actually a front for many activities 
that would fall under illegality but which borderlanders have circumscribed within the 
framework of legitimacy. Hence, because they can control their own movement while 
legitimately navigating different vernacular spaces, they perceive the state dimension of the 
border affecting them as a form of mis-governance. According to them, vernacular governance 
is more legitimate. It is therefore common for some youths to erect roadblocks at unofficial 
passageways and demand payment from those who are using these paths.  
  
 
Picture  18 - Small river running across the mud road in the Cameroon-Nigeria border area 
I hired a motorbike rider to take me on exploration along these tracks. As we approached a 
small river running across the mud road (picture 18 above), there were several people signalling 
menacingly to stop. The bike rider tried to ignore them, but they surrounded us both on the 
bike, some of them carrying stones. The pictures below are stills from the video taken from the 
camera, which had been strapped to the bike rider’s chest as I sat behind him. The first still 
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frame shows us being surrounded, and the second one shows one youth threatening us with a 
stone, for attempting “to disrespect us [them, the youth who erected the checkpoints]”. This 
self-assigned legitimacy entitles them to rationalise their economic strategies based on their 
sense of ownership over the borderland. In the example in picture, the youth in the picture 
shouting to me “I am the border here” is, in this regard, a striking example. His legitimacy here 
is conferred by the community, which I read as a construction of a vernacular border institution. 
 
 
Picture  19 - Surrounded " the border na we" 
 
Picture  20 - Threatened by a stone 
The conversation leading up to the payment ran like this:  
DW: “Why do we have to pay to cross?” 
Youth 1 (youngest): “If you don’t want to pay, turn your Okada (motorbike) and go back. Just 
go away, if you are not looking for wahala (trouble.)”  
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Youth 2 (the one with the stone): Everybody pays, that’s the rule, Oga. He [pointing the bike 
rider] he knows it, but he just wants to disrespect us.”  
DW: “Yes, I understand. I am willing to pay, but I just want to know why I should pay. Are you 
guys part of the government?” 
Youth 2: “No, we are the people who look after this place. Your payment is your contribution.” 
Youth 3: “Look at my hands. Look! Look! All these stones do not transport themselves han! If 
not for us, you wouldn’t have a road here to use. Just pay. It’s normally 1000 Naira. But it is 
2000 Naira now that you have annoyed us.” 
DW: “But why are you not asking that woman to pay too?” (An elderly lady happened to be 
crossing on foot) 
Youth 2: “She lives here. She is going to her farm just over there. Why would she pay? How 
does that concern you?!”  
DW: “Her contribution. She is using the road too, isn’t she?” 
Youth 3: (Pushing the motorbike): “Just go back now, even if you pay, you will never cross here 
again. You want to be difficult with your stupid questions. Just go before something happens to 
this Okada (motorbike)!”  
 
Having grown up in Cameroon, the whole situation did not frighten me at all, and I was able 
to beat the price down eventually to 500 Naira, and we crossed. I also learned later on that these 
youths are actually not even from this that area (Etung). However, they had been doing that 
“business” for so many years and roaming the area so much so that they can tell who an outsider 
is, and who is not. I witnessed a similar case with Bilial, who though not originally from the 
border area of Eboro (Gabon-Cameroon), was making money from his knowledge of the area 
by facilitating the passage of illegal migrants and contraband products. As an economic 
strategy, this is obvious, but Bilial told me that the key thing for him was the mutual respect 
between him and the locals, who accepted him as one of their own.   
 
There is however a divergence in the sequencing of these strategies between Deniers and 
Acknowledgers, as illustrated in the table below. Discursively, while the Deniers tend to 
problematise their own mobility in various ways so as to subtract themselves from the effects 
of the said border, the Acknowledgers avoid verbalising the border and its effects. As a result, 
while Border Acknowledgers’ mobility deconstructs the border using language, the Border 
Deniers ’ unsaid words end up reifying the border and its dividing function. The same paradox 
is observed in their performative relationship to the border, i.e. their performances and non-
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verbal actions in relation to the border. Hence, despite their discursive deconstruction, while 
Border Acknowledgers proceed to acknowledge the border by submitting to checks for 
instance, Border Deniers  destroy it in the physical realm through relatively violent actions. 
Both categories end up acknowledging and rejecting the border, albeit in differing 
circumstances. The “differing sameness” of the two categories of borderlanders and the 
ambiguous separateness between the state and borderlanders are thus two sides of the same 
coin, which can be summarised by the differing aspects of how borderlanders negotiate 
mobility and mobilisation of resources across the border space.  
 
 
Table 6 - The paradox of border denying - acknowledging 
 Border Acknowledgers Border Deniers  
Discourse  Acknowledge the border  
Don’t mind talking about the 
border 
 
Refute the border 
Don’t like to talk about the border 
Performance  Engage with border signs & 
symbols, only to subvert and 
disempower them (“you want me 
to pay to go to my house?”) 
Move to benefit from the “border” character 
of their space (smuggling, “the border na 
we”, “gift from God”) 
Cultivation patterns acknowledge the 
border 
 
So far, I have tried to portray the ways in which the socioeconomic activities and human 
relations around the transborder locales depend on negotiated mobility. It is evident that 
borderlanders have forged bi-placed identities which they juggle according to context, in order 
to negotiate movement across the border; especially when they confront the official border. A 
few examples include when they emphasise their bi-placed identities to deconstruct the 
international character of their mobility across the border, or to assert their entitlement to free 
movement as per their self-defined legitimacy. While it can be suggested that not all 
borderlanders engage in mobility across border in order to assert their bi-placed identity, it is 
nevertheless true that their localised agency emerges in many ways through their options, 
attitudes and practices as regards crossing the border. Choosing longer footpaths through the 
forest to go from one border village to another, instead of using the official crossing point is an 
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example of local agency that opts to assert itself in contradistinction to the official border. By 
the same token, the sense of solidarity amongst travellers and various groups defined by border 
performativity, which emerges primarily in contexts of negotiations with representatives of the 
state border is significant.  
 
These solidarity networks, sometimes instantaneous and almost always formed for the sole 
purpose of “fighting” the border, constitute a testament to the dynamic interplay between the 
official dimension of the border and the vernacular spaces produced as border communities 
respond through their geographical imaginations. Yet, as Border Acknowledgers navigate the 
multiple spaces and layers of the border region, emphasising their bi-placed identities as 
economic strategies to control the mobility of others or as security strategies to benefit from 
the protection of the state, the ambiguities that characterise their relationship with the border 
become very clear. They resent border officials’ actions, but they must also maintain working 
relations with them in order to generate income through mediation on behalf of travellers who 
need their help. They minimise the border but take advantage of the economic differentials 
between two systems. They deny the border any rights over them, but they claim borderlander 
identity when they benefit from the movement of others (illegal migration). They subdivide 
spaces of crimes into what is legitimate and what is not, relying on the state functions of the 
border to protect them from the nefarious effects of crime. These ambivalent relationships with 
the border can be transcribed as the intersections between the various vernacular border spaces 
and the border on the one hand, and as an overlapping among these spaces themselves, on the 
other hand.  
 
The various expressed attitudes and actions of (both Deniers and Acknowledgers) make clear 
that they are fraught with conflicting feelings about the place of the state border. They see it as 
negative and yet are unable to change on the one hand, or do not wish it to change on the other 
hand. The Deniers do not want to give the border any more importance as it might disrupt their 
way of living, even though, at the same time, they sense that a state border is something larger 
than their geographical world. The Acknowledgers are border-crossers who are fully conscious 
of the economic opportunity brought about by the existence of the border. However, they 
rationalise their mobility as the negation of this border in order to secure their livelihoods. In 
any case, the tension that arises from these conflicting feelings is not the usually assumed 
tension between the local and global, or the external and the vernacular, or the state and the 
community. It is a tension that invokes the full agency of situated human beings dealing with 
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another agency in their spatial environment, amongst other things. In other words, in the same 
way that the state border is a structural feature of something that extends beyond its immediate 
physical space, the borderlander’s world is not limited to the statist dimension of that physical 
space. Consequently, this tension is much more fluid than geographically distributed or structurally 
layered, as laid out in the mainstream understanding of border dynamics. That is, Border Deniers can 
become Border Acknowledgers, and vice-versa. Conversely, when the borderlander is given centre stage 
in the analysis of the same border dynamics, especially through allowing the narrative of their experiences 
and the direction of their sense-making to guide our interpretation, we remind ourselves that border 
communities are not passive subjects of exposure to central authorities.   
 
However, this reminder should not only be considered as the starting point of envisaging the active 
influence of the borderlander on the border space as has already been established in existing research on 
border community agency (Mercer et al., 2003). It can also serve as the working base for understanding 
that this active influence of border communities is the prime of a more dialectical relationship with the 
border, seen as an annihilating agent. My findings confirm that a significant, yet unacknowledged part of 
border dynamics is predicated upon how borderlanders see themselves in relation to the border. 
Furthermore, these findings have indicated that navigating the border space is tantamount to travelling 
between dismissal of the existence of the border and domestication of its (nefarious) impact. This clearly 
diverges from the duality of the performativity understood only as mutual influence between the border 
and the borderlander. Of particular significance in these narratives is the emergence of the 
centrality of border communities who might not be fully aware of what the border means to 
others, but have carved out their own sense of the border beside and beyond the officially 
intended meaning of the border. Whether by dismissing the border, denying it, crushing it, or 
negating it in any form, or personifying it, the ways in which borderlanders respond to the 
tension between this dismissal and their apprehension of the border maintains a consistence of 
their agency that supersedes the intended purpose of the official border. In other words, the 
narratives of borderlanders project this tension only as the thrust that sustains their control over 
the border space as well as other things necessary for continuity and stability in their own terms. 
Behind the guise of instability or dynamism presented by all the changes occurring in the statist 
realm of the border, border communities paradoxically only seem to see one perpetual 






5.4 Conclusion  
 
As this study has established, postcolonial state borders have invited various responses from 
the border communities, ranging from the ways in which they make sense of this border to how 
they operationalise this sense-making in their daily lives. In this chapter, I have looked not only 
at the continuous dynamics of economic actions as negotiated against state representatives in 
the border space, but I have also specifically distinguished between human mobility on the one 
hand, and the territorial space of the borderland (understood as a natural endowment) on the 
other hand. I have underlined that these vernacular bordering practices are a product of both 
imaginations of space and imaginations of self in the context of the postcolonial border. This 
distinction provided a firm empirical foundation to scale up the analysis of the links between 
geographical imaginations and everyday life across the border space. In this analysis therefore, 
the articulation between the contentious agency of borderlanders and their sustained 
negotiation strategies has been of particular interest. Amongst these strategies, I have paid 
attention to the role played by language use as part of performative dynamics. Ultimately, to 
situate the question of mobility and mobilisation of resources, this chapter has been an 
exploration of how contemporary relational dynamics across the border space articulate with 
vernacular representations of territoriality. 
 
Based on insights from fieldwork data, this chapter’s argument further complicates Gupta and 
Ferguson’s view on hybridisation and other such notions transferring the border’s dynamic 
character to ontological implications about the borderlanders. In fact, borderlanders in 
Cameroon, Nigeria, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, especially those in the border locales of my 
fieldwork for this research project, are actors with dynamic performances of the border against 
a backdrop of deep territorial roots on both sides of the border. Their mobility speaks to a form 
of bi-placement rather than dis-placement. As an alternative framework, I propose a bi-
placement of identity of rooted bordering practices rather than hybridisation of multiple 
identities and displacement. This differentiation connects the performative relationship 
between the borderlander’s sense of self, and the multiple spaces produced by the vernacular-
official performativity of the border (as seen in the previous chapter). Understanding these 
relationships is key to explaining three main strands of the borderlander’s imagination of the 
border space, namely: border personification, border dismissal and border as natural 
endowment. Building on from the inconsistencies of this differentiation, the second part of the 
chapter focused on the ambiguities, tensions and intersections within vernacular border 
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performances. In the chapter’s third section, I looked closely at how these spatial 
representations and imaginations of self within the border space shape the ways in which 
borderlanders negotiate resources and mobility across the borderland. This section specified 
the extent to which vernacular bordering practices enable borderlanders to negotiate the border 
space itself as a type of endowed resource to be exploited, and to monetise mobility across it.  
 
I conclude that crossing the border has become the basis for a strong collective identity that is 
transient in its form and focused on mutualising efforts to subvert the official border. Looking 
at both Border Deniers and Border Acknowledgers, this chapter has documented the ways in 
which borderlanders juggle with various vernacular spaces or mobilise their identities when 
opposing the other official border. In the context of negotiating the borderland as resources or 
mobility across it, utilising their various practices, borderlanders seek to symbolically discard 
or diminish the ability of the border to interfere with their daily lives, and therefore combine 
many strategies, either discursively or physically. As this chapter has demonstrated, distinct 
actions and their outcomes are deployed as the borderlander grapples with the need to navigate, 
or indeed maintain connexion between the different spaces divided by the border, as well as 
take advantage on the economic implications of the said international border. These negotiation 
patterns are also important factors underpinning mobility strategies and resource politics from 
the vernacular perspective.  
 
It is therefore evident from the data explored that the day-to-day reality of navigating the 
vicinity of the border itself results in new socio-political and economic phenomena on the 
vernacular dimension of the border. The common preoccupations of borderlanders have 
emerged in the face of the meaning of the state border and the implications thereof to their 
geographical space. Borderlanders have invested in constructing boundaries between 
themselves and the state, as well as between themselves and such spaces that are seen as useless 
or threatening. That is why the border becomes a site of contested and sometimes ambivalent 
relationships, where borderlanders draw economic and political negotiation tools from their 
positions in the interstices of two economic and two political systems. This is not a revelation, 
as the existing literature has largely discussed this tension between border communities and 
the border itself. However, a vernacular narrative approach enables us to understand that they 
manipulate their marginal circumstances to their own advantage by rationalising their identity 
as bi-placed. This transpires through the ways in which they make sense of the various 
vernacular spaces they navigate. It is also clear in the basis for wedging themselves between 
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other border crossers and the state, or simply by emphasising their legitimacy over the 
borderland as cultural commodity.  In terms of navigating various vernacular spaces of the 
border, examples include how borderlanders distinguish between spaces of crime and their own 
spaces of community as a discursive strategy to facilitate mobility or preserve specific physical 
spaces.  
 
Whether or not borderlanders realise that their marginality is related to their geographical 
location at the “edges of the state”, they transform their fate into the opportunity to centralise 
that very marginality to maintain their social relations, protect their resources, develop 
economic strategies and tap into the ambiguous values of powerful cross-border movements. 
Having said that, there is significant interest in the ways in which borderlanders have responded 
to their transnational geographical space by entrenching their identities ever deeper into their 
border space. This notably raises the question of what items of meaning can be gleaned from 
the sense-making imaginations produced by the borderlander’s vernacular agency. And as far 
as international policies are concerned, especially those targeting border areas, one may also 
ask the extent to which these vernacular bordering practices can articulate with the said 
policies. The question at this stage is how does a borderlander’s agency, in thus defining a 
sense of self and making sense of the border space, translate into organisation of knowledge 
across such a fragmented spatial configuration?  In other words, when we engage policy 
concepts such as resilience and security, which are preoccupied with improving the living 
conditions of marginalised communities akin to border communities, what do these bordering 
practices tell us about the security and resilience of borderlanders? That will be the topic of 












6 Chapter 6 - Idioms of Security and Resilience in the Borderlands  
 
As elaborated upon in Chapter 2 (State of Field), the dominant imaginaries of border security 
in Africa are still deeply influenced by the global securitisation agenda, predicated mainly upon 
the Liberal Peace logics which considers some border areas in Africa as “ungoverned”, “under-
governed” or “misgoverned” spaces. In this perspective, border governance priorities of 
African states have tended to converge with the global securitisation agenda, thus reinforcing 
a particular discourse of vulnerability where border communities are seen as victims of state 
absence, or indeed oppressive presence. Borderlanders are therefore enlisted in a state security 
narrative as part of dealing with some functions of the state across this spatial environment in 
their everyday life. Henceforth, one should not underestimate the ability of official narratives 
on security and resilience to shape behaviour and discourse within the border space itself. The 
problem however remains that in the absence of a narrative by borderlanders themselves, 
unilateral state-based understandings of postcolonial borders exclude a host of vernacular 
dynamics such as those examined in Chapters 4&5 above. In so doing, they deprive scholarship 
and policy making of an aspect of knowledge that could otherwise be put to good use. The 
research question this chapter is going to answer is : What do the above practices and sense-
making tell us about biographical disruptions to continuity as seen by borderlanders? 
 
Previously, chapters 4 and 5 established how imaginations of self and schemas of spatial sense-
making amongst borderlanders feed into vernacular (im)mobility strategies across borderlands. 
To deepen the understanding of these vernacular practices, this chapter goes beyond sense-
making and negotiations to glean the security meanings contained within these geographical 
imaginations in the context of the postcolonial border. It brings the borderlanders’ livelihoods 
and mobility practices in conversation with embedded idioms of security and resilience. This 
uncovering of the borderlander’s “security speak” offers greater insights into the plurality of 
security and resilience, especially the ways in which we can enrich their conceptualisations. In 
other words, by gleaning the meanings that borderlanders attribute to their social reality, their 
own idioms of vernacular security emerge that concur or diverge with existing bottom-up 
conceptualisations of security, be it critical, such as human security or positivist, such as states 
protecting borderlanders. This uncovering also reinforces the necessity of not limiting our 
insight into borderlanders’ vernacular world only to the ways in which they make sense of the 
territorial space they live in. It becomes crucial to also examine how, in so doing, they engage 
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with the very themes of resilience and security as contained in those policies which target 
borders specifically. Bearing in mind the (in)direct references to security and practices 
amounting to resilience observed in the field; or simply put, bearing in mind the fact 
borderlanders “do” security and resilience without terming them as such, this chapter will draw 
upon fieldwork data to excavate vernacular idioms of security representations and resilience 
practices in the borderland, beyond state narratives, and as part of vernacular relation to reality.  
 
In other words, the main research question this chapter sets out to answer can be rephrased as, 
how do borderlanders understand (in)security or (in)stability, and how do they mobilise their 
knowledge repertoire and these schemas of understanding to respond accordingly? The aim is 
to assess the extent to which vernacular identities, geographical imaginations and (im)mobility 
strategies in borderlands engage with the notions of security and resilience to illuminate 
borderlanders’ vernacular knowledge. The chapter is divided into four main parts. The first 
section discusses the limits of dominant narratives of security, especially how vernacular 
experiences of borderlanders illustrate these limits. Here, I argue that pushing back on the 
Eurocentric lens invites us to explore the vernacular world and this paves the way to seeing 
how these idioms articulate with common security problems. The second part contrasts samples 
of vernacular idioms of security with known understandings of official security narrative. Here, 
I select three common security problems to illustrate how border communities approach them 
from a vernacular standpoint with efficient results. After exploring vernacular understanding 
security and disruption and they ways in which they evade dominant conceptualisations, the 
third part studies three examples of resilient practices drawn from the vernacular repertoire of 
borderlanders. Before the conclusion, the fourth part of this chapter draws on the diverging 
narratives of disturbance and (in)stability to reflect on the vernacular resilience of 
borderlanders.   
 
6.1 The impossibilities of mainstream “security speak”  
 
Mainstream security speak is the dominant vernacular of security, which is not equipped to 
capture the realities expressed by other vernaculars, such as those of the border communities. 
Throughout the interviews and casual conversations, borderlanders’ narratives of their daily 
lives within their spatial environment made (in)direct references to “feeling[s] of insecurity 
aris[ing] more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event”, 
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like  the 1994 UNDP report suggested, when it introduced the concept of Human Security. In 
this chapter, I argue that, as expressed through geographical imaginations and spatial 
performances or mobility practices, patterns of resilience and security representations emerge 
that fall outside the mainstream “security speak” as discussed in Chapter 2 (State of the Field). 
There is therefore a great potential to better diversify and expand the notion of security and 
threat in the context of these border communities. At the same time, it is not enough to just turn 
security on its head to look at those vernacular fears and insecurities, or more precisely at how 
these borderlanders use their own vocabularies, knowledge repertoires and schemas to 
construct and describe their experiences of (in)security. Instead, it is more useful to build on 
this vernacular sense-making to also examine in detail how borderlanders “cope with and 
respond to violence in ways that differ, sometimes radically, not only from the dominant state 
security narratives, but sometimes also from universal conceptions of human and citizen 
security” (Luckham, 2017, p. 112; Luckham & Kirk, 2013).  Notions of security and resilience, 
chosen for their alignment with the notion of improving lives, can be found as woven into the 
imaginations and practices of the border communities studied, albeit with different scales, aims 
and character.  
 
Below is a sample of the answers borderlanders provided during interviews when I asked what 
they are most afraid of: 
 
“When you cross the border every day to buy and sell, your fear is the border itself. Because 
you never know how much you are going to make until you cross the border. These people are 
unpredictable, and if you are unlucky to deal with the greedy ones, you end up on a loss. So, 
my anxiety every time is about how much the border is going to take from me”. – Odette, 
Cameroon-Nigeria Border  
 
“We live here with the constant fear of fire. You can have a shop like this and the next day even 
your shop assistant is richer than you. Just because of fire. There was a guy just over there, he 
is now working for someone else as a shop assistant, he used to have his own big shop. But the 
whole thing burnt down overnight”. – Florence, Cameroon-Nigeria Border  
 
“You have to be very careful with people around here. Some people are just jealous for no 
reason. They are just wicked because that is what their witch[craft] commands them to do. 
Since they are not successful in this world, they are very powerful in the world of darkness and 
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can harm you anytime. That is why I avoid arguing with anybody here. If you take my money 
or buy on credit and don’t want to pay me, I will only ask one time. If you don’t pay, finish. I 
will leave you with the money. Because what this witch[craft] people want is an argument. 
When you argue with them, your anger is the vehicle they use to get to you and eat your soul 
at night. That’s why you see many people just drop dead without any explanations”.  Odette, 
Cameroon-Nigeria Border  
 
“I am mostly afraid of rituals. That is why I am of two minds about going to university. I know 
there is a lot of secret societies there and they force you to join them through rituals. These 
rituals can be deadly you know…There was one guy from my village who went to University 
and just returned a few months later, a completely deranged man. He has never recovered.” 
Student on the Bus – Cameroon- Gabon border 
 
“I mostly fear stumbling on drugs or arms traffickers using cutty roads. When you see their 
faces, they will do everything to finish you, even if you promise never to tell anyone. So, when 
they tell me about a cutty road, I first make sure that road is not used by them”. - Aliou, 
Cameroon-Gabon Border  
 
“It is not just mine, but I believe everybody’s in this community. We have nightmares about 
pharmaceutical companies. We hate logging companies. They are more powerful, and they can 
just destroy us”. – Yomi, Cameroon-Nigeria Border  
 
In Ikom Central Park, where many wholesalers have their shops and warehouses and where fire has 
repeatedly destroyed a lot of properties, the predominant concern was about fire incidents. Traders who 
crossed the borders on a daily basis to buy and sell, taking advantage of currency differentials or structural 
differences in respective national economies, expressed anxiety over their livelihoods being threatened by 
currency volatility and whimsy weather that could create shortages.  At the time of this fieldwork, the 
story of the girls abducted in Shibock and said to have been taken over the border to Cameroon was still 
very much a topic of conversation. So were the transnational insurgent activities of Boko Haram. 
However, the issue of transnational terrorism did not feature prominently as a threat according to our semi-
structured interviews and group discussions. For Francis (on the bus), Boko Haram was a very distant 
threat and, “we [could] only pray for those affected”. Francis was more concerned with the impact of 
the falling Naira value on border tradesmen and small businesses, as well as financial insecurities that 
would ensue. These are issues to which the main border policies are oblivious given that their alternative 
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referent object, purpose and methodology are centred on the macro-characteristics of transborder trade 
and its potential impact on national economies. The divergence of threat narrative here occurs at the 
intersection between such trade and the social as well as microeconomic realities of local border 
populations. This illustrates how despite referring to “border experience” especially by invoking the 
impact of trade and the protection of border communities, official border policies are lacking in insight 
into how border societies actually involve themselves in this “border experience” and how this vernacular 
involvement engages and reformulates representations of threats and (in)security. 
 
During fieldwork, discussions often revolved around national security topics such as the failed coup in 
Equatorial Guinea during which assailants were chased down across the Cameroon-Gabon border. There 
were also concerns about the potential spill over effects into Nigeria, of the [then] brewing anglophone 
crisis in neighbouring Cameroon, or even the possibility of Boko Haram’s transnational activities moving 
south. Despite this, the predominant concern again was about how this might affect immediate family 
members and with the border closing hypothetically, how this would also disrupt social life as many have 
relatives on either side of the border with whom they meet regularly for both business and social pursuits. 
It is clear therefore that vernacular representations of everyday (in)security as found in the choice of issues 
that border residents or travellers identified as threatening their security on a daily basis differed markedly 
from those identified by official border governance strategies and objectives as seen in the AU Strategy 
for Enhancing Border Management. For example, while smuggling features in various guises across all 
the policies aiming to improve border governance, the types of goods and people that members of the 
border community find threatening are more complex. The same goes for the issue of human trafficking 
and illegal immigration. In order to gain an insight in this complexity, we need to differentiate between 
legal, legitimate and lawful as borderlanders do, following their knowledge categories. The border 
community’s use of borderland principally shows that their primary pursuits of economic gains and 
maintenance of social connections across borders makes a clear distinction between 
lawful/legal/legitimate activities.  
 
Differences in national economic policies, regional resources, currency differentials, make borders 
lucrative zones of exchange and trade everywhere around the globe, often illicit and clandestine. It has for 
a long time been extensively documented that cross-border smuggling provides a significant means of 
livelihood for border residents, thus prompting creative social networking and cross-border ties within 
borderland populations (Kavanagh, 1994). In their mobility practices, ordinary members of border 
communities would not participate in child trafficking for criminal purposes (ritual killings of infants or 
“baby factories”) and smuggling of drugs across border; at least those participating would not do it openly 
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within the community. When asked why, almost all interviewees agree that such practices threaten their 
values and endanger the lives of people. They say that they would report to the authorities, should they 
know of any such activity going on, and that their silence on this could not be bought with money.  At the 
same time, many undocumented teenagers are brought over from Cameroon into Nigeria, not for ritual 
killings or baby factories but to work in shops across the border in Nigeria and sometimes even further 
afield in Lagos or Abuja. These are mostly abandoned children whose parents died or are too sick, in any 
case unable to support them as they become teenagers. Furthermore, the state does not assist these 
children, so much so that going to Nigeria to work albeit with no significant salary is better for them than 
their lives in Cameroon where most of them do not even have a roof nor a birth certificate that parents 
are unable to afford. Nevertheless, crossing the border with these undocumented children still falls under 
the human trafficking description used in border management. Since the travellers and transporters often 
know exactly where these children come from and where they are going, the “trafficker” cannot be 
denounced to the authorities. Instead, he is protected by all the tactics devised and honed within the 
community to outsmart border officials or subvert the border. This form of “human trafficking” is 
considered legitimate even though still illegal, as opposed to other forms considered as criminal, and 
therefore illegitimate as much as illegal.  
 
From a mainstream “security speak” viewpoint, these can be considered minor or trivial 
security concerns, as compared to the threat of Boko Haram or other insurgency groups. These 
answers to my direct questions regarding their fears and anxieties could therefore be dismissed 
as what Foucault termed “subjugated knowledges”: “a whole set of knowledges that have been 
disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naïve knowledges, located 
low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity.” (1982, p. 
82). Indeed, the fears and anxieties registered in the borderlands include what many “scientific 
minds” would call superstition, but which, when examined closely, become very interesting, 
not least in the way they structure their responses to the perceived threats. In this regard, the 
below story of Odette is emblematic of how both the coordinates of, and reaction to fears and 
threats seem at odds with what would ordinarily be expected. A particular relationship with the 
border reality has emerged from the data, wherein many members of the border communities 
structure their action according to a worldview, which to the outsider should be very important. 
Where there are limits to the mainstream understandings of security, I do not mean the 
importance of this worldview as knowledge in itself, but as paths through which one can truly 
grasp and explain certain vernacular security and/or resilience practices that are meaningful 
only within the specific contexts of the border areas studied. In this regard, a particular series 
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of events that happened to Odette is very illustrative of how her actions across the border space 
are underpinned by her geographical imagination.  
 
 Odette scammed  
 
Odette27 believes that on one occasion when she made a huge loss on a particular purchase, 
due to an unusual series of misfortunes on the trip back to the market from the forest, her 
business had been cursed by the forest gods as retribution for greed, ungratefulness (for having 
two countries), and disrespecting the forest.  
 
“The ancestors must have said, we are already blessing you with two beautiful countries 
(referring to her ability to move between Nigeria and Cameroon), why do you want to 
disrespect us again?” Odette confessed.  
 
In fact, on that particular day, Yomi (the Forest Gatekeeper) had not been present on that specific 
spot where he and some of his forest gatekeeping colleagues meet customers at the outskirts of 
the forests for supply. The reason for this collective absence was that, the day was a particularly 
busy one in the region with many concurrent celebrations going on. Notwithstanding its 
particular hecticness, Odette instead saw this exceptionally busy period as an opportunity to 
scoop in on the increased demand for various forest products, especially from city-dwellers 
who would come home for the traditional celebrations. She therefore made the trip against all 
odds to the usual selling point on one of the agreed days under normal circumstances. However, 
upon Odette’s arrival at the outskirts of the forest, Yomi was nowhere to be found, and neither 
were his usual colleagues. Instead, new faces presented themselves as standing in for the 
absentee gatekeepers. As Odette struggled to recognise them and expressed reluctance as to 
their credentials as bona fide Forest Gatekeepers, these individuals managed to persuade her 
that they had just recently undergone the rite of passage to become “gatekeepers” themselves, 
and that they were in effect standing in for the absentees because Yomi and others were taken 








area, there was no way to verify their claim. Shaking off her doubts about their claimed 
legitimacy, Odette proceeded to buy her products from the suspicious-looking individuals. This 
misjudgement on her part indeed became a fact when she met Yomi the following week. It 
turned out, these individuals had not been mandated by anybody at all, and the actual 
replacement sent by Yomi came only a few minutes after Odette had bought her supplies from 
the imposters and left the forest. It is speculated that some carefree young people must have 
overhead Yomi discussing his upcoming absence as well as plans to have a replacement for that 
specific day, and then proceeded to impersonate the replacement, using the opportunity to make 
quick money. That is, after all, the only logical explanation for such a well-planned and 
executed act of impersonation.  
 
However, what interests us more in this story is Odette’s series of misfortunes on her way back 
on that particular day. She had a car accident, from which she barely rescued half of her 
investment in forest products from the overturned car. Even as she came out of the accident 
with only minor injury, she eventually met up with unusually demanding border guards when 
she managed to reach the border with half of her cargo. Negotiations added to time wasted 
because of the accident, making her extremely late for market peak time. Odette ended up with 
a loss on that particular trip, where she expected to quadruple her normal earnings per trip. 
Odette’s eventful misfortune can be explained in a way similar to the increased likelihood of 
one person dying if requiring emergency medical attention on a Sunday in many Western 
countries. This cartesian explanation is backed up by exactly the fact that this was a very busy 
day in the border region, with increased cross-border traffic and probably a heightened greed 
on the part of other individual border actors who were all aware of the gains at stake during 
that particularly hectic period full of business transactions. This combination of at least three 
converging factors would have sent warning signals to an otherwise forward-thinking and 
sophisticated border market analysis, about the deceptive appearance of such a crunch time. 
One may dismiss Odette, as a backward village woman roaming the remote peripheries of two 
developing countries, who failed to understand that she should have replenished her stock in 
advance of that special day, in order to avoid being caught up as she became in the hecticness 
of that crucial day. Yet, the knowledge schema used by Odette in this case is most useful for 
understanding how borderlanders relate to that particular forest and how such a sense-making 





First of all, in her own narrative of the story and how it affected her, she does not portray herself 
as a victim. She positions herself very much as the main actor manoeuvring her own fate across 
the border, instead of as someone complaining about having been scammed, involved in a car 
accident, and ripped off, all in one day. She does not complain about Yomi either, or the forest 
gatekeeping system for having failed to organise a safer transition of duty while absent. She 
does not complain about the potentially poor state of the vehicle (most of them are very old) 
which might have led to the accident. Even the behaviour of the greedy border officials she 
met on that specific day is viewed in a more fatalistic fashion, instead of as a given variable 
that could have altered the outcome of the day for her. Even though the overarching belief 
system behind this mental attitude to events is grounded in the transnational potency of the 
forest Gods, the fact remains that she emphasises her own agency as someone already 
unusually blessed by the Gods with two countries to draw her livelihoods from. This articulates 
well with the basic principles of a resilient mindset, which is shared by the border community. 
Not only does she not allow her current plight to undermine her confidence in what she sees as 
an asset (blessing), she always readily projects herself forward by emphasising her decision-
making ability to address the crisis and avert it in the future.   
 
Secondly, whether Odette’s core belief is demonstrable or not is not important, but 
understanding this belief is instrumental in grasping what she sees as a potential for disruption. 
In this particular case, breaking the rules of the forest has been the trigger for the string of 
destructive events that unfolded later. Even in cartesian terms, there is no way of proving that 
she would have been in that very accident had she delayed her departure from the forest for a 
few minutes, just enough to deal with genuine individuals instead. Quite to the contrary, it is 
highly likely that she would not have been in that car, at that specific place and that very 
moment when the accident occurred. The law of probability reinforces this by the principle that 
the same chance event is not likely to happen twice within a relatively short time period, like 
cars overturning within minutes of each other. One could therefore refer to this alignment to 
say that Odette’s premise in ordering her mobility across space is as valid any other belief 
system, but most importantly, it tells us more about this particular understanding of disruption 
as a having a trigger at a realm beyond the immediate observable environment of disruption 
impact. This links in with notions of epicentre and apocentre in terms of disasters and 
catastrophes. It also highlights the necessity to garner a vernacular understanding of apocentre 
before engaging with the impact of a disruption. Furthermore, this also means that Odette’s 
geographical imagination conforms with her tangible reality in that her breaking the rules in 
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one particular realm of the border world, triggers a series of undesirable events across the 
transnational space where her body, mobility and livelihoods coalesce. As an integrated 
ecosystem therefore, the imaginaries of the border space can rightly be put in conversation with 
the concept of security.  
                  
 Imaginaries of the border space in conversation with the concept of security 
 
Apart from incidents like the one in which Odette was involved, a great deal of the expression 
of vernacular (in)security is in fact embedded in the geographical imaginations of 
borderlanders. To illustrate this, I will now combine vernacular spatialisation of the border 
space as discussed in chapter 4 with a case study of the Etung transnational forest. This will 
help glean the security meanings of borderlanders’ performance of their relationship to border 
space and to the forest. A key aspect of this section will capture the multiple ways in which 
borderlanders pre-empt security threats or address insecurity problems across their transborder 
space.  
 
The borderlanders I interviewed avoided discussing certain topics related to terrorism or illegal 
activities that are very dangerous for them, such as drug trafficking. At the Cameroon-Nigeria 
border, all but one respondent agreed for our semi-structured interview to be recorded on tape. 
The reason for this reluctance was related to an earlier incident where many individuals were 
imprisoned based on an audio-recordings they had shared about Boko Haram. Even though 
borderlanders consistently said that they did not feel threatened by the Boko Haram insurgency 
happening far away in the North of both Nigeria and Cameroon, this collective reluctance to 
address the topic and/or to go on record shows not only an acute awareness of the overall 
security situation affecting both countries, but most importantly, an awareness of the ways in 
which this situation relates to their personal circumstances as individuals in their transnational 
geographical space. In other words, while they employ the same terms of insecurity in relation 
to terrorism, their fears are not exactly the same as implied by those terms in official narratives 
of the Boko Haram insurgency. The vernacular dimension of this insurgency is therefore not 
similar to what is fashioned even in the human security discourse on how insurgents might 
pose threats to people’s lives and property. In fact, they have no anxiety or fears about the 
insurgent group, but they are acutely aware of how the Boko Haram phenomenon might affect 
them. And most importantly, it is also an awareness of being in such a transnational milieu: 
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“where people come and go, and if it turns south there will be no one to witness for you.” (– 
Ekema, Nigeria – Cameroon Border). This reveals that their anxieties over Boko Haram are 
not the same as the ones felt by Nigerians north of Abuja for instance, and as framed in the 
official security narrative.   
 
These fears and anxieties are expressed in indirect ways. No one told me directly that they did 
not want to be recorded or why exactly they gave me appointments to which they would not 
show up, or where they showed up but said that they needed to check with someone else 
(husband, chief) before they could be recorded, or other excuses. I noticed that when I was 
noting down the reason why they did not want to be recorded, I had to infer the reluctance from 
the strange consistency of excuses from different individuals to avoid going on tape. (Example: 
“I recently had an issue with my throat, so this is not my usual voice. I am still recovering. I do 
not want you to record something that someone might say tomorrow this is not my voice”. – Or 
“If you are in a hurry, why don’t we just talk, and you write down as you are doing now?”. 
Additionally, it was through other parties, as I participated in casual conversations, that I was 
able to connect the collective reluctance to the incident about Boko Haram recordings which 
landed a few members of the communities in prison. I now wonder whether these topics were 
not purposefully brought up in my presence, frequently as they were, to indirectly tell me what 
the community thought about my prospect of recording some people. Obviously, I had openly 
shared my intentions with all potential respondents and in hindsight, I suspect they must have 
discussed in my absence and decided they had to let me know how dangerous this could be. 
This reflects the circuited ways in which the danger can materialise for them, an explanation 
of the metaphorical vocabulary used to designate the phenomena. This also explains the 
apparent paradox between their saying openly that they are not afraid of the insurgent group, 
yet refraining from talking about it, especially on the record. 
 
Moreover, the delineation of areas which borderlanders can frequent and those they cannot, is 
not just virtual in the sense of discussing security matters. It extends to the physicality of the 
border space with their avoidance of certain activities that are deemed dangerous either because 
it brings them in direct confrontation with the state, or because it puts them in harm’s way to 
other non-state actors, or even exposes them to accidents. These include crossing the border 
using routes frequented by drug-traffickers or using accident-prone riverbanks. Another telling 
idiom of security is the ways in which Border Deniers  manage to “unborder” the forest, 
expressing the fear that allowing the border to materialise across their territorial space is likely 
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to bring disruptions. For example, Yomi (the Forest Gatekeeper) told me that thanks to the fact 
that the borders in the forest are not clearly demarcated, pharmaceutical companies find it 
difficult to obtain permits to exploit medicinal essences from the forest. 
  
“When they go to Nigeria, we say that is Cameroon, and when they go to Cameroon, we say 
that is Nigeria. The day they get a permit, we are finished here. You see, it is not a simple 
matter, we are fighting for our life here, and it will fight like that till the end”. (Yomi)   
 
The borderlander’s fears and anxieties over the possibility of pharmaceutical firms moving in 
is indicative of the fact that their geographical imaginations and practices that tend to deny the  
borders are also a reflection of their situated understanding of that specific threat posed by the 
materialisation of the border, which could then lead to the devastating actions of industrial 
actors. Hence, this knowledge of security and stability not only confirms the borderlander as 
an informed and sensible actor whose understanding of security is not aligned with statist 
interests in security, but also as a transnational actor whose referent object of security is none 
other than himself across the borderland as delineated space. The spatial delineations of the 
borderland as produced by vernacular imaginations of border space also clearly assign those 
spaces where the state is expected to intervene in order to uphold security, and where the 
borderlanders know they have to rely on themselves. This is very evident in their mobility 
strategies. In acknowledging the border before negotiating to annihilate its effects on them, 
Border Acknowledgers thereby recognise state space in the border and also its role in securing 
them. But at the same time, these borderlanders know that they have to rely on themselves if 
venturing in remote areas or protecting their businesses. This virtual and physical spatialisation 
of security responsibility is a window into the agency of borderlanders as far as wielding their 
own security rationale goes. That is why the following examples of two seemingly 
contradictory security situations involving borderlanders ultimately concur to the expression 
of the same vernacular security rationale in the borderland.  
 
In the first situation, members of the border community in the Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea- 
Gabon three-part border helped the Guinean authorities with intelligence and physically 
participated in the manhunt and arrest of armed mercenaries who were smuggling themselves 
into Equatorial Guinea as part of a wider plot to overthrow the Obiang N’Guema regime in 
2018. In the second situation, the same border community is known to have misled both 
Cameroonian and Guinean military over the location of border markers, as sections of the army 
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from the two countries were mobilising over an apparent territorial dispute. When both 
countries’ armies had come to investigate reported encroachment of their respective national 
territory by either army, borderlanders misled both. Instead of borderlanders siding with their 
respective national armies, they cooperated from both sides of the border to lead both armies 
astray and confuse them. Most importantly, this transborder cooperation amongst borderlanders 
was not coordinated, as everybody “just knew the right thing to do in a situation like that”( 
Docta). As a matter of fact, borderlanders from the Cameroonian side told the military that 
indeed the Guinean army had come to the area, but proceeded to give wrong information on 
the exact location they had visited, making sure that their indications would locate the Guinean 
army site exactly within Equatorial Guinea. Borderlanders in Equatorial Guinea did exactly the 
same, in reverse order. In the first situation (cooperation with state authorities), we see 
borderland populations siding with the state and in the second case (territorial dispute), we 
paradoxically see the same borderlanders working against the state. This is only a paradox if 
seen through the eyes of the state. Beyond this, border communities are however very 
consistent in the pursuit of their own security interest, which consists in avoiding 
destabilisation of their geographical space, whatever the reasons.  “When elephants fight, it is 
the grass that suffers” is the phrase that regularly concluded the story each time a member of 
the border community told me about these tactics to keep their living space safe.  
 
 This also shows that knowledge schemas applied to the borderland diverge from the statal 
meaning of the border. The knowledge categories as seen in the hierarchy of spaces means they 
know what to avoid in specific areas, which alliances to form, and where neutrality is a safety 
card. In situating the agency of borderlanders in terms of security as can be seen in these two 
different cases, borderlanders clearly indicate the centrality of their own spatial environment 
as security referent, making their alignment with state space and official security narrative a 
pure coincidence. This does not mean that borderlanders cannot be affected by security 
problems that concern the state like in the case of Boko Haram. It simply means that their 
security interest in the phenomena is always likely to diverge and vary. This goes to show that 
in so doing, even if the surface observation suggests otherwise, borderlanders reject attempts 
by central governments to enlist them in official security narratives, and instead follow their 
own vernacular transcript of security that is discernible only upon closer observation. Whether 
this results in outcomes that converge with statist agenda is pure coincidence, the same as 
divergence with government objectives does not seek to satisfy the purpose of dissidence, 
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contradiction or confrontation. It is merely a difference in nuances which I shall illustrate with 
a case study of the Etung forest at the border between Cameroon and Nigeria.  
6.2 Security case study of the Etung Forest 
 
Paying particular attention to the ways in which Border Deniers  mobilise their geographical 
imaginations to discursively and performatively deconstruct the state border, and focusing on 
the transnational Etung forest straddling the Cameroon-Nigeria border, the  gleaned meaning 
of the border community’s relationship to the forest is revealed. It shows that their spatial 
practices encompass various security concerns such as the protection of biodiversity, anti-
deforestation efforts, food security, income security, and environmental security altogether. I 
will argue that tapping into this vernacular understanding of security allows us to uncover other 
security “idioms” in terms of keeping biodiversity safe, as well as protecting food and income. 
These idioms also reconfigure our perception of security in terms of costs.  
 
 Protection of biodiversity  
 
As Yomi explained during our semi-structured interview, borderlanders living around the 
transborder Etung forest use a variety of methods to protect the biodiversity of the forest. It is 
worth emphasising that Yomi does not use the term biodiversity or does not explicitly say that 
protecting biodiversity is the goal of their conservationist-like action in the forest. As seen 
earlier, only a selected number of individuals like Yomi are allowed to enter the forest and 
harvest forest products, set traps, or even hunt. According to Yomi, they become the forest’s 
“gatekeepers” after a month-long initiation rite during which they “receive instructions from 
[our] ancestors to protect the shrines [in the forest]”. Gatekeepers belong to the Etung ethnic 
group found both on the Cameroonian as well as on the Nigerian side of the border. The 
protection they provide for the forest is not understood as physically preventing people from 
entering the forest, but rather as enforcers of community taboos and sacred principles. In effect, 
the (un)intended result of protecting their space against potential intruders is that in the way 
they do, by dissuading access into the forest using traps (it is forbidden to fire a gun or make 
loud noises in the forest), and only allowing a select number of individuals to harvest or hunt 




 As part of the moral economy practised by Yomi and his colleagues who are allowed to hunt 
and harvest in the forest, only a selected number of forest products can be exploited at any 
particular season of the year, thus allowing time for the forest to naturally replenish the stock 
before further harvesting. This would not have been the case had the forest been open to 
industrial exploitation of medicinal plants for example, which are plentiful. Selecting specific 
types of forest products to harvest in specific periods of the year even when they are available 
during other periods, ensures that the right quantity is extracted regularly without jeopardising 
the forest’s ecosystem. Again, it is worth emphasising that this analysis of the consequences of 
their conservationist actions is consciously using the dominant environmental security lens and 
parlance, only as a way of accessing and translating vernacular idioms of security. This limited 
usage is therefore mindful of its potential to reify borderlanders’ own security rationale or 
repackage them into mainstream policy projects regarding environmental security. 
 
The vernacular convention around the sanctuary status of the forest raises its value in the eyes 
of the community, prompting a collective reverence for the site that makes widespread hunting 
inadmissible, trespassing an abomination, and industrial exploitation a threat that is collectively 
fought. This is significant because being located virtually in a no-man’s land where national 
borders are not clearly demarcated, national governments would have been at a loss had they 
to muster the necessary financial and human resources to protect the forest and monitor hunters 
and/or poachers. The second most important challenge to national governments would have 
been to determine, in that forest straddling two countries, where their respective jurisdictions 
started/ended. Forest users from both sides of the border would have undoubtedly taken 
advantage of this confusion to evade government control and harm the forest’s biodiversity in 
the process. We can therefore see that these conceptualisations of the border space as a natural 
endowment by the border community and vernacular practices akin to resource politics do 
conceal a hidden transcript of the vernacular form of understanding threats and addressing 
security challenges to the community.  
 
These actions by Border Deniers, despite and beyond the state border, culminate in what could 
translate in other mainstream terms as environmental security. Furthermore, this incorporates 
even the institutional dimension to the extent that they manage to impose a vernacular 
institution of control that is respected by everybody in the transborder community, including 
the state-sponsored forest guards whose presence is more a formality than anything else. Since 
this border community conceives of the forest as containing sacred sites such as ancestral 
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shrines that must be protected against the border, and based on their imaginations of the border 
space that structure their physical “deconstruction” of the all expressive forms of the state 
border functions in their area, these Border Deniers  (un)knowingly participate in 
environmental security from their vernacular vantage point. The unintended results 
nevertheless articulate strongly with global environmental security concerns.  Apart from 
environmental security, these practices can also be seen as ensuring food security and income 
security.   
 
 Food and Income security  
 
In fact, the role played by this forest in sustaining the lives of borderlanders cannot be over-
emphasised, as it provides opportunities for food, shelter (wood for construction), and income. 
The transnational forest is a major source of food (mushrooms, seed and spices, fruits, 
vegetables and a great variety of animals). In addition to food destined directly for local and 
immediate community consumption, a great deal of forest products are sold to intermediaries 
(such as Odette) who cross the border to sell them back in Nigerian and Cameroonian border 
towns or further afield in order to generate income. However, this in itself is not really crucial 
to our study. What is more interesting is the extent to which borderlanders manage to maintain 
such a sustainable stream of those opportunities through spatial practices that are for the most 
part inspired by, or structured around, their location in the borderlands. As a matter of fact, 
even though Border Deniers  tend not to admit the advantages offered by their location at the 
centre of the transborder exchange, I observed how this geographical particularity enhances 
the value of forest products for several reasons detailed earlier. It is therefore in cognisance of 
this enhanced value owing to the transborder paradigm, that Border Deniers  firstly view their 
spatial environment as a natural endowment; secondly, they move to protect it against the usual 
manifestations of the state border as well as other outsiders to their space of community; and 
thirdly, they ultimately manage to ensure food and income security thereby mitigating their 
own anxiety as regards food supply.  
 
Because they have made sense of their spatial environment as a natural endowment, a “gift 
from God” as they put it, Border Deniers living off the transnational forest have developed a 
forward-looking relationship with the forest. In this sense, both their present and future are 
intertwined with the existence of the forest and their spatial proximity to this major source of 
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food relaxes the pressure to accumulate on an industrial or commercial scale. “They know we 
always come home with something for them; and if it is not me, it is one of the other 
gatekeepers”. Yomi’s customers who are transborder traders not buying for personal 
consumption know that the supply is limited and that is why they cannot have more than four 
days’ worth of stock and have to return to Yomi at least once a week to replenish their stock. 
Conceiving of the forest as a natural endowment and being aware of its economic advantage 
due to its transborder geographic location, has underpinned the moderation with which the 
forest is exploited by the border communities who also look after it as an ancestral legacy.   
 
The respect for ancestral traditions means they respect those gatekeepers appointed to go into 
the forest and “look after the shrines”; these same people are the only ones entitled by tradition 
to take things from, or kill animals in, the forest. A sort of vernacular institution emerges out 
of this respect and adherence to ancestral rules by the people living in the immediate proximity 
of the forest, so much so that those coming from outside the area find it difficult to go against 
existing arrangements. I argue that these arrangements amount to a food security governance 
in that specific border space that would otherwise become vulnerable through uncontrolled 
exploitation out of the state’s reach and therefore threatening the very survival of surrounding 
communities by jeopardising their access to vital sources of nutrition. As borderlanders 
themselves regulate access to food resources, they distribute the stock available parsimoniously 
without pressurising the forest. Consequently, the abiding participation of traders and other 
border “acknowledgers” in that system of food security also feeds the community with the 
necessary income. The steady supply cycle of forest products therefore guarantees an equally 
stable supply of food to the community and a steady flow of income, especially when those 
who “look after” the forest reinvest their money back into the local economy. In addition to 
protecting biodiversity, as well as ensuring food and income security, the geographical 
imaginations of borderlanders produce an alternative understanding of security through 
assigning a differing meaning to the cost of security. 
 
 The cost of security  
 
The three or four Nigerian government-assigned forest guards essentially only patrol the outer 
surroundings of the forest. These forest guards are often portrayed by border communities 
neighbouring the forest as a nuisance and seen as likely to endanger the forest “because of their 
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stupidity”, as Yomi explained. However, after careful observation of the workings of forest 
protection as organised by Gatekeepers from both sides of the border, one easily concludes that 
these forest guards only perform formalities here, and the fact that they abide by the rules laid 
down by Gatekeepers strongly suggests a positive assessment on their part of the role played 
by these forest’s Gatekeepers, as a mutually beneficial status quo. In fact, one cannot begin to 
imagine the sheer amount of financial, infrastructural, human and technological resources that 
would have been required, were the state to achieve the same environmental objectives without 
the participation of the Gatekeepers. Needless to say, that it costs nothing for the community 
to run this “environmental security” and “biodiversity protection” processes.  At a time when 
funding is seen as the absolute cornerstone for security worldwide, and even more so, that 
better security simply equates to more funding, these vernacular approaches observed in this 
Etung transborder forest show that ordinary individuals are able to optimise their spatial 
environment at virtually no cost, to address their fears in multiple security areas. This puts in 
perspective the notion of ungoverned spaces as understood in security studies and IR, where 
the lack of (or perhaps funding for) state infrastructures is made to equate the absence of 
security or ability to organise security.  
 
6.3 Examples of resilient practices   
 
In this section, I am going to trace vernacular resilience through mobility practices across the 
border space, by highlighting their particular understanding of the border as a disruption. I will 
do this by exploring their use of language and the ways in which collective forms of resilience 
can be reformulated. The understanding of the postcolonial border as a disruption bears 
similarities with the wider understanding of the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’, which 
adopted a view of African states as impediments to development, growth and population 
resilience (Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999). However, it is important to emphasise that the 
methodological lens of this study see resilience in contrary terms to the ‘structural adjustments’ 
framework that informed the ‘Washington Consensus’. Instead, this notion of vernacular 
resilience fits well within the heuristic of the resistance framework as developed James C. Scott 
through “everyday forms of resistance” (1989). Yet again, this resilience of border communities 
cannot be articulated as tension with political regimes against which various forms of collective 
organisation would develop to address their absence or indeed, oppressive presence. Even 
though the call to recognise and study vernacular forms of resilience situates itself within the 
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framework of ineffective or oppressive eco-political orders, it is worth noting that the diffuse 
resilience of communities dealing with the presence and persistence of externally-imposed 
international borders provides material resources and practices for uncovering the border itself 
as a disruption. This resilience is much more prosaic than political, as it is built mainly as 
relational engagement with the specific geographical environment of the border. I will therefore 
first discuss three examples of how various practices of mobility can be understood as forms 
of collective or individual resilience. Secondly, I will draw the implications of these practices 
of security-related conceptualisations such as stability or continuity to reformulate an 
understanding of the border as disruption. 
 
 Performative subservience and resignation   
 
Even though they work and sometimes live amongst borderlanders, border guards and customs 
officers all perform urbanity in their mannerisms, appearance and acting. Their use of official 
national languages (English or French) shows that they are relatively well educated, or at least 
they act very much as though they are better educated than border users. Meanwhile border 
users, including those with university degrees, inhabit the role of the "backward" and 
"uncivilized” rural resident. I met Ekema , a tradesman with a master’s degree in law from the 
University of Yaoundé at the Cameroon-Nigeria border. He told me that he has to act 
uneducated, dress shabbily and pretend to be very poor in order to minimise costs while going 
through the border with his merchandise.  
“When I call them Oga [Boss], they are very pleased and assured. But I only come here once 
a week. Little do they know the rest of the time I train people who are their superiors. I can 
actually pay the salary of two or three of them every month [….]. One of the reasons you should 
not show off with them is that they will find out that the specific item you trade generates a lot 
of profit and they become very greedy when they sense that you have the money”. (Ekema ) 
 
Obviously, not all border users are well-to-do university graduates disguising as poor illiterates. 
In fact, quite the majority of border populations actually fit a description of powerlessness that 
contrasts with the image of the border official. However, Ekema’s efforts to fit into this 
representation of the borderlander is indicative of the vital and conscious adjustments made 
rationally to circumvent or mitigate the border perceived here as a potential danger. In the 
context of various structural orders of the state threatening from above, this rational practice of 
199 
 
false subservience can account for vernacular resilient strategies breaking out from below. This 
is an “everyday form of resistance” famously documented by James C Scott in his work 
“everyday forms of resistance” on hidden forms of peasant resistance in Latin America, which 
can also extend to other economically subordinated groups. In the context of the border, Ekema  
epitomises this subordinated group and the false subservience he displays towards the border 
officers is none other than a ruse to ensure that the threat of discontinuity to his trip or economic 
loss does not materialise. Needless to say, Ekema’s false subservience is not directed at a 
particular officer, but rather at anything or anybody that can wield state power through the 
functions of the border. The assumed powerlessness of borderlanders in the face of border 
officials is indeed predicated upon the acceptance that these border officials are above all, the 
representatives of the state. As such, the state is often the target of political rhetoric which 
borderlanders sometimes use to negotiate their way across the border.  
 
When asked how, considering those fears, they go about their daily lives, they showed very 
little reliance on the state, and instead expressed a sense of powerlessness (“Man go do how?” 
“On va faire comment?”) which is interestingly contradicted by the resilient practices traced in 
their daily activities. This expressed sense of powerlessness is at the surface level also 
indicative of the extent to which dominant narratives of resilience have enlisted border 
communities in dismissing their own resilience practices. Furthermore, on a deeper level, this 
expressed sense of powerlessness acts as a subterfuge concealing a powerful determination to 
act and address what they see as obstacles or danger.  In other words, a surface level analysis 
of border communities’ expressed sense of powerlessness shows that they are resigned and 
have been forced to accept that what they actually do about their fears and perceived 
uncertainty of their spatial environment does not count and cannot not change anything. 
However, upon closer analysis, these expressions do not actually mean what they are used for.  
The “Man go do how?” and “On va faire comment?” expressions that are recurrent amongst 
borderlanders in both border locales, are constative expressions rather interrogative ones. 
These are not questions in and of themselves, they are instead acting like rhetorical questions 
and usually come at the end of explaining the paradox or incongruity of a situation. Most 
importantly, instead of conveying resignation, they mark a determination to stand one’s 
grounds. For example, I noted an incident at the Cameroon-Nigeria border between a 
tradeswoman and border officials. After her goods had been seized, she sat near the border 





“The first man searched my bags and said if I bless him with 3000 Naira, I am free to go. I 
emptied my pocket and gave him. After just a few steps, now his colleague says I need to go to 
the office and pay custom duties on the food I am going to use to feed my family. So, we are 
here. Man go do how?” (name unknown) 
 
In this phone call, which I suspect was not a real phone call, the woman was actually aiming 
her message at the border officials. Her intention, speaking within hearing distance and loudly 
enough, was to state that they had a deal, of which they failed to honour their side. Secondly, 
she was letting them know that she has no more money and that there was no point in keeping 
her there. The border officers played right into her scheme, and she was free to go a few minutes 
after the phone call (most likely a fake call). 
 
 Reading newspaper headlines to cross the border   
 
The marketplaces of border towns or border hubs ordinarily have two or three shops where 
newspapers are displayed for sale. The “screaming” front pages of many of these newspapers 
are full of anti-government rhetoric highlighting state inadequacies in various areas. Many 
tradespeople line up in front of the newspaper stalls in the morning, while eating their breakfast 
standing or waiting for a vehicle to transport them across the border. They rarely buy these 
newspapers but whatever is written on the front covers is likely to resurface when they get to 
the border and negotiations with border guards seem to hit a deadlock. In exaggeratedly 
demonstrative anger, these tradespeople can be heard politicising state inconsistencies in their 
discursive positioning. They inhabit the role of a marginalised group being further harassed 
through the border.  In situations like these, they will address border guards as though they 
were in the face of the Government, with statements like: 
 
“If you don’t allow us to do this, what else can you give us? We live here without electricity, 





“If we had waited for this government, we never would have this smuggler highway tarred like 
this. How can the Chinese do something, and you guys are now taking credit for it?” (name 
unknown) 
 
“How can you treat us like criminals and terrorists?! These people [lorry drivers] do not even 
pay the little that you are turning down. And we know everybody uses the border.” (name 
unknown) 
 
“Is it too much to ask, when you cannot even build a school here? Tell me!” (name unknown) 
 
In utterances like these, border users resort to the political repertoires of opposition parties to 
remind state representatives (customs officials) that the state is in their opinion not only 
responsible for the economic hardships they endure at the border, but that they are also unable 
to deliver in the areas of security and fighting crime. Pertinent political points drawn from the 
front cover of newspaper headlines are made to suit a much wider political discourse of 
marginalisation of border communities and the state’s inability to discharge its duties at the 
border. 
 
“You are prepared to let us die of Ebola because you don’t care, and you are not prepared to 
let us go and die in our homes, again because you don’t give a **** about us”. (name unknown) 
 
Border users in a sense centralise their own marginality as a strategy to undermine the 
legitimacy of state officials working at the border. They know this will not change anything 
politically (that is not their objective), but in doing so, they attack the confidence and legitimacy 
of border officials. I was able to see expressions of embarrassment through nervous laughter 
and anxiety over escalation into a full-blown protest on the part of border officials when 
statements like those were made by members of the border community. This level of 
confrontation is not common, but when mobility strategies get to the level of political 
statements being made, border officials become sensitive to the likelihood of this turning into 
a collective protest and quickly diffuse the situation by giving in to the demands of the 
individuals, or group of individuals confronting them in this fashion at that particular point in 
time. Indeed, anti-state rhetoric of the above kind flares up in intensity with any policy 
enforcement or economic shift that means state authorities will exert more control on border 
transactions or movement than it is already doing. I noticed this peak at the Cameroon-Nigeria 
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border when the Naira-CFA Francs exchange rate became very volatile, and at the Cameroon-
Gabon border when a new policy was introduced. The relaxed border rules specifically for 
border residents seems to respond to this demand from border populations to enjoy relative 
ease of movement between neighbouring countries. 
 
Roadblocks are a typical example of how borderlanders thus centralise their marginality as a 
livelihood strategy. Even though not directly targeting the state, they mimic the government 
where the government is absent. They also take advantage - albeit in a different approach – 
from the central power’s inability to discharge its duties everywhere in the border zone.  A case 
in point is the youths I described earlier on as regularly setting roadblocks. As context to the 
study of a border resilient subject, we could interpret their actions as simply criminal. One may 
say that these individuals are not displaying any form of resilience to anything, but are instead 
engaged in organized extortion, transnationally for that matter.  However, in their mimicry of 
the state, the same individuals could also be seen as the embodiment of a marginalised 
community turning state inconsistencies upside down, and centralizing this marginality to 
sustain life across the border space. Further, we could also see the expression of a genuine 
vernacular institution capitalising on the border space that is perceived as a natural endowment. 
This is achieved by controlling the mobility of others. Even if setting up roadblocks to collect 
money from border crossers can be seen as the actions of marginalised people turning state 
inconsistencies upside down, it is nevertheless their sense of rootedness in that particular space 
that grants them, in their view, natural rights of control over outsiders’ movements. This shows 
how vernacular identities feed into livelihood strategies. By asserting their right to control all 
goods and movement through their territory, they construct their livelihoods around their claim 
to be “the border here", which also shows either that border does not mean the same or that 
they are happy with some aspects of the border.  
 
 Solidarity  
 
Although the regulation of mobility in borderlands falls under specific legal frameworks and 
regional border policies, the ethnographic data collected exposes a body of social relations built 
around the mutual interests of borderlanders collectively protected via institutionalised 
subversive strategies that seek to outmanoeuvre the “official border”. These social relations are 
overseen by locally based social actors who operate as gatekeepers at the crossroads between 
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state borders, borderland territorial limits, border officials and cross-border travellers. These 
are various types of intermediaries who are also power brokers, negotiating between border 
users and border officials, and between crossers and transporters, and between sellers and 
buyers. These locally based social actors acting in no formal capacity are also seen as arbiters 
in disputes as well as the authorities assessing where the boundaries of the vernacular spaces 
stand. In so doing, they systematise the border space and codify its practices against the state, 
for the benefit of all those involved. As such, their role is central in the question of mobility in 
borderlands.  
 
This solidarity links to vernacular spaces of communities (Chapter 4) formed instantaneously 
amongst the travellers comprised of drivers, tradespeople, visitors, etc., all assimilated into a 
community, so to speak. It is a creative form of social networking, obviously prompted by the 
imminent adversity represented in the international border ahead of them. It speaks to the 
capacity for a group to instantaneously come together for the purpose of addressing adversity. 
Instead of the conceptualised local solidarity at border level which essentialises and simplifies 
the borderlanders based on ethnicity, I argue here for the more specific notion of localised 
solidarity. As the process of crossing the border does not occur in one single place, this 
solidarity (use of mobile phones, networks) in the face of adversity, ties in with the dynamic 
character of mobility, addressing adversity from one place to another, therefore dismounting 
and remounting resilience strategies in the face of such adversity. This relates to the notion of 
the border as not being place-based.  
 
We see in the solidarity of borderlanders, how the ‘social fabric’ is shaped by perceived threads 
or woven in the practice of sharing costs and secrets to outsmart border officials when rules 
and regulations constitute a hindrance to their objectives. The mobility practices performed by 
travellers across borders eventually create a system of resilience, which while reflecting the 
agency of these social actors, conveys an awareness that complete, compete or contest the state 
structure expressed through the non-dynamic performativity and the reifying character of 
international borders. Drawing on James Scott’s celebrated study of poor peasants in Malaysia 
(1985) to analyse the mobility practices of borderlanders across the two border locales, my 
fieldwork further indicates that subtle but powerful forms of ‘every day resistance’ rather than 
visible historic ‘events’, create a conscious and diverging narrative of contemporary politics of 
threat amongst  the border community.  All the above examples of resilient practices, far from 
exhaustive, constitute a sample of multiples strategies used by borderlanders to protect the 
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continuity of their biographical trajectories and to ensure that mobility across the borderland 
benefits them. Essentially though, the most important insight from observing these strategies 
is not their qualification as resilient practices, but the fact that accepting these as resilient 
practices unveils a character of the border as seen only through vernacular eyes. In this sense, 
the personification of the border is a trope for the divergence in the narrative of disruption that 
exists between state-based understandings and vernacular representations of threats.   
 
6.4 Diverging narrative of disturbance and (in)stability 
 
While travellers seemed resigned to other challenges such as poor roads, uncomfortable 
accommodation and bad food during the trip, they seem very concerned about these controls.  
 
“I did not mind when the road was bad, we didn’t have all this wahala and you could do your 
thing with anybody monitoring you. Now every driver only wants to use the tarred road. And 
when you pass through it, you must pay almost every man you see. I am even asking myself 
what the use of that road to us is. It is just to grease the hands of those people”. Odette, Nigeria-
Cameroon Border  
 
Put differently, state inconsistencies or the state’s inability to discharge its duties towards 
border communities are at worst an inconvenience in their scale of priorities. The border area 
development agenda therefore meets a differing priority ordering when we note that 
borderlanders have a more acute awareness of, and concerns about, the implications of these 
policies for their deeply territorialised lives straddling the border space. This is so acute an 
awareness that complying with all official border-crossing requirements and the normative 
materiality of the border is not at all a matter of complaint in the conversations or answers of 
borderlanders. However, complying with these requirements does not protect the travellers 
from harassment on the part of immigration officials who can abuse their powers and cause 
extreme annoyance simply by detaining a passenger a whole day awaiting immigration 
interview.  Moreover, major policy shifts and political developments at regional and/or national 
levels further destabilise their economic strategies, even when these shifts are destined to 
facilitate mobility across borders and “protect border communities”.  A striking example is a 
major policy shift (on paper) whereby visa requirement was officially waived for CEMAC 
countries’ citizens who hold valid passports. Despite the implementation of the prescription 
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about free-movement within CEMAC that the Heads of States of the six-member countries 
enacted in 2013, and officialised during a summit in Chad in late October 2017 (while I was 
still doing fieldwork in the area), I witnessed first-hand how this measure instead worsened the 
plight of travellers who now had to pay higher prices for “smuggled” visas, that had 
paradoxically just been waived. The same holds true with the threat from Boko Haram or from 
territorial dispute.  
 
From the responses of borderlanders to the changes, we can study of mobility practices and the 
agency within by isolating specific patterns of resilience from the ethnographic observation or 
interviews conducted during fieldwork. However, with respect to how exactly these border 
policing practices disrupt their lives, there is not a single answer. In essence, this proves almost 
as difficult as pinning down the concept of resilience itself within relevant scholarship. There 
is a consensus that, resilience as a concept lacks coherence, clarity and consistency of use when 
operationalised in the social sciences (Norris et al., 2008). Nevertheless, the character of the 
border as an unstable space has been expressed through various ways in which borderlanders 
have mapped their geographical imagination of their living space. Using the case of policy 
change (CEMAC passport) or security problems that arose during the attempted coup in Guinea 
through the Cameroon-Gabon border, Docta describes this instability in the following words, 
 
“There are many things that can make your life change overnight. So you can’t really make 
long term projects here as if you were in any other town where you can buy your land safely 
and…and…you see”. 
 
The same was observed at the Nigeria-Cameroon border where during the time I was there, 
there was a combination of both the falling rate of the Naira and security problems in 
Anglophone Cameroon affecting the Cameroon-Nigeria border. In fact, the fall in the value of 
the Naira meant a fall in profit margins for traders buying in Cameroon to sell into Nigeria. On 
the other hand, political uprising in the English-speaking part of neighbouring Cameroon, just 
across the bridge from Nigeria, caused various sorts of disruptions to the local border 
community.  
 
The most important thing to note here is the multiplicity of events which culminate to create a 
serious disruption requiring a fully-fledged coping strategy; one event alone would have been 
a normal imperfection of everyday life. These combined events described in the two locales 
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only for the period of our presence have been preceded and indeed followed, by similar 
disruptions which explain why borderlanders view their space as an unstable space. Unstable 
in the sense that it cannot guarantee the sustainability of their livelihoods or the certainty of 
their social arrangements without their direct intervention. This differs from the state 
understanding of the border as unstable or as disruptive. This divergence can be further 
examined in the motivation that drives border communities to find ways to address these 
challenges to continuity and certainty. When asked for example, why they would store the 
goods they buy in order to wait for a better rate of the Naira or take the challenges of either 
immigration harassment (CEMAC passport), or transport difficulties on roads that avoid 
checkpoints,  their motivation was mainly the desire to support their family. This family support 
does not only include providing financially; physically visiting a relative was stressed by 
respondents as being very important and also worth the trouble to “fight the border”.  
 
Taken as a whole and considering the border as a dynamic space, this understanding of 
instability justifies the perception of the border space as one within which coping and 
adaptative strategies must be organised in order to maintain a certain equilibrium. Yet, while 
the official perspective on the instability of the border relates mostly to threats to the state as a 
system, borderlanders only consider those threats that directly affect their ability to sustain 
themselves socially and economically. Consequently, while resilience as envisaged by state 
authorities entails biopolitical efforts to ensure the perseverance of the border community as 
the social component of the territorial border, borderlanders view their resilience as constructed 
through a strong social support base and cross-border connections to protect themselves from 
the border. In other words, the changing political and economic environment is reflected in the 
border areas as direct impact on trade and mobility. However, the flexibility of the border as 
the medium through which the objectives of trade and mobility can be pursued despite these 
changes, is interpreted differently from either a state or community perspective. That is why 
travellers ceaselessly cooperated/conspired to outsmart security forces and immigration 
authorities. In this regard, the border areas studied make a compelling point for observing the 
experiences and coping strategies of various types of travellers as they use different techniques 
to outsmart border security forces, with the aim of avoiding/mitigating harassment, financial 
loss and even imprisonment before formulating policy.  
 
The ease with which border residents play on state inconsistencies to juggle with their identities 
and stories while crossing the border contrasts with the borderland identity struggle as 
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portrayed by Gloria Anzaldua in the US-Mexico border, where “the ambivalence from the clash 
of voices results in mental and emotional states of perplexity. Internal strife results in insecurity 
and indecisiveness. The mestiza’s dual or multiple personality is plagued by psychic 
restlessness” (1987, pp. 78–79). I argue that this lack of anxiety can be explained firstly by the 
collective rather than individual approach to border consciousness observed in both border 
locales, and secondly by the awareness that the materiality of the state border is transient and 
flexible. Border residents in the Cameroon-Nigeria border for example use pidgin English to 
include or exclude border guards in their interactions. They activate power relations by 
assigning a formal or informal place to border officials when they choose to speak to them in 
English or Pidgin English.  
 
Furthermore, even those who speak the local Ejagham language prefer to always speak in 
Pidgin English on the border scene for what I see as an effort to connect more widely to the 
border community comprising those who are not locutors of the Ejagham language. Likewise, 
language use across the Cameroon-Gabon area amounted to a desire to maintain a community 
based around the solidarity against what is considered border harassment. This use of language 
can also be likened to the ways in which travellers and transporters readily come together in 
exchanging “strategic intelligence” and cover for one another during crossings. In a sense, their 
invisibility diluted in their apparent hybridity as they come from diverse horizons and being “a 
little of this and a little of that, and not quite one or the other” (Rosaldo, 1989, p. 209), is 
compensated by a solid a collective resilience system illustrated by how they empower 
themselves as a community to cope with the adversity of the border.  
 
6.5 Conclusion: alternative starting points for analysing the contemporary politics of 
threat and (in)security   
 
The question this chapter set out to answer was “what do the practices and sense-making 
examined in the two preceding chapters tell us about the disruptions and threats as perceived 
by borderlanders?”.  Borderlanders’ accounts of security and resilience offer any alternative 
starting points for analysing the contemporary politics of threat and (in)security in border areas. 
Accounts of resilience and representations of stability as drawn from my fieldwork have 
suggested that borderlanders develop their own resilience strategies which seek to treat the 
border as a disruption. While the materiality of the border is an enduring feature of the 
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borderlanders’ geographical imagination, it has become clear through various statements that 
the expression of border governance itself is largely apprehended as disruption. As such, 
borderlanders view their resilience as constructed through a strong social support base and 
cross-border connections to protect themselves from the unpredictability of the border. 
Furthermore, the referent of security unsurprisingly differs between state rationalisation of 
threat and vernacular representations thereof. Accordingly, while the state-based understanding 
of security is expressed in terms of its ability to maintain control over the border and regulate 
mobility and exchanges, border communities have been observed and heard to refer to their 
immediate relatives and livelihoods as constituencies of security.  
 
Against the backdrop of a border governance reflecting the strictures of postcolonial states in 
Africa, the materiality of the postcolonial border carries in its performativity all the disruptive 
vectors inscribed onto African territorial space since the colonial era. Border communities then, 
and today, have had to constantly reassess their geographical imagination following various 
historical developments and policy changes in the wider international context affecting them 
directly and adversely. Put differently, the postcolonial border can be considered as a site of 
disruption; a permanent turbulence in the lives of border communities, owing to its being a 
colonial legacy, a physical feature of the postcolonial nation-state doubling (in)conveniently as 
an instrument of neoliberal global agenda.  However, this chapter is far from constituting the 
record of these changes and the resilient dynamics they have constantly been creating. It has 
only used a few examples of these dynamics as an entry point into truly expanding the 
vernacular dimension of security and of resilience as embedded in mobility practices and 
resource politics of borderlanders. This conceptual expansion has been emphasised here as 
necessary because despite critical security and resilience scholarship turning to bottom-up 
approaches and agency-based conceptualisations to ascertain people-oriented security and 
resilient practices, certain key assumptions undergirding the literature continue to trap the 
thinking within a limited western-centric framework.  
 
Most of the findings from semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions about how border 
communities perceive threats to their security individually and collectively –including the kinds of 
conversation topics that they feel threatened by – support the conclusions of past studies associated with 
the vernacular turn. Like Jarvis and Lister (2013) or Gillespie and O’Loughlin (2013) have suggested, the 
individual or immediate family members is/are the regular referent object(s) of security.  In this regard, 
the conversation between Lamel and Padday in the Cameroon-Gabon focus group discussion is consistent 
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with the ways in which the perceived salience of a threat was typically expressed in terms of spatial 
proximity, priority ordering and potential origins that differed greatly from the statal representation. When 
asked directly what they were mostly anxious about in terms of their safety and security in their living 
areas, many borderlanders readily responded by expressing concerns about threats to their livelihoods and 
other sources of threat that could be dismissed as unsubstantiated.   
 
I note here that the narratives of threat amongst the border populations and the state are divergent at two 
levels. First, while border communities focus on human security with their own bodies or immediate 
relatives as referent object, the threat narrative of border governance is concerned with policing bodies in 
their cross-border movement to ensure that they do not deviate and pose a threat to the state. This diverging 
representation extends into what is seen as legitimate by border communities while being characterised 
as illegal by border regulations. Secondly, another analysis of these diverging narratives can be drawn 
from the ways in which the border, as a contested site of discourse, reveals how the state marginalises its 
inadequacies as much as borderlanders centralise their marginality. For instance, the discursive 
generalisation of all movement of undocumented persons across the border as human trafficking, and 
therefore a threat that needs to be addressed in priority, can also be interpreted as a way in which the 
postcolonial state repackages its insufficiencies into discursive vulnerability for others. This ultimately 
criminalises those who mobilise their a-statal actorness, while they could otherwise use the border to 
problematise the role of state in terms of social services delivery for instance. In a very subtle dimension 
therefore, the divergent narratives of threat at the nodal point of the border does not just illustrate the 
differing security referents and the lack of empirical engagement with the “border experience” on the part 
of state policies. It also tells us about how states can still use territorial borders to shut down their own 
socio-political contradictions.  
 
Saying this does not underestimate the impact of this state threat discourse on border communities or 
indeed the ability of governments’ agendas to shape security narratives within border populations, not 
least because of the powerful infrastructures and resources deployed to manage the border. On matters of 
“extreme security”, the interests of borderlanders, immigration officials and the state seem to converge, 
and border communities show some awareness of their “duty” to uphold the state, albeit in their own 
interest. In any case, they do not negate or contest in the sense that they participate in the implementation 
of the border by helping the state with the prevention of the smuggling of weapons across borders. Border 
communities in the Cameroon-Gabon border have since the failed coup in Equatorial Guinea in early 
January 2018 been helping security services with intelligence. There is therefore an underlying awareness 
of being needed by the government and (albeit very low) expectations of entitlement as borderlanders so 
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long as this does not fundamentally jeopardise the state. This aligns with the deep contradiction in which 
border residents especially find themselves embroiled in their relationship with the state, as part of their 
role as brokers between diverging worlds. They express feelings of hostility against the state as represented 
by border officials for intruding upon their informal economic system and for interfering with what they 
view as their legitimate right to benefit from clandestine traffic and immigration. Paradoxically, they know 
the stakes are only as high as the immigration controls are tight. And sometimes, they profit by acting as 
mediators between traders and border guards. This intersection of interests and navigation between 
confrontation and cooperation tends to blur the distinction between both discourses.  
 
Prima facies accounts of security threats and priority ordering might therefore seem to reproduce the logics 
of governmentally. However, semi-structured interviews with selected respondents has made it possible 
to “de-silence” and isolate the security interests of the community, and to understand how these are shaped 
by a particular “border experience” currently inaccessible to the state logic. This experience produces 
vernacular accounts of (in)security that identify several issues of pressing concern, which are nevertheless 
excluded from various border strategies. This raises the question of whether these accounts or the issues 
they raise, fundamentally disrupt the logic of security. For this reason, unmuting the voices of 
borderlanders, who have hitherto been largely excluded from debates and policies targeting borders, is 
sufficiently substantiated as a disruptive move since vernacular representations of the border exclude the 


















7 Conclusion & Implications: Towards a Conceptual Framework for 
African Borders (A-statal Actorness?) 
 
A few decades ago, Painter indicated that politically constructed narratives of the  border are 
only the product of geographical devices rather than a reflection of a societal reality (1995, p. 
47) . As this project’s fieldwork has found out, the societal reality itself is often much more 
complex and multi-layered, especially when we look at how borderlanders make sense of their 
specific geographical environment. This thesis empirically engaged border dynamics through 
the study of borderlanders’ experiences, imaginations and practices as shaped by territorial 
space beyond the reification of the state. The patterns emerging from observing practices and 
representations within these two border communities have provided a basis for questioning 
existing theoretical assumptions about transnational (in)security and resilience across African 
borders. They also help establish an empirical junction between the theorised African border 
specificity and the push to use the postcolonial border space as a central conceptual tool in 
understanding word affairs. The data thus collected suggest that downplaying vernacular 
perspectives on territorial space has created a combined knowledge gap; a theoretical defect 
brought to light by the contrast between the persistent nation-building rationale and vernacular 
experiences as shaped by contextual spatial dynamics. The project has collected more evidence 
of the necessity to go beyond the widely accepted notion that the border is only a product of a 
dual performativity within which, state and society are entangled in various contested forms of 
sense-making. In effect, in a addition to offering a conclusion to this thesis, this chapter also 
answer research question 4: Can this vernacular understanding of border spatiality help 
reformulate questions of security and resilience in African borderlands? 
 
The third space as theorised by Edouard Soja (1996) is multi-layered in the postcolonial context 
of the border, as gathered through the experiences and dialogic interactions of borderlanders.  
The imaginations shaping this third space speak of differing experiences depending on 
everyone’s situated relationship with the state border. These situated experiences on African 
borderlands have been studied far less; and even less so are the ways in which borderlanders 
mobilise them to make sense of the world they live in and the extent to which this can help 
reformulate questions of security and resilience. The excavation of this sense-making based on 
the borderlanders’ own narratives has been the main task of the PhD research project. Insights 
from this analysis show that once we move away from the narratives of the border as produced 
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by geographical devices on maps and their meaning in realist IR, we find ourselves trying to 
make sense of a chaotic border world. We experience a destruction of our common meaning; a 
dismantlement of the “approved” relation to the physical world as conveyed by mainstream 
geography, and a crumbling of the meaning of objects within the border space. Some of these 
objects include border posts, roads, cars, people, dwellings, farms, animals, words, sounds, 
signs, etc. contained within the bounds of the interstitial spaces between countries. This 
excavation from the borderlanders perspective reveals that many of these borders objects of 
inquiry to be emptied of their very substance, or insufficiently signified when we uncover other 
meanings as produced by the vernacular engagement of borderlanders.  
 
In the context of these border locales, the rituals, narratives, symbols, and archetypes that 
define communities, as well as the vernacular border spaces to which the communities attach 
meaning provide key insights into this “third space”. At this stage, for the cursory observer 
willingly divested of the statist lens, it takes a conscious effort not to seek refuge again into the 
comfortable explanations of the border mediated through its state-based normative 
conceptualisations. Yet, a vernacular perspective on this border space reveals itself to be more 
substantial and coherent than initially anticipated. It offers insights into hitherto unexplored 
realms of the border space and the communities therein. Members of the border communities 
recounting their experiences and expressing how they make sense of their spatial world help 
create reasonable order, and a way out of the  semantic anxiety and semiotic chaos that erupt 
as we move away from the statist lens. The rich layers of lived experiences and the ways in 
which border communities make sense of their space constitute a centre of expertise that we 
can learn from in many ways. In this regard, ethnographically observing the border world and 
exploring the continuous experiences of borderlanders as recounted through their own 
narratives has been key to better understanding four important facets of the vernacular 
conception of the state border:  (1) the dialogic interactions between the state border and the 
borderlanders producing a third space; (2) how this vernacular border world is spatialised and 
articulates with imaginations of self and space; (3) an appraisal of how this (albeit tensed) 
vernacular sense-making and bordering practices produce interesting idioms of security and 
resilience. (4) Most importantly, and this Conclusion will establish, uncovering these 
vernacular bordering practices enriches conceptualisations of security and resilience.  
  
This PhD research project has studied the ways in which border communities in Cameroon, 
Nigeria and Gabon relate to their living spaces by focusing on the vernacular dimension of the 
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border. Based on the data collected, it can be concluded that, as various functions of the state border 
holistically interfere with the agency of borderlanders, the spatial sense-making and practices of the latter 
produce different ordering effects on social interactions within the border community on the one hand, 
and between borderlanders and their spatial environment on the other hand.  In this study’s focus on the 
border space as a place subjected to a reification of state processes originating outside its immediate 
historical and geographical coordinates, a useful preliminary observation has been established on the 
spaces produced by the vernacular-official border performativity. As a product of temporal and physical 
entanglement between state structure and society, border performativity can be viewed,  either as an 
iterative process of mutual influences creating a third space between the state border and borderlanders, 
or as the product of vernacular organisation of the border as a social space. These two lenses on border 
performativity can look identical, or even confusing inasmuch as they intersect in many ways to conjure 
the notion of mutual influences.  However, in practice, the former lens ends up only studying the societal 
impact of rationalising official border functions, thus occulting the emerging social ordering from below 
as a response to the state border. The latter lens, however, highlights the epistemological inequality 
concealed in the assumed dual performativity of the border, so as to foreground the vernacular 
organisation of the border space.  
 
 In the same vein, this project has sought to focus mainly on that one side of the coin, so to speak, to 
understand the vernacular implications of the “confrontation” between the two axes of the power that 
contest the border space.  This approach has taken my research away from just tracing the impact 
of state borders on communities that live around it, to inquire into how an exploration of the 
geographical imaginations and corresponding practices amongst these borderlanders reveals 
their vernacular agency especially in the areas of security and resilience. The tension that 
emerges between community action and the totalising ‘state space’ is the crux upon which 
revolves the agency of border communities studied, as they make sense of their transnational 
living space and act accordingly. As such, this study finds that tracing the agency of border 
communities in contemporaneous border contexts in Africa commands an interrogation about 
the place of  border communities in the historical processes of border making as well as in the 
epistemological foundations of bordering practices. It emerges that the state border and its 
negation can exist side by side, be entangled or locked into battle on the same site. Even more 
so, interesting questions arise from the ways in which borderlanders combine their bi-placed 
identities with the juggling of multiple vernacular spaces to negotiate mobility and mobilisation 
across the borderland. These questions are raised not only about processes of identity formation 
across the border space, but also about how geographical imaginations shape the border 
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communities’ ability to negotiate across such a site of converging commodities, currencies, 
international socio-economic processes, and even global policies.   
 
In conclusion to these choices, even though I acknowledge the visual predominance of the 
state dimension in the materiality of the border, the choices made mean that this research has 
not looked at the border from a statist understanding of the international border. That is why in 
the data collection process for instance and the rendering of various narratives, utterances from 
state officials have been systematically discarded from the analytical framework. The one and 
only exception was the reference to the Senior Nigerian border officer in the video clip 
commentary at the beginning. Apart from this, this project’s entire frame of reference has been 
set up to respond precisely to these vernacular understandings and imaginaries, rather than 
mobilising security signifiers that could have been mapped out in advance. Equally, the project 
did not seek to evaluate any particular security policy or any specific school of security 
thinking. The main aim has been limited to creating space for rethinking security and resilience 
based on borderlanders’ vernacular knowledge. The aim is generating a framework of thinking 
within which vernacular narratives can help reconsider knowledge production in the fields of 
security and resilience, especially as regards borderlands in Africa. The empirical engagement 
with the borderlands has produced an alternative or perhaps a complementary approach to 
people-centred (dimensions of) policies, but it stops short of making direct and specific policy 
recommendations, even if there are clear contributions in this regard.  
 
In terms of policies, my critical understanding of security and resilience has been rooted in a 
vernacular consideration, which envisages security as situated experiences, notably the 
necessity to conceptualise security along the interest(s) of such communities, rather than 
institutional policy makers. Insights from critical geography provided preliminary 
conceptualisation and delineation of the transnational border area as an integrated geographical 
unit on the receiving end of externally imposed spatial ideologies and the reification 
postcolonial state structures. This approach has usefully been complicated with vernacular 
expressions of agency to capture the relationships between behaviour patterns and the specific 
environment of the transnational space.  Going beyond the state-based conventional 
understanding of the border in order to uncover the border world as seen through the 
borderlander’s vantage point, helps us escape a vision of state borders as “ mirrors of nature 




The methodology section and, indeed the writing of this methodology into the rendering of empirical 
data analysis, have amply demonstrated that delinking the official border dimension from vernacular 
border performance helps uncover a sustained link between the vernacular imaginations of borderlanders 
and the various ways in which border communities “perform” the border space. Similarly, the centring 
of vernacular agency has shown, that within these practices and vernacular sense-making, are buried 
various silenced expressions of fears and anxieties which borderlanders either verbalise or perform in their 
relationship to the border. The insights from the fieldwork further suggest that the silenced ways in 
which borderlanders understand security threats and address them do carry the potential to expand human-
oriented approaches to security and open avenues for research and policy work. To detail these 
implications for border and security scholarship, this Conclusion Chapter is divided into three main parts. 
The first part outlines key insights and arguments of this dissertation. The second draws the 
epistemological implications of these insights in terms of conceptualising border space in postcolonial 
contexts; rethinking security and resilience; and designing border policies more generally. The final part 
sets out potential research and policy paths on border security by proposing a conceptual tool (the a-statal 
actorness) and a conceptual framework for African borders. 
  
7.1 Key insights and arguments: geographical imaginations  
 
The main insights of this PhD project have consistently been structured thematically, discussed 
substantively in their respective chapter, and summarised accordingly in each conclusion 
sections. In the end, three overarching points emerge from this study: (1) the reified immobility 
and permanence of the state border; (2) the direct links between vernacular geographical 
imaginations and spatial practices of borderlanders; and (3) the expansion of security 
representations and notions of threat as harboured within these vernacular sense-making and 
practices. Interestingly, foregrounding the experiences and sense-making of borderlanders in 
this study is not only a methodological option with a potential to enrich empirical engagement 
of borderlands, it is also a logical move following the realisation that focusing on the reified 
functions of the state border cannot provide significant insight into the perspectives of 
borderlanders on the border space. In this section therefore, before summarising the project’s 
key findings on geographical imaginations, vernacular border practices and corresponding 
security meanings, I will firstly focus on an in-depth assessment of the qualitative data on the 
first point that has emerged, namely official border performativity as dynamic immobility. This 
will also serve as a steppingstone to the second part of this section, i.e. summarising the 
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relationship the borderlanders’ geographical imaginations and their performance of the border 
space. Established in this study as a crucial entry point to the understanding of vernacular 
agency across the border space, the data on the imaginations-practices relationship reveal the 
borderlander as a self-centred actor navigating an integrated space beyond the territoriality of 
the state. In this a-statal actorness that produces vernacular idioms diverging or conflicting 
with the state rationale of the border, the borderlander is not an actor within state space. The 
third part of this section shows that idioms of security and vernacular resilience patterns are 
embedded within vernacular bordering practices.  
 
 Border performativity as dynamic immobility  
 
As theorised by Rabinowitz (2001) and further explained by Navaro-Yashin (2003), the 
primary practical purpose of borders is to stop things, immobilise people and stall ideas from 
moving around without control. This function of the border has been verified in the two border 
locales studied, both from historical and spatial perspectives. The various ways in which the 
Nigeria-Cameroon and the Gabon-Cameroon state borders is experienced by borderlanders 
invoke the state’s ability to constrain, restrict, and dictate against the communities’ desire to 
benefit from the border space as a corridor of opportunity and/or a natural endowment vested 
in their geographical space.  In this sense, a dynamism of the border understood as the constant 
changes in the ways in which the state delivers on this purpose of the border; its assessed impact 
on border communities is a flawed understanding of dynamism. It is flawed because when we 
look at the border from the perspectives of the borderlander, these changes - such as historical 
locations of borders, physical transformations and shifting policy practices - are not meaningful 
in themselves and do not seem to structure the entirety of social ordering around borders. 
Furthermore, their investment in immobility rather than mobility contrasts hugely with the 
principle of dynamism. These characteristics that dominate the usual understanding of the state 
border can therefore be rightly seen as the opposite of dynamic. 
 
Border performativity has usually been understood as part of the notion that, borders acting as 
barriers, are intended to “censor” the movement of people, things, including ideas. In so doing, 
borders then trigger various social attempts to define them as much as they define the socio-
spatial environment. The danger with this conceptualisation of border performativity is that it 
risks essentialising border communities as being themselves a product of the border, while 
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evidence from the data suggests that the border is just one relational element amongst many 
others within their spatial environment. Furthermore, this study has uncovered borderlanders’ 
agency as one which wields control over the border space rather than being subjected to it. As 
seen in their negotiations of mobility, border communities in Cameroon-Gabon and Nigeria-
Cameroon have come to intuitively associate the statist dimension of the border with the 
concept of immobility, rather than mobility which should normally underlie its intended 
dynamism. In effect, the border keeps attempting to arrest the dynamism of borderlanders by 
restricting their mobility or assigning new meanings to their actions across the border space. 
This potential of the state border to immobilise border populations can be seen in the symbolic 
meaning of barriers and checkpoints; waiting times associated with administrative formalities 
at the border or even the unresolved disruptions of the political order that “suspend” everyday 
life through biographical disruptions (see “Border Bridge Closed”).  
 
This borderlanders’ perspective on mobility offers insights into the fact that the three regimes 
of expression (the global, the national and the local) that are projected unto the borderland as 
vectors of dynamism are actually converging to signify immobility. Hence, even if 
borderlanders inhabit a geographic receptacle of the classical tripartite scheme of the World 
Systems Theory known as the centre - semi-periphery - periphery, the tension between state 
and society across the border space is too complex to be grasped from this three-level 
perspective only. In addition, foregrounding the borderlander’s geographical imaginations has 
shown that, in contrast to what is laid out in their classical understanding, the concepts of centre 
and periphery are much more fluid than geographically distributed. In other words, there are 
centres within/departing from the peripheries. Centring the borderlanders within their 
geographical space thus turns the notion of border performativity upside down, since, as 
Kolosov rightly observed, “local territorial communities are not passive subjects of exposure 
to central authorities, but actively influence the formation of identity, and the nature and 
perception of borders […]” (2015, p. 43). The data collected from fieldwork suggest that border 
communities have integrated in their geographical imagination that borders are constantly 
transformed, displaced, reworked, re-functionalised. While these changes reflect the dominant 
policy/political climate of the day, I have observed that border communities are not so much 
interested in the details of changes, as they are in the permanence of these changes. The 
postcolonial border dynamism is in effect non-dynamic as the border itself never changes. Only 
communities adapt to various state reification processes, of which the border is a mere catalyst. 
As such, Wallach’s dualistic conception of border performativity as an empty signifier (2011), 
218 
 
should be recast as a plurality of signifiers, most likely to be substantiated by vernacular 
practices than the state side of the border world. However, performativity is often understood 
as just the state side, and wrongly so. The state is predictable and therefore linear and non-
dynamic as compared to the communities who are unpredictable, inventive, unrestrained and 
non-linear.  
  
It is now clearer that the much-discussed dynamic nature of the border which essentially 
foregrounds the impact of changes in state functions of the border, as related to short-term 
socio-political activities, normally contrasts with its intended permanence and stability. Thus,  
by positing that “No border is built for a short term: it is built for eternity”, Van Houtum  
confirms the findings from critical historiographical analysis that even though the idea of the 
border itself might be permanent, no state borders possess eternal properties (2010, p. 290). 
However, the border properties are often taken to represent the border itself.  Borderlanders 
make a distinction between the two, so as to effectively engage the permanence of the border. 
As shown through the empirical examination of borderlands in Cameroon, Gabon and Nigeria, 
borders have ceaselessly been changing both physically (actual wall/fences), locationally 
(moved from one place to another) and functionally (from imperial frontiers to inter-national 
borders). This means that the dynamism of the border seen in the sense of material instability 
fails to capture real border dynamics since the material changes described above constitute only 
a reflection of a permanent geographical construction that has been inserted into the mental 
landscape of the populations living around these borders. It is therefore very important to 
distinguish between the development of the border, which is axiomatic to the nature of the 
border and the dynamics it creates by “inscribing” itself unto the geographical imagination of 
the local populations. This dialectical ambivalence of the border where change is the only thing 
that does not change is also supported by the fact that African borders, as outcome of ongoing 
postcolonial state processes (also referred to as “official bordering practices” or “border 
dynamics”), are not necessarily a reflection or representation of border experiences.  
 
These experiences are better discernible as outcome of vernacular practices that centralise the 
borderlander in an epistemology of the border. In other words, just as contemporary state 
bordering practices do not in themselves tell us anything about the borderlanders, apart from 
the impact these practices may have on them and further border policing changes, a border 
performativity seen through statist lens cannot truly account for vernacular bordering practices.  
So, while “bordering practices” (essentially border properties) can be seen as dynamic changes, 
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they do not mean much to the border community other than new parameters of a permanent 
situation. This completely shifts the focus to how primarily the social nature of interactions 
across borders is shaped by dynamic direct encounter between the two main vectors of the 
postcolonial border space, i.e. the vernacular and the official. Their location, physical changes, 
and state mobility policies are not as important as the new socio-economic dynamics generated 
as a response from border communities. The Cameroon-Nigeria and the Cameroon-Gabon 
borders have each espoused this oxymoronic conflation of, for lack of better phrase, dynamic 
stability, or static dynamism. They have not always been in their present location; they have 
changed forms and functions across historical time and geographical space. And yet, there is 
no better evidence of their ingrained permanence in the borderlanders’ imaginaries of space 
than these changes themselves. Put differently, without looking at the response of border 
communities, a historical overview of these changes only confirms the entrenched nature of 
the colonial border and its reification in contemporary mainstream representation of the 
postcolonial African international border. Nevertheless, in their direct relationship to the border 
space, border communities engage the state borders on a daily basis not by rationalising these 
functions or properties of the state border, but rather by relating dialogically with signs, 
symbols and actions that denote the official border dimension.  
 
As such, the performativity of the border space from the borderlander’s perspective is the 
mobilisation of many tools and devices which take on different meanings. The totemic signs 
and symbols of the state such as flags, barriers, directions, uniforms, and even the road are 
examples of the ways in which the state is expressed in the physical realm and which 
borderlanders can contest or interact with accordingly. In this performative relationship to the 
border, we understand borderlanders’ emphasis on themselves, not as subject to the border, but 
as social beings having command over their living space, of which the border is only an element 
mediated through these signs and symbols. This dichotomy between the vernacular and the 
official is different from the one that foregrounds the statist dimension of the border, as it allows 
the analysis to look both at the shifting layers of the border as understood by borderlanders as 
well as the discrete distribution of various bounded spaces produced by border communities 
across the physical and/or abstract space and time of the border.  The complexity of borders in 
general, combined with the established fact that various sorts and dimensions of borders can 
exist within the same territorial space, compromises the notion of a dualistic and egalitarian 
understanding of border performativity. As outlined above, gaining a better understanding of 
the diverse factors which bring every unique (part of) border into being, requires a shift in focus 
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as advocated by border scholars such as David Newman (2015), namely moving from borders 
to bordering practices.  
 
While doing this, it is however important to distinguish between state bordering practices and 
vernacular bordering practices. As seen throughout this thesis, state bordering practices do tell 
us more about the state, than they help us decode the said border itself. Conversely, a people-
centred perspective which not only decentres, but also problematises this decentring process, 
has created a fundamental basis in understanding how vernacular relationships to spatial 
environment and practices of mobility work together to constantly reinvent borders in terms 
that are understood differently by borderlanders. That is why it was necessary to carry out an 
exercise on the development of the two border areas studied and link this development to be 
analysed as a non-dynamic process underpinning the static nature of the border. In this step 
towards decoding the border from a non-statist perspective, the different border and bordering 
components and functions have been bundled together as an integrated performance of 
externality and adversity vis-à-vis centralised border communities. Looking at the constant 
changes in bordering dynamics as a transcript of a territorial “tumult” in the past, as well as 
their present-day consequences, allows us to critically examine what these changes mean for 
border communities as they deal with the multifaceted and amorphous processes of borders 
shifting physically and functionally. Narratives of the past, anecdotes of lived reality, mobility 
patterns, accounts of everyday experiences, expression of sense-making, etc. collected from 
various individuals across the border areas studied constitute the discursive landscape, through 
which communities attempt to make sense of state borders through their own practices. This 
discursive landscape, which certainly shapes their geographical imagination, renders a 
representation of their living space as one within which constant changes are naturalised and 
internalised. As an indication of emerging vernacular resilience strategies for instance, many 
respondents linked their preparedness for instability to these changes that they expect and 
address regularly.  
 
Overall, this understanding of border performativity has allowed the uncovering of a different 
and active rapport to territorial space where the borderlander’s agency is primarily geared 
towards their present need for new resources and/or societal fulfilment. As fieldwork has also 
allowed us to observe, these primary motivations underlie the diverging functions of their own 
representation across space, as compared to the intended or assumed functions of the state 
border. Paradoxically therefore, while the border presents itself as a facilitator of movement, 
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yet gaining meaning as a restrictor of mobility namely through stopping or monitoring the 
movement of goods and people, borderlanders pull themselves in the direction of bi-placement, 
pretending immobility while actually their performance of the border space as related to their 
geographical imaginations denote an extensive engagement with mobility across the border 
space. In this performative relationship to the border, we understand borderlanders’ emphasis 
on themselves, not as subject to the border, but as social beings having command over their 
living space, of which the border is only an element mediated through signs and symbols. This 
dichotomy between the vernacular and the official is different from the one that foregrounds 
the statist dimension of the border, as it allows the analysis to look both at the shifting layers 
of the border as understood by borderlanders as well as the discrete distribution across various 
bounded spaces produced by communities in the physical and/or abstract space and time of the 
border. 
 
 Borderlander’s Geographical Imaginations and Performance of Border Space  
 
In the following lines, I will revisit the building blocks of the borderlanders’ geographical imaginations 
(imaginations of self and space) as well as the ways in which these have structured various negotiations 
of (im)mobility within the border area. 
 
Starting with imaginations of space, the data analysed suggest that, as a response to the rigid and 
oppressive character of the official border, borderlanders conceive of the border space as multi-layered. 
By “blowing up” the border into its constituent parts, borderlanders find it more manageable to navigate 
the border space in sequence or deal with one layer while avoiding the other. Of crucial significance to 
this vernacular “layerisation” of the border is the distinction between fixed layers and shifting layers of 
the exigencies imposed by the official border. For example, in the identity category, nationality is a fixed 
layer of the border as seen by borderlanders, but ancestry and marriage can be used as shifting layers to 
move around nationality and escape its rigidity. Still in relation to space, the data suggest that 
borderlanders create several spaces within the border space, both abstract and physical, whose bounds are 
inhabitable either simultaneously, in sequence, or discriminatorily. Amongst these spaces, I have 
particularly noted spaces of legitimacy, spaces of money and spaces of community, as distinct bounds 
within the border space, or because of the border space. Within the parameters of these spaces, the 
overarching impetus for action is either security, money or community respectively. Needless to say, that 
the spaces thus listed are not exhaustive, but they are important as illustrations of how to access the border 
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world from the vernacular vantage point. Equally important is the relationship between the border space 
and its overall meaning for the borderlanders. 
  
In this regard, in addition to seeing the border as one element of their spatial environment amongst others, 
an insightful distinction has emerged between Border Deniers and Border Acknowledgers. Identified as 
the first building blocks of the borderlander’s sense-making, these two categories are not conceived in 
the sense of positivist or deterministic classification of borderlanders. Instead, they should be seen as a 
mapping of a fluid relationship to border space as expressed by borderlanders. In other words, a Border 
Denier can become a Border Acknowledger and vice-versa, depending upon circumstances. The former 
category is made up of individuals/behaviour patterns that typically live in the transborder space, yet do 
not accept/conceive of themselves or their lives as dependent on, or influenced by, the international border 
nearby. The latter, however, may or may not live in the ‘frontier’ space, but engages the state dimension 
of the border in various ways to facilitate mobility, and/or as economic strategy. I observed that, while 
Border Acknowledgers label themselves as “Border Person”, “Border Girl”, “Border Man”, etc. to 
emphasise their bi-locational identities, Border Deniers  instead consider the border as having no bearing 
on their identity. At most, they consider their cross-border identity to supersede the border, which is 
therefore immaterial in their imaginations of self. Both categories of identities in the borderlands studied 
are expressed through statements, signs and symbols that constitute a discursive divergence. Indeed, as 
summarised above, we noted that imaginations of space vary. This variation is shaped by the 
borderlander’s situation in relation to the border. For example, Border Acknowledgers view the official 
border as a corridor of opportunity that can be engaged through various mobility strategies, while Border 
Deniers  see the official dimension of the border as a nuisance that should be annihilated, if not physically, 
at least symbolically.  
 
Consequently, a divergence emerges in the type of preoccupation and activities expressed by both 
categories of borderlanders based on the sense they make of the border space in relation to their particular 
circumstances. While Border Acknowledgers are more interested in how to mobilise their social capital 
and especially their bi-placed identities and solidarity networks to freely navigate the border space, Border 
Deniers  work towards the symbolic deconstruction of the border in order to highlight the physical 
continuity of their living space. The data collected also suggest different forms of attachment to the 
territorial space of the border. Whereas Border Deniers tend to live a little further from the main border 
towns and profess a moral commitment to living in these specific locations, Border Acknowledgers are 
more transient and can move around more easily following business tide and whims. These differences 
and diverging attitudes are however of a very superficial order, because when one looks more closely, 
223 
 
both Border Deniers  and Border Acknowledgers participate in different aspects of the same politics of 
rejection of the state border, juggling vernacular spaces and negotiation strategies to achieve the same goal 
of disabling the effects of the state border on them.  
 
In terms of similarities, both types of borderlanders above all see the border’s advantageous aspects as an 
entitlement to which they are naturally eligible. I have concluded that emphasising bi-placed identity to 
navigate the border space is not just a mobility strategy;  it appears in fact to be a chiasmic operation that 
enables the borderlander to mentally dissociate from the official border in order to avoid the ambiguity of 
both cooperating and rejecting, while all the same retaining the moral ability to justify the benefiting from 
the border. Notably, Border Acknowledgers see the border as a corridor of opportunities, to which their bi-
placed identity guarantees preferential entitlement. Conversely, Border Deniers who reject the notion of 
the state border as much as possible, still see their transborder living environment as a natural endowment 
for which state interference is uncalled for. A case in point is the Etung transnational forest. Put it simply, 
both border “acknowledgers” and “deniers” end up participating in the same practice of disabling the 
border in order to reduce its effects as much as possible, even though we can see differing imaginations 
of the border as summarised above, or imaginations of self as will be summarised in the following lines.  
 
The materiality of the border in itself is not a significant concern and has been accepted within 
the geographical imagination of borderlanders as a “fact of life”. This can also be observed in 
their integration of multiple identities and spatial adjustments in their social relations where we 
found no “crises of identities” or “borderlands hysteria”. Borderlanders see borders as corridors 
of opportunity only as long as these borders allow them to maintain some freedom of 
opportunity around and across them. In a sense, their full embrace of their interstitial space is 
only predicated upon the certainty that they can control their own movement and to certain 
extent, the movement of other people crossing the border area. However, their perceptions of 
control regimes imposed by states on borders denote disruptive interference which destabilise 
their sense of continuity.  By considering the borderland as a natural endowment (“deniers”), 
or free movement as a right to which they are entitled (“acknowledgers”), borderlanders solve 
the conundrum often perceived as their incoherency between loathing and benefiting from the 
border. As far as they are concerned, the advantages of the border are just a coincidence, a 
matter of fate which could have been negative, and they would still have dealt with. Hence, the 
strategic transborder location of the Etung forest or Cameroon-Gabon border villages selling 
black pepper is not something that borderlanders readily admit in their narratives. Instead they 
brush this under the rug to emphasise the fact that their geographical unit is one and continuous, 
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despite the border. Both groups therefore set themselves to operate according to mental and 
physical frameworks that transcend national boundaries and nation‐state borders.  
 
 Borderless performance of the border space 
 
The discursive difference constructed as part of imaginations of self and space in the borderland 
is very important, especially as regards the ways in which these imaginations shape differing 
performances of the border in terms of negotiations, vernacular politics of resources, and 
mobility strategies. Analysis of semi-structured interviews and ethnographic observation 
provides the understanding that both types of borderlanders experience the performance of the 
border superstructure (check points, officials, rules and regulations) as a disruption to their 
perceived sense of continuity – despite the border itself being an opportunity. In order to 
circumvent this disturbance in the physical and temporal spaces between them and their socio-
economic pursuits, borderlanders come up with various practices that are solidly aligned with 
their geographical imaginations. Examples include several negotiation strategies used by 
border crossers or border residents taking advantage of mobility across the border. In this case, 
bi-placed identities have constituted a key asset in navigating the border space. Furthermore, 
strategies to dismiss the border amongst Border Deniers have also been interpreted as 
emanating from their vernacular representation of the border space as a natural endowment 
over which they have ancestral rights that supersede various constructions and functions of the 
state border. To mark their agency and refusal to be subjectified by the border, patterns of 
border personification are all indicative of the fact that borderlanders  consider the border not 
as the sole defining aspect of their life, but as an important relational item in their multi-layered 
living space that extends even beyond the physical location of the border. In any case, juggling 
with the varied layers and across the multiple spaces within the border space, the performance 
of the border indicates more control than normally envisaged. This control reifies the agency 
of borderlanders in mobility patterns and politics of resources, which themselves carry deep-
seated idioms of resilience and security.    
 
 Embedded idioms of resilience and security 
 
The rejection or the disabling of the official border is a single objective aimed at by both types 
of borderlanders and achieved through different means. These include discursive strategies, 
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performative strategies, and linguistic strategies. In terms of discursive strategies, this thesis 
has shown how both categories of borderlanders create a dissuading discourse directed towards 
border officials, with the aim of significantly reducing the ability of the border to control them 
or dictate their behaviour. For mobility practices, discourses of bi-placement, entitlement and 
even of political neglect, enable users to lessen the financial impact of crossing the border. 
These are also means through which many other borderlanders control and/or profit from the 
mobility of others crossing their territorial space. In the performative realm, the actions of 
Border Deniers are more telling of their desire to physically prevent the border from 
materialising with both linguistic and semiotic distancing, in addition to active subterfuges. In 
other words, their spatial performance through language, signs and symbols is, at the same 
time, a dismantlement of the state border.  
 
These all point to the border as a permanent threat, or at least a continuous disruption that 
borderlanders address on a daily basis as part of keeping control over their living spaces. Their 
fears and anxieties are therefore embedded within their actions and strategies, which (upon 
deeper analysis) can be read as vernacular idioms of security and resilience that apply to other 
areas of live. Furthermore, as an extension of geographical imaginations and vernacular 
bordering practices, these idioms of securing and surviving expand the concept of security into 
the vernacular and the concept of resilience to plurality. As such, the interaction between three 
processes (imaginaries of space and self; contentious mobility and resource politics; idioms of 
threat and disruption) forms the crux upon which revolves the borderlander’s vernacular 
agency. Put differently, the ways in which borderlanders make sense of the border space and 
act accordingly, also comprise vernacular understandings of threat and disruption, as well as 
vernacular responses to these dangers.  
 
For instance, the personification of the border, seen as a circumscribing a threat or a disruption before 
addressing it, has enabled us to establish how meanings of vernacular security and patterns of resilience 
can be gleaned from the otherwise anodyne actions of border communities. In order to complete this 
exercise, it has first of all been necessary to centralise the vernacular worldview which structures the 
actions of the borderlander. Like in Odette’s story, this acceptance of vernacular interpretation of border 
space has enabled us not only to see a possible hermeneutical alternative for the explanation of the 
origin(s) of insecurity, it has also helped uncover the choices made by borderlanders to protect themselves, 
their communities and the continuity of sustained livelihoods. In this sense, the imaginaries of the border 
as expressed by borderlanders is not just a passive perception of geographical spaces, it is an operative 
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imaginary that structures rational actions taking into account the transborder nature of this particular 
physical space. In the case study of the transborder Etung forest for instance, we note how vernacular 
conceptualisation of the transnational forest leads to what would qualify as robust environmental and 
human security. Furthermore, these vernacular practices of security raise questions about the cost of 
security in mainstream understanding of border policing. Apart from these idioms of security, the practices 
of border communities in the two border locales also show several examples of resilience practices that 
help rethink the concept of resilience, and most importantly the conventional understanding of disruption.  
 
To conclude this section on key insights of the study, it is safe to say that thick cartographic 
borderlines which represent international borders between states, are actually also signifiers of 
ongoing negotiations between border communities and their spatial environment. The variety 
of the geographical imaginations’ constitutive elements, and corresponding socio-spatial 
organisation and bordering practices are fuelled by the permanency of the border as both 
postcolonial disruption and opportunity. From cross-border solidarity networks to transnational 
vernacular security institutions, the social dynamics and modes of spatial organisations 
generated in response to the (post)colonial border are testament to vernacular agency of 
borderlanders.  By shifting the focus to the daily lives of border residents and users, an eclectic 
map of the border space begins to emerge, within which vernacular trajectories and 
performative interests are juxtaposed. By envisioning the border as a contested political 
structure with sometimes limited social insertion, the border space appears as a site of agency 
where local patterns of expression, and indeed of being, contest and compete with the state to 
constantly reinvent the border space beyond the state itself. We now see that first, navigating 
the border space is also synonymous with juggling between several identities and spaces, or 
holding onto many of them at the same time. Secondly, the border community is an assemblage, 
woven together in its members’ shared belonging to the border and their relative consciousness 
of this common destiny that however stops short of being defined solely by the border. This is 
demonstrated by greater affinity for ethnically different borderlanders than for co-ethnics or 
co-citizens who do not belong to the border area. Third, these findings suggest that the border 
retains a special importance in the development of community consciousness across the border 
space and remains an important crux of the multi-pivotal geographical imagination of the 
border community. Fourth and finally, the ways in which borderlanders conceive and perform 
the border space are also a coded transcript of their particular idioms of security and vernacular 




7.2 Epistemological implications  
 
The findings of this research bear epistemological implications of two main orders. Firstly, there are 
implications in terms of conceptualising the postcolonial border space in Africa, and secondly these 
findings lead to rethinking bottom-up approaches especially as concerns security and resilience. 
Conceptualisation of border space as a site of contestation and performativity is enriched by the 
borderlanders’ geographical imaginations, which, when centred, cast a new light on the border space as 
more complex than just a physical divide between two countries or an abstract fault line between 
statelessness and stateness. Conceived through vernacular lens, the border space emerges first, and 
foremost as natural endowment bestowed upon borderlanders or as a corridor of opportunity within which 
they are legitimately entitled to navigate without state restrictions. Furthermore, this perspective on border 
space questions its usually assumed marginality through the border’s ability to centralise and revive social 
issues that have been swept under the rug as illegal, and yet which resurface at the border in question 
marks. For example, between vernacular spaces of legitimacy and spaces of community, what is known 
as child trafficking takes on a plural meaning and highlights a nationwide state inability to discharge its 
duty of care towards neglected children. In this regard, the second order of epistemological implications 
of these research findings expand the notions of safety and threat through an alternative understanding of 
vernacular practices. In other words, security and resilience as seen by borderlanders displace, relocate 
and complicate what it means to be safe. Where disruptions to complex human systems are usually 
conceived as external and abrupt, borderlanders teach us that the border itself is a disruption and, what is 
more, a permanent and slow one integrated in the functional make-up of the border itself. In response, 
vernacular resilience and security strategies are embedded and entangled within the border-community 
relationship. The border becomes a disruption that border communities embrace as part of mitigating 
various adverse effects of their otherwise advantageous living space -instead of seeking to eliminate or 
run away from the said disruption.  
 
The various resilience strategies used by borderlanders lead to three main epistemological implications 
for resilience thinking. Firstly, resilience as a practice is embroiled in the borderlander’s entire existence 
(“border girl”). This embroilment of resilience as a way of life conceives of resilience as a life equipment 
inherent to the border actor, and which should be harnessed instead of being provided by external 
agencies. Secondly, and directly related to the permanence of resilience, is the challenge to the universal 
understanding that seems to prevail over what a disruption or a threat is. In resilience thinking, shocks 
or disruptions or threats are often seen as eventful, sudden, external and “loud” (Lindroth & Sinevaara-
Niskanen, 2019; Walker & Cooper, 2011).  However, we see through vernacular eyes that the border as a 
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disruption or threat is an internally impulsion instead of integral dynamics; silent instead of loud; and 
continuous instead of sudden or abrupt. Put differently, the postcolonial as a site of tension 
constitutes a permanent and silent disruption to the lives of borderlanders. The most important 
part of this argument is not the ways in which colonial legacy combines with the physical 
feature of the postcolonial nation-state and instrument of neoliberal global order to constitute 
a threat or disruption. Instead, just as it is important to see plurality in resilience practices that 
incorporate vernacular resilience of borderlanders, it is equally important to expand the notion 
of disruption or threat beyond its conventional understanding.  As a third epistemological 
implication, this expansion creates a link between security and resilience through the 
commonality of the ways in which border practices tell us more about vernacular meanings of 
fear and anxiety, than they do about the physical constraints posed by the border.   
 
This goes to show that while border constraints and processes might be universal, the key 
insights from this research suggest that border communities across Cameroon, Nigeria and 
Gabon respond to these constraints in a way that alter their meaning. As such, the vernacular 
layers of meanings that are created in response to the official dimension of the border become necessary 
to fully understand bordering practices deployed by these communities. Hence, the actions of these 
communities across the border are based on a rationale that is mediated through their geographical 
imaginations rather than through the border dynamics. The point of departure to understanding their 
bordering practices, or indeed this rationale, should therefore be the sense they make of the border space 
and not the functions of the state border or the latter’s supposed impact on the border society. A 
triangulation of the border space, border practices and geographical imaginations as shown below (Figure 
5), reveals that these three are centred on idioms of threat and disruption which border communities 





Figure 4 – Triangulation: border space, border practices and geographical imaginations 
 Consequently, their security representations and resilience strategies are all embedded in the ways in 
which they make sense of the border space and physically relate to its distributional organisation across 
time and community. Such a triangulation is an opportunity to bridge the cognitive gap between the 
“spatial turn” paradigm and the persistent failure of human-centred approaches to directly capture the 
agency of specific communities within their living environment, especially in the context of resource 
politics (Brown, 2011).  Where borderlanders are conveniently casted as passive subjects of the border, 
this triangulation goes beyond the mere invocation of vernacular agency to provide a pathway towards 
substantiating their control over the border space and the material possibilities thereof.  This is also an 
emancipation from assumptions that conceive of borderlanders as necessarily a trope for mobility or 
displacement.  
 
Looking at how borderlanders operate on their subjective and situated spatial coordinates, the 
geographical physicality of the state border and indeed its reifying instruments fail to contain the 
production of vernacular spaces. The concept of a-statal actorness has risen from this research data 
analysis and lingered over its rendering because mobility has proved too reductionist to capture and 
explain the phenomenological relationship between the border communities studied and the state border, 
as part of border performativity.  As a matter of fact, transborder mobility (i.e. literally moving from point 
A to point B across the border) explains many of the attitudes and negotiation strategies deployed by 
borderlanders in their interactions with state border agents. Beyond their own mobility, we have also seen 







across the borderland, as a way of sustaining livelihoods. It is therefore undeniable that the border is a site 
of intense and dynamic mobility practices. However, the mobility paradigm does not account for the 
imaginations of self and of space that profoundly structure these socio-economic strategies across the 
borderland, and indeed other attitudes and practices that seem to contradict. The mobility paradigm 
would, for instance, fail to explain the apparent paradoxical tension between Border Acknowledgers and 
Border Deniers.  While we might attempt to explain the attitudes and practices of the former through 
mobility lenses, it is more difficult to use mobility as a defining element of the latter’s relationship to the 
border. In the second group of borderlanders, immobility seems to be the predominant paradigm anyway.   
 
Indeed, as seen earlier, mobility is paradoxically promoted by the border while the geographical 
imaginations and bi-placed identities constructed by borderlanders structure a discourse of immobility. 
Flaws have therefore been revealed in the mobility paradigm by the combined effect of the following 
findings: both groups of borderlanders eventually concur in their objective of  “disabling” the border by 
arguing for immobility where the border sees mobility; the distinction between these two groups is more 
operational than ontological; and from the borderlander’s perspective mobility equates subalternity. Based 
on this realisation, emphasising mobility in the understanding of the border and indeed of borderlanders 
therefore amounts to persisting in the foregrounding of the statist paradigm. Following on from the 
preceding demonstration, it is clear that as a marginal process reifying the state paradigm, mobility is 
unable to encompass border performativity in its entirety. Instead, it seems more coherent to look at the 
borderlander as an actor in direct relationship with their situated spatial environment, expunged from the 
overblown ability of state processes to shape space and define behaviours. The conceptualisation of 
this converse ability as a-statal actorness helps us express that theorising the postcolonial border in 
Africa from a community perspective, gains in being articulated as theory of vernacular practices in an 
integrated spatial environment, instead of as a theory of state space embroiled in particular marginal social 
processes.   
 
This leads us to the conclusion that knowledge production about borders especially in 
postcolonial Africa has mainly assumed that merely looking at the (negative) societal impact 
of changes in the reifying state realm amounts to a critical study of borders. Nevertheless, it 
has been demonstrated that while changes in state structure or border functions are likely to 
reconfigure the meaning of space for the border society, very little is still known about how 
this change of meaning is (re)produced through the representations and actions of the said 
society.  Moreover, even people-centred approaches have tended to reinforce the assumption 
that state-based changes shape the “third space” created through the border-society dynamics. 
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Consequently, this research has attempted to sketch out a knowledge gap created by poor 
consideration of vernacular bordering practices, which tend to be linked to known changes in 
the realm of the state border, such as policy changes, cross border conflict and disaster 
management in remote locations. Such an approach overlooks the wealth of other dynamics 
from below that offer perhaps better explanations of vernacular bordering practices. In order 
to fill this lacuna and bridge the knowledge gap indicated above, the iterative analysis of semi-
structured interviews and ethnographic observation conducted as part of this research project 
establish that more solid empirical links exist between the borderlanders’ imaginations of self 
and of space on the one hand, and bordering practices on the other hand. Most importantly, 
thus foregrounding the vernacular sense-making of the border space opens up learning beyond 
vernacular practices across the border space. It centralises vernacular idioms of threat and 
expands the notions of security and resilience beyond their restrictive conventional framework. 
The design of border policies and indeed of any people-centred intervention in border areas 
might benefit from the “convex” framework or “valley” path for policy and research that 
emerges from this study.  
 
7.3 The proposed valley research path or convex border framework   
 
 What is it? 
 
In order to show the potential usefulness of the valley research path or the convex border framework, I 
will begin by explaining the representation of this framework. Then, I will proceed to elaborate on how 
this representation articulates with key elements of the framework itself. According to the Merrian-
Webster dictionary, a convex is an abstract shape “curved or rounded outward like the exterior of a sphere 
or circle”, and the dictionary adds the interesting mathematical detail that a convex is also made up “of a 
set of points : containing all points in a line joining any two constituent points”.  The closest physical 
similarities to this framework’s abstract representation could be an upright bowl, as opposed to a bowl 
turned upside down (a concave). A convex can also be likened to a valley, as opposed to a mountain 






Figure 5 - A convex Vs a Concave. Source : Stack-Exchange 
(https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/2364116/how-to-remember-which-function-is-
concave-and-which-one-is-convex) 
The representation of this framework is much more than shapes, it casts the relationships and 
interconnections between the cognitive triptych consisting of knowledge production, border experiences, 
and border performativity. The images of the convex and the valley are summoned here to camp this 
representation because, with their references both to corresponding shape and the connection between a 
set of points in mathematical terms, they accurately represent both the rich tapestry of vernacular sense-
making and the performative relationships that have been overlooked in border and security studies. Put 
in another way, the mountain or upside-down bowl approaches to studying the postcolonial border 
brought to acknowledge all the three elements listed above but establish flawed connections between them 




 Figure 6 - The mountain (concave) approach to studying borders 
The mountain approach summarises the critique I have made of the state of the field. In this representation, 
the most prominent element is the peak of the mountain or the top of the bowl/concave, symbolising 
territorial border performativity.  This could be the phenomenological manifestations of any type security 
threat or even natural hazard, or a combination of both in the border context. This mountain framework 
shows how people-centred approaches in the vernacular or local turn are indeed informed through the 
base by vernacular experiences. This aligns with global development and humanitarian frameworks such 
as the Sendai Framework, the Grand Bargain, the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States and the 
International Health Regulations. The knowledge production that shapes theories and policies engaging 
state functions and disruptions seem in fact to be tuned to these local experiences. However, it is instead a 
matter of proportion, position and orientation. In this mountain analogy, the rather subterranean 
relationship between knowledge production and vernacular experiences is the metaphor of how 
vernacular voices are muted or silenced within knowledge production about borders. This is exemplified 
by the AUBP acknowledgement of border communities, who are nevertheless not centralised in border 
policy making. Furthermore, as can also be seen on the mountain approach representation, the 
subterranean relationship between local experiences and knowledge production is one of domination and 
silencing through compartmentalisation. Consequently, theories and policies on threats and disruptions 
are still very much dominated by territoriality, even though they are connected to vernacular practices. 
Finally, upward orientation means that there is bound to be an imbalance or divergence of the territorial 










approach as below advances a framework for border theorisation and policy design, that alters the 
positions, reshuffles these relationships and overturns the orientation.  
 
 
Figure 7 - The valley (convex) approach to studying borders 
The above figure represents the convex border framework or the valley research pathway that has 
emerged out the key insights and epistemological implications of this study. It summarises how the key 
findings and their epistemological implications reconfigure the postcolonial border as a site of knowledge 
pertaining to the border itself, but also to issues of security and resilience. This reconfiguration also covers 
the proportion of vernacular input, the position in knowledge production as well as orientation of the flow 
of conceptualisations about borders. Firstly, in terms of position, disruptions and border site are placed at 
equidistance from the centre of the convex, with no direct relationship to each other. This means that both 
elements of the framework are important, but not central. Instead, the centre and the mediating both the 
production of knowledge about borders and the construction of border performativity are invested by two 
distinct layers of border factors (vernacular sense-making and border practices). Secondly, in terms of 
proportion, the equidistance between both disruptions and the border site ensures that both elements of 
the framework, though not in direct relationship, can be fed-back in equal proportion with the empirical 
dynamics of the border. These multi-layered empirical dynamics themselves constitute the larger portion 
of the framework, owning the typical relationships between vernacular sense-making and border practices 
(both official and vernacular). Finally, the flow of conceptualisation of the border space goes from the 
border site itself all the way to knowledge production but passes through the necessary tapestry of border 










Hence, this framework allows the researcher, theorist, policymaker or intervention worker to avoid the 
universalism of human-centred approaches, as they continue to conceal dominant imaginaries of the 
postcolonial border. It looks at the deeper meaning of border practices beyond discourse, by using 
vernacular narratives as an entry point to empirically engaging border sites. It ultimately conceptualises 
border practices as a multi-layered performativity, by centralising vernacular-sense making. This is, 
according to the findings of this research, a key to uncovering border practices as defined by the 
geographical imaginations of border communities and their own idioms of security and continuity. 
Combining these constitutive elements of the postcolonial border can enable us to frame a theoretical 
space for the expression of the borderlander’s agency or (the) a-statal actorness.    
 
 Framing a theoretical space for the African borderlander’s agency 
 
The contention that modernisation is a reconfiguration of colonisation as far as formerly colonised people 
are concerned combines with the reifying legacies of colonialism such as borders, to highlight the 
necessity of a paradigmatic shift that will frame a theoretical space for the African borderlander’s agency. 
The two main parts  of concept of “delinking” as laid out by Mignolo (2011) consists in this paradigmatic 
shift.  Untangling and isolating the “third world” away from the subsuming conceptual web of coloniality 
on the one hand; and rebuilding its politics, economy and philosophy on the other hand constitute the 
concept’s main tenets. Firstly, the paradigmatic shift advocated by the untangling and isolation of the 
“third world” is achieved here through the choice of border sites, and types of actors. In other words, the 
first step of delinking is covered by choosing to work on border locales that are not defined by active 
post-conflict or disaster management programmes. In its second dimension, focusing on the a-statal 
actorness of border performativity complements this isolation from coloniality. This provides a 
framework for the recovery of vernacular histories and knowledges. Furthermore, tapping into the 
vernacular sense-making of borderlanders through a narrative approach creates a discursive space wherein 
the borderlander’s worldview and related practices can predominantly shape the understanding of the 
border.  A look at the African borders in this fashion is therefore deconstruction of the ways in which 
borderlanders have been integrated into the coloniality of power through colonial map-making, post-
colonial state-building rationales, and interventionist agendas.  Positioning the postcolonial border as a 
site of knowledge therefore means framing a space wherein the agency of the borderlanders can be 
theorised. This means crafting the centrality of a-statal actorness in the understanding of the border as a 




In so doing throughout this research project, a distinctly emancipated voice of the African borderlander 
emerges from what Mignolo terms the “abyssal line” of knowledge production. This line of 
“epistemicide” i.e. a process  through which non-colonial knowledges are rendered invisible or swallowed 
up (Grosfoguel, 2013; Santos, 2014) runs through the pre-eminence of Westphalian conceptualisations of 
territorial space, and universalist understandings of security even when repackaged as bottom-up.  
Creating a space for theorising vernacular knowledge in border locales means conceiving of the African 
borderlander as an emancipated agent, tapping into the a-statal actorness of the borderland. The 
borderlander should be seen here as performing at equidistance between the state site and the 
expected impact of external processes influencing their environment. The borderlander is the centre of 
their own world (in this case the border site), where their situatedness is centred mainly on their needs 
and not in presumed relationship to the absence or oppressive presence of a political order.  A-statal 
actorness therefore operates as full social agency in negotiating mobility and mobilisation of resources 
across relatively distant sites encompassing the border. It is a conceptual tool that captures the agency 
of border communities and their sense-making in order to better understand the ways in which these 
interact with other dematerialised border actors such as political structures and sociohistorical trajectories. 
Locating this beyond the state/non-state dichotomy has enabled the gleaning of idioms of resilience and 
security embedded in socio-spatial dynamics and vernacular representation of space. This clearly shows 
that various disruptions and threats in the border context have not fundamentally altered the relationship 
between border communities and their spatial environment. Instead, they have provided a new context 
for expressing this a-statal actorness as can best be recovered through vernacular narratives. This is 
certainly not a revolutionary insight, but the potential impact of thus conceptualising the borderlander 
would be significant to any theoretical approach of the African border. The borderlander’s agency is 
therefore located in the interstice between the vernacular and epistemological, as supported by 
borderlanders’ narratives.  
 
Finally, inquiring how the practices of boderlanders translate across different local contexts becomes 
synonymous to isolating and monitoring the independent interactions of such actors through a-statal 
actorness. This can help reformulate questions of spatiality and security especially as far as the 
postcolonial border is concerned. It emerges from this novel outlook on border space, that 
theorising the postcolonial border in the African context should be articulated more as a theory 
of a-statal actorness instead of theory of state space, and, within the same token, as a theory 
which foregrounds the voice of vernacular agency in relation to geographical space. Beyond 
unmuting vernacular voices from borderland communities, centring vernacular forms of spatial practices 
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offers new insights into understanding security and resilience. These insights may benefit students of 
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Interview guide  
 
Semi-Structured Interview Guide 
         
Nickname: ----- - Age Range: ------ - Gender: ------- Profession: ------- 
 Location(s) of interviews: ----------Date(s) of interview(s):----- Language of interview:  
   Interview Profile:   
~ DAY 1 ~ 
 
A. BIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND 
 
1- Were you born here?  
2- Why did your family move from ----?  
3- Or when did you or your parents move here? Why? N/A (When did you settle here)  
(What business?) 
4- What made you move from your place of birth? (if relevant)  
5- Where does the majority of your relatives live? Why?  
6- Which ethnic group would you most likely identify with? 
7- Apart from English/French, what other languages do you speak?  
8- Which of these languages, including English do you find more useful? Why?  
9- Which of these languages, including English do you consider your mother tongue? 
Why?  
10- What is your job here?   
 




11- How often do you cross into Cameroon/Nigeria/Gabon? (if ever)  
12- What was the last time?  
13- Do you have friends, partners, and relatives on other side of the border?  
14-  Where? In Ekok or further afield?  
15- Tell me about them (relatives, partners, etc.)  
16- How are people on the other side of the border related to you?  
17- Do you consider yourself as related to Cameroonians? How?  
18- Do you understand one or tribal more languages? (If not, why?) 
19- Can you tell me about three separate occasions you have been to other side of the border 
(if any?) 
20- How do you feel about them coming here? Are they useful? 
 
C. RELATION TO SPACE - MOVEMENT / TRANSPORTATION  
 
21- Do you know how long that border has been there?  
22- Is it a good or a bad thing for your movements?  
23- Have you ever been to the border? Is it a big place? Why (not)?  
24- If they could change a few things on that border what would you propose?  
25- How did you feel about the trip – to the border or to Cameroon?  
26- Can you describe the journey (from here to Ekok)?  
27- What are the risks in travelling to the other side of the border ? How would you avoid 
those risks?  
28- How did you travel? What did you do during the journey (and why)?   
29- Can you do the job you are doing here somewhere else far from the border? Yes 
30-  How does the other side of the border contribute to your job and security here?  
31- I hear that a long time ago, Cameroonians and Nigerians/Gabonese living in this area 
were one people. Can you tell me more about this?   
32- How did you learn about all this?   
 
D. SECURITY IN OWN TERMS (BASIC VERNACULAR PERCEPTION)  
 
33- According to you, what is security?  
34- Who is responsible for your security?   
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35- Are you responsible for other people’s security? Why not? (or how)  
36- What do you have to protect here?  
37- Against what/whom do you have to protect from?  
38- What would you say is the level of threat from what you have described?  
39- What are you most afraid of here?  
40- If you were affected like that, whose fault would you say it is?  
41- There are more security forces in this area than in other places, how do you feel about 
that?  
42- If you have a security concern at personal or community level, who would you speak 
to in the first place?  
~ DAY 2 ~ 
E. FEARS AND WHAT MATTERS 
 
43- What are you most afraid of here?   
44- Is there any phenomenon/behaviour/prospect that makes you unsafe here?  
45- Is there any phenomenon/behaviour/prospect that makes you unsafe here?  
46- What danger can make you leave this area?  
47-  Can you describe how that danger would affect you so much?   
48- For instance, what is if they stole all your clothes, would you run away from this place?  
49- Are you afraid of Boko haram here? Why?  
50- Who do you trust most with your security, apart from yourself?   
51- Do you think Cameroonians who come here create trouble?  
52- Would you feel safer if they closed the border?  
 
F. SHARED PRACTICES  
 
53- How many times have you (someone you know) experienced a serious problem here?  
54- Describe what happened  
55- Who did you (they) report it to in the first place?  
56- Did you (they) get satisfaction?  
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57- How did you (they) go about getting that satisfaction? What in your opinion was the 
key thing in this process?  
58- Do you know some members and the leaders of the vigilante group?  
59- How they chosen and what is their role?  
60- Do you know any other similar group on the other side of the border?  
61- Do you know any such group that would comprise both Cameroonians and Nigerians? 
What is their purpose?   
62- How does the government contribute to your life here?  
 
~ DAY 3 ~ 
 
 
G. OTHER CHALLENGES 
 
63- Apart from immigration control, how else do security forces here help the community?  
64- Have you ever seen something you like from the security forces on the other side of the 
border?  
65- If you (or someone else) needs emergency treatment in hospital today, what is the likely 
scenario?  
66- I see very beautiful roads here. Is the government doing well to address development 
problems here including security issues?  
67- Why are there new border infrastructures (being) built?  
68- How do you think that would improve the lives of communities on this side?  
69- Why in your opinion has it not been built on the other side?  
70- How often do you move around this area to do things not related to your job or family? 
What do you do? How often? Who do you do with?  
 
 




71- Are you (or do you know someone who is) a member of any group, or organisation that 
connects people from both sides of the border?   
72- What is the purpose of that organisation?  
73- Who do they negotiate with or influence to achieve their objectives?  
74- What do they use to push things to go their way?  
75- How does one does (did you/they) grow in that organisation?  
76- How does the leader of that organisation maintain their respect and consideration within 
the community?   
77- What qualities should one have in such a group to be able to appeal to people from both 
sides of the border?   
78- Do you think the leaders of such groups are powerful in the community?  
79- Do you think the leaders of such groups exploit the border authorities or are they 
exploited by border authorities?   
80- If any of your fears you talked about the other came to materialise, how can members 























Diary Note: 30/01/2017 
 
Today’s to do: sort out phone sim card with Demos; Book tickets for Ikom/inquire about the 
trip.  
 
While waiting to depart for Ikom, the border area on the Nigerian side, I am housed at my 
former classmate’s home in Lagos. Very nice and big mansion. Demos is now a Businessman 
in Nigeria.  Very successful! Big house with maids. wow. A hotel room would cost me at least 
£30 per night. Financial constraints are limiting some of the things I can do 
 
On TV and in casual conversations, the topic that keeps coming up is the uncertainty about 
President Buhari’s health. Some are claiming that he passed away, but the information is just 
being kept secret. Another talk of the day is the currency exchange rate that has fallen 
dramatically against the Naira. Demos takes me to someone who can exchange my Dollars into 
Naira ( Demos advised me prior to my departure that exchanging the Dollars is easier in Nigeria 
than other major currencies, so I took dollars with me, instead of GBP) 
 
We go to the bus station to buy advance tickets for tomorrow. Departure is 6: 00 AM only with 
prepaid tickets. 
 
I go out for a drink with Demos, and we are joined by his brother Mark. Discussions with other 
people sitting around the same table in the beer parlour. No electricity. People in Lagos are 
very aware of their personal security and the context in Lagos. Mark cannot sate late, past 9PM 
because “Lagos is too dangerous” at night, they all agree. He will need to take two taxis before 
reaching his home. Even with the effect of alcohol on the face of my interlocutor, on senses 
that they are very much conscious of the danger. All urge Mark to leave. I ask if anyone here 
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has experience insecurity in Lagos, thinking about Boko Haram, but they all say there’s no one 
in Lagos who has never been robbed, assaulted, or have their house broken into. I mention BH, 
the mood changes. They say those affected by bombings is just bad luck. The day God said you 
were going to die.  
 
Thinking in my head, how to police and organize security in such a busy city. Very crowded, 
you can feel the pressure walking in the streets. Sense that people have no identity.  Streets are 




Diary Note: 31/01/2017 
 
I bought some newspapers that I hope to read on the on the way. I have been told the journey 
lasts the whole day. Demos woke me up at 4 AM and by 5:30 we are at the Bus station already. 
I go through the newspapers, and all of them talk about Boko haram. I boarded a bus which 
headed south at 6:30, departing Lagos. I understand the journey is going to take the whole day, 
we are going travel southeast through several states (Ondo, Edo, Anambra, Enugu, Ebony) 
before reaching the border state of Cross River. I show my newspaper to the passenger sitting 
next to me (Francis), to engage them in a conversation about Boko Haram, insecurity. He 
carefully avoids the topic.  
 
As we depart Lagos, a well-dressed preacher with a bow tie climbs into the already 
overcrowded bus, squeezes himself through a row of passengers waving an old Bible held high 
in one hand. The man introduces himself as “senior evangelist”. Silence in the bus. He starts 
praying for all of us and all heads bend forward and repeat “amen” in chorus to each line of 
prayer. He prays, amongst other things, against road accidents, carjacking, breakdown, 
sickness, bombs, etc. Prayer lasts 5 to 10 minutes. At the end, the preacher throws his hand 
around to receive donations.  My neighbour donates 500 naira. I later asked why that much, he 
says he wants to show his faith in the preacher’s words. Francis agrees to me recording what 
he says about his faith and motivation to give money to the preacher, but is not so keen to talk 




Failed attempt to start a conversation with Francis since disclosing that I am a student doing 
research on security, taking notes and recording. I can tell he finds me suspicious. Sitting to 
my left, Friday Obele seems interested in my unsuccessful attempts to engage Francis in a 
conversation. Friday is a young student, travelling from Lagos to Ebony state to join the 
Polytecnic. He is curious. Friday agrees to tell me about security and his fears. He says the 
main security problems around Ebony state is land dispute between farmers and cattle herders. 
This often result in deaths and destruction of properties. The second is rivalry between 
fraternity groups on the campus. This is sometimes also deadly.  Friday is puzzled that I am 
Cameroonian, but instead coming from England. He brother regularly travels to Cameroon to 
get raw material (animal skin) for his business. Francis asks me if I know anyone who can 
supply them with pangolin skin. No, I don’t know. He is not going as far as cross river state, 
the one adjoining Cameroon, so is not much of an interest to the research  
 
The Road  
 
I am agreeably surprised by the state of the roads, apart from a difficult stretch of about 60 km, 
the road is tarred from Lagos to Ikom. Otherwise, the journey could last btw 2 to 3 days. That 
was the case before. But we have to stop at numerous checkpoints, heavily militarised, different 
agencies of security forces, police, military, customs, immigration, wildlife, etc. most overstep 
their duties, and all want bribes of some sort from the passenger and the driver.  
 
When I asked passengers why so many checkpoints, many reply that it is normal, it is for 
security “you know what is going on in the country” referring to Boko Haram I guess, but when 
I asked if it was different before BH, no one is really sure.   
 
We stop at Onitsha, I start a conversation with fellow passenger Moses, and explain to him the 
reason of my visit to the UK, He says he know someone living in Ikom, who can help me with 
interview or field information. Arikpo. I like the sound of the name. He calls Arikpo, introduces 
us and gives me his phone number.   
 





Diary Note: 1/02/2017 
 
Woke up at 11! Still very tired and some headaches. Hopefully not signs of malaria! I am taking 
medication. I will go out of the hotel to look around for cheaper accommodation, I can’t afford 
to stay here more than two days. Very expensive for my budget. I also need to find a place to 
eat and look around. Maybe make some more contacts. I plan to start my ethnographic 
observation tomorrow. Excited but find the task daunting as well. Never done it.  
 
I met Prince a few hours ago. A transporter who carries passenger to the Border. Looks nice 
and intelligent. He says he can get me cheaper accommodation and assist with transportation 
whenever I need him (priced to be agreed hourly). RDV avec Prince demain matin.  Simple 
questions for conversations, maybe interviews. Needs to refine interview questions, people not 
very talkative, especially when it is about security. Misundestanding? Mine or theirs?  
Probably need to review interview questions?  
 
 
Diary Note: 2/02/2017 
 
Prince has found an accommodation for me. Been to Prince’s house and greeted his family 
(wife and daughter). I am going to rent a room in Ruth’s house. Have not seen the house yet.  
 
Prince has been hired for the morning, and I have asked if I may spend the time with him and 
his passengers. He agrees. Passengers agrees as well, though it has taken time to explain that I 
am not a journalist. Initially very reluctant and said he would not speak to a journalist. I am not 
a journalist!  
 
Had my first observation today. Not too sure what to make of it. It is so difficult to do without 
thinking about the theories, the whole PhD project. Feeling that it is artificial. I think the sense 
of urgency, if I had good budget and plenty of time to spend here, maybe I would feel 
differently. Anyway, I am here now, on the field!   
 






Observation note: 02/02/2017 
 
The passengers are in fact one businessman (name not given – I call him the boss) and his 
assistant (Olivier).  They have travelled into Nigeria crossing the border to buy car parts. They 
arrived last night and will be going back this afternoon. The Boss is sitting on the passenger 
front seat. I am Sitting on back next to Olivier. Olivier and Boss are francophones, so I think 
conversations can flow more easily. I don’t really speak Pidgin English and speaking English 
in Nigeria gives a different dimension to the conversation. Boss tells me he has a lot of Nigerian 
friends settled in Cameroon. They introduced him to the trade of car parts. We drive to the shop 
of one of his suppliers. Business is conducted in pidgin. Car parts are spread all around the 
shop front, many more on shelves, one giant almanac with people wearing traditional Igbo 
costumes is hanging on the shop door. Small talk, not a lot – Boss is in the hurry. The boss and 
the shopkeeper obviously know each other, shake hands warmly, tap on the shoulder. Boss 
walks around the small shop, goes behind the counter to inspect some articles. Pulls out a list 
from his pocket and reads out his order. Shopkeepers takes list and gives his own assistant. 
Boss calls Olivier. Both assistants go behind the shop (storage) and come with many car parts 
in boxes. Two trips. Put in the car boot.  
 
Back in the car. Boss addresses Olivier without looking at him sitting just behind. He asks 
whether he made sure the number of parts ordered was correct. “Because last time you made a 
mistake and it cost me a lot of money”. Olivier confirms he cross-checked everything. I asked 
Boss a few questions, but he does not seem to want to talk a lot. His answers are Yes/No 
answers. Why? Is this his natural way of talking? Is he preoccupied by his business? Or he does 
not want to risk saying things he shouldn’t say [secret] We arrive at the second supplier. A 
larger shop than the previous one. . Olivier gets out the car together with everybody else, but 
waits in a distance while Boss greets and does small talk. But he is paying attention. 
Discussions between boss and supplier go to price of goods. Price agreed. Olivir carries the car 
parts to the car boot. No assistant for this shop owner or assistant on a different duty. I help 
Olivier carry some of the items.  
 
We stop at a different location (Ekirikiri). This time not for business. Boss says he won’t be 
long, he is dropping in on somebody there. (Who? Relative? Friend?) Olivier tells me Boss has 
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a child with a lady who lives there. Wife? No. “Juste comme ca”. But they stop there every two 
weeks they come for business. The lady is Cameroonian too, but anglophone although now 
settled in Nigeria. Boss calls Olivier to bring the bag they had. I stay in the car with prince. 
Prince tells me there are many Cameroonians who just cross the bridge and settled here and 
nigerians do the same as well. Not necessarily because of prior family ties. Some have ties to 
the area. Boss and Olivier return, with lady escorting them to the car. We drive towards the 
border now, Mfum. Many chechpoints. Stops. Boss steps out of the vehicle. Police officers and 
soldiers at some checkpoints want to inspect the car and order that the boot should be opened. 
Boss talks with them, convincing some to let us go with some bribes. Other take the bribes but 
still inspect, though casually. Some check our documents as well – identity mainly. No 
immigration question until Mfum. I try to ask Boss about the bribe he gives. He avoids the 
topic, I insist a bit he says he does not want to talk about that [secret]. We arrive in Mfum. 
Prince will not be crossing today. Olivier gets their luggage out of the car and hails another taxi 




Diary Note: 03/02/2017 
 
Before  
I am observing Ikom main market today. I think it will be better to start from there and sweep 




I ended up having to speak to people to find out more about the market and their situation 
within. Maybe I am doing it the wrong way. Not really interviews just supplementary 
information to make sense of what I was observing.  
 
Observation Note: 03/02/2017 
 
No military presence in the market as on the roads. In fact, no uniformed security agent in 
sight. Prince describes the market for me, different “wards” for different kinds of items. We are 
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sitting in front of a ward where they sell everything to do with kitchen utensils (cups, glasses, 
pots, etc.). Interaction with Gloxy (anonymised, age 40-50). She tells me Border makes Ikom 
less secure. People come from Cameroon and commit crime here. Nigerian criminals often 
escape to Cameroon very easily. Gloxy also expresses frustration: Cameroonians come easily 
to Nigeria, while Nigerians are submitted to stringent security check while going to Cameroon.  
Gloxy agrees for participate in the interview in the future. I gave here the information leaflet. 
Going around the market, it is difficult to tell who is Cameroonian or who is Nigerian. Market 
not very busy. But very big. The car park is combined with the market. In the motor park, taxis 
and old buses go and come to/from other destinations than the border. I met Gloria (nickname) 
with a two bags of bread, waiting for Okada (Taxi Bike). Born in Nigeria orginally from Abbi 
LGA, but moved with family to settle in Ekok (Cameroon). Travels back to Nigeria every week. 
Taking the bags to the border to add to other things she has bought already. No knowledge 
about security in the market or around the market. Does not feel there is a security problem. 
Has never experience insecurity when she travels to/from Cameroon. I can start to clearly 
distinguish the Igbo language when it is spoken in the market. Predominent. But other 
languages are spoken as well, including Pidgin English which I understand perfectly though 
can’t speak to the same level.  
 
Shops are mostly family businesses, with husband leading the management. The wife is 
generally cashier and there are one or two assistants usually family relatives or mere maids? 
Shopowners look very opulent by local standards. Big SUV for errands. The husband and 
wwife very well-dressed, expensive jewellery, skin bleached 
 
A taxi bike rider comes and stops in front of the shop, offload boxes tied to the rear of bike, 
greets everyone including me, says such and such sent the parcels with him to complement 
previous deliveries. Wife calls such and such immediately, confirms they have received the 
parcels. Thanks. Husband on the phone chatting casually, does not seem to pay attention to 
what is going on, he is laughing on the phone (social call?)   
 
Moving to a different ward. Two large delivery trucks parked nearby. Drivers sleeping at the 
wheel. I gather they travelled through the night there are restrictions on lorries travelling during 
the day.  Waiting to be offloaded.  
 




Short conversation with Maggi. She works in one of the shops with her “Oga” (oncle? Boss? 
Relationship not more specific than that). Why did she come to Ikom instead of Lagos or Abuja 
for instance? 
 
[inter] Moving southeast towards the border; many opportunities based on kinship as many 
shop-owners here speak Igbo while the original inhabitants of the area speak 
Etoung/Ekoi/Edjangang.  
 
As compared at first sight to other Nigerian towns I have seen especially coming down from 
Lagos, one can say that Ikom is actually a small town, rather than a city. However, it looks 
more expansive and modern.  Tourist attraction sites include Nigeria’s Stonehenge called Ikom 
Monoliths, which extends all the way to Calabar, Afi rain forest, Ikom town beach and 
Agbokim Waterfall. I understand there is a lot of fresh foods and low-cost housing as compared 




Diary Note: 4/02/2017 
 
Focus today is on taxes the drivers taxi drivers and passengers arriving on the main road front 




Border does not belong to borderlanders. Who are borderlanders? People in the market are all 
just press passing no even aware of why this specific place is what it is may be the border is 
too hyped up? 80% of people arriving into the market to sell I foods stuff or usual household 
items  
 
The others are just travelling further away (Onitsha, Lagos, Abuja, etc.  if food stuff are sold 




I guess today has enabled me to understand Ikom a bit more, raising many questions about food 
and the interactions away from the border on the Nigerian side. where do all the products come 






I speak with Caroline she’s aged between 45 and 55 she lives normally in Ikom and travels 
between Ikom and Mfum regularly. She’s a tradeswoman. she believes that the business is 
affected by the fluctuation of the exchange rates. she also thinks that taxes are too high. she has 
a shop in Ikom and she thinks that fire safety measures are not good enough, so she does not 
feel safe. There was a problem last year around this time; a fire  problem caused by poor 
electrical wiring she lost her shop to the fire around 50 other shops were destroyed, razed by 
the flames.  another t that affects her Business is strikes in Cameroon she thinks that when there 
are strikes in Cameroon, it affects her business very badly. She has never experienced buckle 
around she has one hundred percent faith finger.  
 
Esther is sitting with Caroline they are waiting for a taxi that can take them to Mfum. She 
agrees with everything Caroline says by constantly nodding. becomes particularly agitated 
when it concerns Exchange rates, she says that she had to change the type of items she sells 
completely because of currency rate fluctuations between Cameroon and Nigeria.  she also 
complains about compulsory Insurance that they have to be in the shops here in Ikom while 
virtually nothing has changed in wiring habits across the market since last year.  
 
Moss cars here carrying passengers and dear log each across the border and from Econ and 
from son to Econ are V is these vehicles are reputed to be very that come I’m hard to maintain 









Today I intend to make a general observation of Mfum, and from this establish a more detailed 
observation plan based on some of the questions I already have and others that might arise such 
as where do the products come from? Why is there not a market as big as this in Mfum? What 






The Mfum border bridge is technically located in Ajassor community.  On the way, a few small 
cars, loaded with many bags on top pass us and Prince says these are cars coming from 
Cameroon. He can recognise some by their Cameroonian number plates but tells me he just 
knows the cars. We are not questioned at checkpoints since our car is not loaded and carrying 
only two people. Prince also tells me the “main people” here are members of Nigerian Customs 
Service (NCS), normally deployed to borders to check smuggling of contrabands and other 
illicit activities sabotaging the economy. Border open at 5:00 in the morning. Early hours of 
the morning in Mfum. We arrive at the border at 7:30 am.  My attention is caught by 42-seater 
with the inscription ‘Sans Payer’ acroos the side. Several bags of rice, fabrics, fresh tomatoes, 
kassava, among others, are being offloaded from the bus coming from Cameroon. The bus is 
clustered by about eight officials of the NCS. Prince tells me these officers are actually 
soliciting bribe from the driver and the passengers who are obviously smuggling one thing or 
the other if one goes by the book, considering the nature of some of the items. I do not ask 
which specific items are contraband. Other NCS elements are openly stretch their arms to other 
vehicles and close them on banknotes. I repress the desire to take pictures…Those who “shake 
hands” with officers from the car obviously parted with money and can continue without 
screening. The cars are again stopped at subsequent checkpoints ten meters apart from each 
other.  it seems ‘legal’ for any item to be brought into the Nigeria from neighbouring Cameroon 
and for people to move in and out of the country as long as money changes hand.  Border users 
are very deferential to NCS officials. Too deferential. Why? Prince tells me the situation is 
“more interesting” at night. I make a note to myself to come back here at night.   
 
I speak to Yomi, who is sitting near a heap of bananas. She says she gets them from the farms 
in neighbouring villages in Nigeria. People buy from Ikom or from Ekok. Same Price. But 
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some customers want her to cross the border before delivering. She charges extra. Crosses the 
border without questions, because she is known to immigration. And she gives bribes.  It is so 
normal that everyone, including children know. A woman complains lively that they have 
collected all the money she had and stolen two out of the bags of rice she was taking to her 
village for a burial.  Yomi Agrees to participate in the semi-structured interview. Will call her 
to organise this.  
 
No phone reception here. Cameroonian sim card is better I understand. All people here have 
both a Cameroon and a Nigerian sim card, those who spend all their time here don’t even bother 




Diary Note: 6/02/2017 
 
Mfum is located in the Etung LGA, unlike Ikom which is in the Ikom LGA. Both cities are less 
than ten minutes’ drive from each other on the tarred road, also known as border road.  I am 
warned again by my friend not to take pictures maybe it is better to type up my notes from 
memory immediately afterwards rather than ostentatiously take notes. I already made an 
application to the LGA so don’t think I need to inform immigration officers about my 
observation they may not act as they usually do or normally do because they know I am around 
so I prefer to observe them in their natural environment acting as they normally would.  
yesterday I did not so much need to take pictures but today I understand even better why they 
will frown on having their pictures taken or anything they do recorded of course they can easily 
put forward the argument of security saying for example you are not allowed to film on the 
bridge without permission so there is no way you can film the officers working at the border 
post without filming the bridge itself therefore I prefer to only make notes and whenever 
possible to take notes after the observation not while I am  observing. it is probably no useful 
to attract the attention unnecessarily for the moment.  
 
On the way back from Mfum it is just 12 and we have to leave because Prince has an 
appointment. instead of going back to Ikom all the way, I want to stop at Ajassor mission so 
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that I can do some observation before the evening.  Prince is going to come and pick me up 
after his business appointment.  
 
Need to come back here for more observation and go to ajassor village. 
 
Analysis based on background information :  Takamanda forest: Local livelihoods depend 
on non-timber forest products in Cross River National Park, Takamanda and Korup (Bush 
Onion, Bush Mango, Eru, Njansang, Bush Pepper. Chewing Stick, Bitter Kola, Haoussa Stick< 
Cola Nut, Alligator Pepper), collect as source of income, harvested when demand for farm 






Observation Note: 6/02/2017 
 
I meet Mr Ekeng, a teacher by profession and quickly explain the reason of my presence. He 
declines to take part in the interview citing his position as civil servant. It does not make sense, 
but makes some sense at the same time when one takes into account African socio-political 
context. But also, the topic “security”! However, Mr Eken agrees to tell me about Ajassor. 
Insisting that the locality sustains one of the substations of the Cocoa Research Institute of 
Nigeria (CRIN) with mandate for cocoa and Kola. The conversation takes this turn because I 
have seen bus passing with the signs CR I N and that asked question the bus is carrying many 
passengers who I understand are going for a training at the  C R I N site.  
 
Ajassor is the last Village before Cameroon, it literally ends where in Nigeria ends because its 
limits on the East are the same limits as the Nigerian territory and separated from Cameroon 
by the river called Mfum. 
 
We stop at a crossroads where the main border Road continues towards Ikom.  there are few 
Women sitting behind their stalls and selling various food items. there are two small restaurants 
on each side of the road students are coming back from school in their uniforms one small path  
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is going into the bush, one road is branching into the rear of the village, the road is not tarred. 
the crossroads where Prince me is seemingly very empty despite many houses in its 
surroundings. In fact, many more houses as compared to Mfum.  not many people I am told 
you need to take a bike to just ajssor community /mission.  
 
cars stop from time to time Drop passengers. Passengers now take a bike for their onward 
destination. bikes arrive from the village onto the tarred road with items lauded on the back 
and other things destined for the market.  
 
The surrounding forest is said to be a major source of food for the community and also for 
income. Products sold include mushrooms, seed and spices, fruits, vegetables and a great 
variety of animals. But they say most of the areas where these are produced are not accessible.  
 
 




Dairy Note: 7/02/2017 
 
During my todays’ observation at the Ikom market, when I asked questions about security a 
way of declining by my interlocutors was to redirect me to the vigilante Group in charge of 
security in the market. I was unable to speak to them because they refused to talk to me about 
security. However, I was introduced to the chief of a neighbouring community who also 
organises security in his community situated near the border in The Etai community.  
 
I’m going to meet him today (Chief Ossaji) so we can discuss how he organizes security.  he is 
going to be available only in the afternoon I’m going to make him around 4 PM 
 






Dairy Note: 8/02/2017 
 
Today – travel interviews to be made with Kalu, Fiona and Debra 
 
Observation Note: 8/02/2017– Ajassor – Etomi - Bendeghe 
 
The Agbe initiation rites.  This allows you to be involved in Community issues such as Wars, 
political matters, Society. We witness an initiation rite. Drums are being used. It often takes 
place at the same time with the yam festival. 
 
Only one technical school in Ajassor. No school of agriculture apart from the CR I N. This 
surely explains why farming is traditional. No government interests? Government invest only 
in cash crops (Cocoa, palm oil) 
 
Why cassava from Cameroon? Plenty of cassava farms here. Government-owned estates, but 
mostly private. Best go to politicians. Standardised measurements in the sale of agricultural 
products. Is this the reason why small wing of coffee from Cameroon for.? Measurement. No 
electricity. 
 
The largest towns are actually Etomi me and Bendeghe. I mean the largest towns in the LGA. 




Small village with buoyant life. A few houses are built in concrete material. But the majority 
are built using mud and wood. Roads not tired but accessible when dry. Many people live in 




Impressive Kingdom Hall for Jehovah’s witnesses. Very clearly meet. Impressive and neat, 
contrasts with surrounding houses and all other houses in the village. Market in the town centre 
a bit like market in Mfum, but more products and more dynamic. Lorries being loaded with 







Dairy Note: 09/02/2017. – Mfum Road to Border  
 
 
I am concentrating today on the “smuggler highway”. 
Will focus just on this, though I have been there before, but en route to somewhere else.  Maybe 
something new if I see from this perspective. Maybe a dynamics I did not pick up 
For example, are there by-road? 
 
 
Starting too late today. Prince busy in the morning with another job.   
Anyway no really feeling the stamina today.   
 
 
Observation Note: 09/02/2017 
 
Tared Road. It is called smugglers highway because before the road being tared they used to 
be many places for hiding contraband products. 
 
Development seems bad road? Yes, but not as much as expected. 
 
Three petrol stations being built, but not yet completed. No people working on this site sites. 
 
Another vast construction site to the right of the road. Future Nigeria- Cameroon border Post. 
Why is it on Nigerian side? 
 
Traffic okay. Cars coming in the opposite direction loaded (coming from Cameroon).  many 
minibuses which are stacked and packed with goods 








Dairy Note: 10/02/2017. – Local residents mfum  
 
I will spend time at Mfum today, with special attention to local residents of Mfum. This means 
just going to the houses around the border posts because in my experience of the area, many 
people spend their days in Mfum don’t live there. Local residents should be people who sleep 
there or consider there as their home after work every day. Many people who work in Mfum  
will  spend their days there but go to or other places after work in the evening. 
 
Observation Note: 10/02/2017 
 
Wives of border employees. Bayam sellam.. Mfum villagers who were unable to move because 
they do not have the land anywhere else. poverty. Locals are poorer.  
 
Many people who spend their days at the border to not live there 
 
Houses built in a single line on both sides of the road leading to the border. Some houses have 
doors and windows closed. Nobody at home. A few houses have their doors open. 
 
Small houses off generally two rooms and one living room. No current water. No running water. 
Connected to the grid. But usually no electricity. Most women spoken to leave their big colours 





Dairy Note:11/02/2017. – Mfum Sellers  
 
 




Three restaurants but actually small eating places----they serve Fried eggs, Coffee, bread and 
beans sometimes with spaghetti. Customers are mostly passengers and transporters but 
occasionally some immigration officers order food to be brought to them in the office. 
 
There are also small grocery shops on the roadside in small kiosks. 
 
Bayam sellam (small traders) how bananas, beans, call, corn, etc on display of small stalls. 
 




Dairy Note: 12/02/2017. – Physical Border  
 
 
Observation Note: 12/02/2017 
 
The stretch of road between Ikom and the border at Ekok/Mfum is beautifully tarred, I always 
enjoy the ride.  There’s never too much traffic on this road, despite the road being described as 
one of the busiest in cross river state. Maybe I have always plyied the road at a good time. 
Anyway, no congestion all the way to the border. The border road is also known locally as “the 
smuggler’s highway” . Before reaching the border, We come across many different types of 
police, immigration officers, traffic police, tax collectors, military, etc.  
 
 A suspension bridge built in 1948 connects Nigeria with Cameroon at Mfum border station.  
There is actually no ‘no man’s land’ between the Nigeria and Cameroon, apart from the bridge. 
The lane of suspension bridge is accessible from the Nigerian side only when you have been 
cleared to enter Cameroon and equally, from the Cameroonian side of the border, you would 
not be allowed onto the bridge unless you have permission to enter Nigeria.   
 
Prince drops me and returns to Ikom to look for passengers. I am going to be here the whole 
day, so not in a hurry.  I walk down to the last checkpoint before the barrier. The barrier is 
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adjacent to the offices of NCS officers. Overcrowded. Barrier is an assemblage of large iron 
poles that rotate to open and close. A small enclosure allows pedestrians to step into the offices 
or cross onto the bridge once they have been cleared to enter Cameroon. The offices are located 
within a small two-room building made of concrete. I take notice of poster behind some officers 
standing. The poster is on the wall and reads “Help end corruption. PSA”. PSA is the anti-
corruption authority. The ambiance now is chaotic, officers go up to cars coming from 
Cameroon and collect documents from all passengers, then retire back to their offices. 
Passengers now have to follow them to sort their immigration issues. That way officers are not 
very vigilant who is physically crossing. They are confident no one can go on the bridge 
without clearance. But there seems to be one keeping an eye on people who might loiter onto 
the bridge, or just observing. Not sure. Too any passengers, both those coming from Cameroon 
and those going to Cameroon. Cars park before the barriers if going to Cameroon, or cross the 
barriers and park facing Ikom if going into Nigeria. Bridge is almost always empty. Nor cars 
static on the bridge.  
 
One car is stopped on the bridge. Officers gesture to the driver to clear off. Car apparently has 
a breakdown or is low on fuel. Passengers get out and push to the barrier. Many individuals 
without uniforms clearly working in collaboration with immigration officers. They act as go-
between talking to travellers, then talking to immigration. Cars are lined up, some with engines 
running. Rackets. Fumes. Radio playing from inside the offices. Mostly Nigerian “African 
beat”hit songs. Church music playing from speakers in a small shop nearby, sometimes mixing 
with American rnb sonmgs. I recognise a 50 Cent and Justin Timberlake song. A few people 
sing along with church songs, while attending to their businesses. “Where is your Yellow 
Card?” is the most recurrent question. Pay…. Naira, or you go back to Cameroon. One man is 
standing a few meters away, pacing up and down, shouting “The warnings of God’s oncoming 
judgment” to passengers and handing out leaflets. Some of the things he says coincidentally 
borrow the imagery of bridge and frontier, especially his instance not to cross to the other world 
without giving one’s life to Jesus. He says, once you cross it is over, you may never return to 
change anything you left behind.  
 
Thinking: Mixing of religiously Christianly charged words with secular language in public 
spaces and discourse struck me ever since I arrived in Lagos and paying attention to security. 
Religion and faith is ubiquitous in allegories and various layers of meanings to mundane words. 















Observation Note: 13/02/2017 
 
Passengers alighting at the Ikom border coming from Cameroon and visibly looking to 
continue with a different car are immediately surrounded by the vendors, carriers and 
transporters each offering their services. Transporters usually check first that immigration has 
been cleared and passenger is ready to go. Many transporters at a time. Advertise the comfort 
of their car and also their connections with law enforcement for the remainder of the journey.  
 
On the other side of the road, facing towards the gate, transporters to Cameroon. All using 
pidgin, inviting passengers to their cars. Some passengers especially traders seem to know 
transporters personally. Nigerian side transporters seem more disorganised and scrambling 
over passengers, while Transporters to Cameroonian side wait patiently and seem to “lobby” 











Observation Note: 14/02/2017 
 
 
Both sides: Check passports or documents, yellow fever, uniform, asks colleagues to come over 
for verification, send passengers to other offices, speak in private with transporters on behalf 
of customers, collect bribes both openly and in hiding – seem to hide more from colleagues 
than from the ordinary prying eyes (especially on the Cameroon side)   
 
Language used is pidgin, and English to put a distance, signal hostility or preparing to demand 
higher bribe or threaten customer.  
 
Uniforms are clean, well-pressed, contrasts with passengers and transporters and local residents 




Dairy Note:15-16/02/2017. – Interviews   
 
 








Today I am going to the church Prince recommended to me when I asked about where I can 
see people in the area doing other things apart from buying and selling or trying to cross the 
border. The church is called The Redeemed House of the Lord. I try to rethink my first years 
back in Cameroon at the University of Yaoundé, when a friend invited me to a similar church 
and I found myself lining up in front of the congregation amongst those who were prepared to 
“give their lives to Jesus”.  Prince is coming to pick me with his car at 6PM, I realise that this 
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is also the first time that I will be doing fieldwork at night. Nocturnal ethnographic observation 
hahaha. I used to see people in church with notebooks and pens carefully jotting down during 
sermons, so I will not be a curiosity like when I stand in the middle of the crowded market with 
pen and paper. Prince said the pastor is a friend of his, and no need to ask permission, but apart 
from ethical consideration at university, I just feel strange to be undertaking such an exercise 
in the “house of the Lord” without informing the pastor. I must insist that Prince calls him 
before we arrive. This is not a Sunday, so maybe the church will not be crowded. Who will 
come? Who goes to church these days? Mainly people who have difficult problems and can’t 
find direct solutions (incurable sickness for example). Why do I not go to church? Do I believe 
in God? Still? Specifically, in Ikom, who goes to Church? How does Church attendance shape 
their outlook on the place they live in?  How would I dress appropriately for this, so as to be 
neither too casual or too formal? I need to be as laid back as possible. I will wear a pair of jeans 
and a shirt then.  
 
I will also carry my small black purse to put my notebook in together with my personal 




Observation: 17/02/2017 – The Church  
 
The road to the church takes us away from the town centre towards its edge. We arrive at the 
church, new-looking building, both not really ostentatious as compared to other churches I 
have seen on my way down from Lagos. Building is surrounded by trees. The church is located 
in a solidly more affluent neighborhood, as compared to the market square or the old colonial 
headquarters where chiefs now live. I expected loud singing from a distance as we approach 
the church, but it is quiet outside of the building. Prince parks next to very nice cars. This BMW 
seems brand new! Cars here are imported second-hand. There are still many empty spaces in 
the yard, gets full on Sundays instead.  
 
Pastor is well-dressed but is not extravagant, very articulate (despite his stammering) and not 
too loud. It looks dwarfed by the sanctuary, which swallows all the items of furniture and 




Church members are women in majority, well-dressed, a mixture of nice perfumes up in the air 
, there are men too, but no in the same number as women. Poorly lit in the back here, but the 
podium where the pastor is standing and preaching is very well-lit. The sign on the wall reads 
“Thursday Teachings”. Today is Thursday. Pastor is talking about the place of husband and 
wife. Why is the husband the head? He explains man and woman are equal, but husband and 
wife is different. Duties and rights. Occasional laughter, when Pastor takes funny examples or 
mimic a woman. Some singing from a song book. On the wall behind the pastor, words to the 
song they are singing are being projected onto a large screen from an overhead projector next.  
this church seems to de-emphasize the kind of charismatic behaviour that normally 
characterises services in “born again” churches across Africa these days (faith healing, 
speaking in tongues). Have they broken entirely with the Pentecostals? (I suspect)  
 
Nice and new benches, sitting down – smell of fresh paint or varnish  
 
Service lasts around 20 minutes.  Pastor tells everyone in the congregation to turn around greet 
their neighbour, say “you are blessed” and introduce themselves to the people around them.  
People visiting the church for the first time are asked to show hand. I raise my hand. Some 
comes to me and takes my details. “You no bi Nigerian?”  “No, I bi Cameroonian” – Surprise.  
 
I greet a few people with a shake of hands. I overhear Igbo being spoken by many members of 
the church.  Prince comes up introduces me to a few people. Almost all are “Businessmen” and 
live locally i.e. in IKOM.  I estimate that there are 100 people who participated in this service. 
Many young people as well, almost all attending alongside their parents or bosses (maids). 
Dress is formal, and all members appear to know one another very well.  Almost all my 
interlocutors are puzzled by the fact that I am not Nigerian. The pastor later told me they do 
not have Cameroonians, and indeed other nationalities in the church. One man is from Benin 
(the country) but that is all.  The pastor says the church is newly built thanks to the donations 
of members who are in business.  The pastor himself is a businessman. Almost all operate at 
the motor park. A few have established business in Onitsha, but families live in Ikom.  
 
Diary Note: 18/02/2017 
 
I thought it might make good difference to go from Ekok to Mamfe on the Cameroonian side. 
Ekok being a big Like Mfum on the Nigerian side, and  Mamfe being like Ikom.  the road from 
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Ekok to Mamfe is beautifully tarred. It has not always been the case as I understand,  so the 
experience I am going to halve today Will probably be different from one people had three 
years ago. 
 
Prince is to leave me out at the border in the morning and from there I will make my way into 
Cameroon and hopefully will return before the evening.   
 
Awoken to stormy weather and headed off for the border just as the first colours of the sunrise 
began to break through the foggy sky. I am doing a return trip to Cameroon today, so I need to 
go as early as possible in order to return before border closure or it is too dark and possibly 
dangerous to move around.  
 
Observation Note: 18/02/2017 
 
Is it Mfum or Ekok or Abonando suspension bridge?  it depends on all your ask.  
 
Prince spoke to immigration officers on my behalf. So I am not stressed about immigration 
issues. However I can see that my fellow passengers are very worried and stressed because 
they have to discuss with NCS officers on the Nigerian side and cameroon immigration on the 
Cameroonian side. Passengers negotiate with NCS officers behind the cars; some go to the 
NCS small office just before the barrier where uniformed officers are cramped around a few 
desks. Many of the officers are standing with passports and IDs in their hands. Passengers stay 
there for a few minutes, and come back to the car frowning. Others look helpless and ask the 
driver to plead their case with the officer saying that they do not have enough money left after 
all these negotiations. The driver goes to and fro between the passengers and the officers. 
Finally a settlement is reached and the driver returns with the passengers documents.  All 
passengers are cleared. An officer walks up to our car, orders us to step out of the vehicle 
leaving all our bags in the car, and cross the suspension bridge on foot. The driver follows us 
with the vehicle as we walk to the Cameroonian side of the border. Why did we have to step 
out of the car? The car is not searched?  
 




On the crossing I overhear passengers complaining about the greed of immigration officers 
they’re talking in pidgin English to me; my Pidgin is not great. They change subject and 
accelerate their walking and leave me.  Another group exchanging documents. They are talking 
about iDs for the Cameroonian side.  one woman says to the other woman you know you should 
leave these  with the driver otherwise you might get into trouble and they will reap you off but 
the other woman asks what if they ask for the form from Nigeria, the other woman replies 
that’s why we’ll give them something 
 
We are back in the car travelling to Eyumojock, and then Mamfe.  this is Manyu division. 
Administratively. The people and culture give the sense of Nigerian dominance. you can still 
feel the Nigerian accent in the pidgin English, the Nigerian way of doing business, the fuel that 
comes from Nigeria is everywhere, the tribal languages spoken is a variant of the Ekoi 
language.  I have just spent almost 3 weeks in Nigeria maybe I am a big influenced by that. 
Cameron flags everywhere here. Difference from Nigeria.  frontier police posts not as many as 
in Nigeria. Obsession with ID cards though. Just like Ekok, Mamfe is immersed in the Nigerian 
way of life. 
 
Passengers tell me the bond between these areas and Nigeria has been strengthened for many 
decades by the neglect of the 151 km between Mamfe and Kumba. These had become a buzz-
weep for anglophones until  the road was tared. The same goes true for the Bamenda- Mamfe 
road, and the Mamfe-Ekok lap.  
 
The car smells of contraband petrol/fuel known here as this Zoa-Zoa. This fuel is illicitly 
brought over from Nigeria. No smoking written everywhere in the car. when we stop some 
passengers get out to smoke. They are chased away from the car, as far away as possible by 
other passengers and driver. When we get back in the car I realise that we actually can blow up 
any time. the car is filled with many other illegal imports: fake drugs: generators, electronics,; 
no petrol station insight. Mamfe is a lovely and lively city within serene surroundings of 







Diary Note: 19/02/2017 
 
I’ll left without my observation Book. At the border in Ekok. Some people can be seen passing 
through passport control from Cameroon with no papers or identification being checked. They 
seem to be used to doing so. They nod at immigration officers who nod back, and this sign 
language is complemented by a subtle slip of cash.  
 
When we arrived in Ekok, young people (mostly boys) make transactions through the windows 
of cars preparing to depart of passing immigration control and when they slow down at 
checkpoints, selling bananas and corn-on-the-cob, fruit, juice, and even water.   
 
Meeting a farmer in Eyumojock to discuss casually. I met Andre yesterday on my way back 
from Mamfe. I obviously explained to him the purpose of my visits and the subject of my 
research.  I am going back to meet Andre and discuss especially farming and agriculture in the 
area. 
 
We drive through plantations, some wild stuff - canopying over the road overhead, creating a 
beautiful, dark, green, tunnel. 
 
Road from Ekok to Mamfe : A police checkpoint. We stop. One police officer comes and asks 
for IDs, barely takes a glance, ask us for a gift or juice or fresh water for this hot day. The driver 
gives them something in his closed palm. His colleagues notices the gesture and comes over to 
us from the other side of the road, smiling. They are very friendly. We take off again, driver 
nervously check fuel level ( Diesel) and is worried we might not arrive. There’s plenty of Zoua 
Zoua on the black market but mostly petrol, diesel is hard to find. Contrast of driving through 
such a an oil-rich region but stressing about a few litres of diesel. One petrol station.  
Time from Ekok to Mamfe : over an hour. Longer than Mfum to Ekok.  
 
Andre is a Farmer. I am aware of the strikes and All the social political problems often raised 
by the anglophone in Cameron. I am wondering how much Will these new roads foster 
Communication and more demands from anglophones within Cameroon. Good roads also 
mean that anglophones will easily organise two further their political claims about 
marginalisation, so the roads might actually bring politically reversal of intended consequence. 
I’m thinking this because right now in the car there is a teacher complaining about 
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marginalisation. I discussed with her she only teaches two days a week and returns to Mamfe 
everyday thanks to the road.  
 
Andre tells me about Cocoa smuggling into Nigeria. Cameron Southwest region produces half 
of Cameron’s cocoa.. Cameron ssouthwest region is close to Nigeria than Douala where the 
Port is. That’s why there are many smuggling routes to Nigeria or to nearby villages where 
Nigerians can come and collect products. Villages produce cocoa. Bags of cocoa beans loaded 
on top of pickup trucks. in cars with Nigerian number plates.  
 
Diary Note: 20/02/2017 
 
The administrative configuration in Cameroon is slightly different than in Nigeria. Region – 
Divisions and Subdivisions, headed by appointed Governors, Divisional Officers and sub 
divisional officers.  - In almost all public spaces I have been to, such as public transport, beer 
parlours, football pitches, crossroads, shops, one recurrent topic of conversation is the 
comparison between now and before in terms of the Quality of the road. One man talks about 
the way he was tortured by the road three years ago. One woman who was travelling with me 
in a taxi said That she gave birth on the road to the hospital and eventually never reached the 
hospital. She had had to return home with her new born baby since the road was so bad that 
she could not continue after one day of heavy rain. She waited for one day in the rain with the 
baby but eventually gave up and returned home. 
 
“That is now history”. “The situation was akin to stone age”. “Just like emerging from the 
primitive era”. 
 
Andre told me that large farms have opened since 2015.  Between widikum and Mamfe. Palms, 
plantains. We stop at Kendem. Walk to the bridge over River Manyu 
  
In Mamfe “River Port” (was main commercial liaison between the then west Cameroon and 
Nigeria) – saw smaller boats. I understand they ferry people and goods to remote riverside 




In Mamfe. Intimidating huge Catholic Church near main street. traders in fruit, phone cards 
and sweets.  Restaurants, makeshift, cobbled together with wooden planks. rice and tomato 
sauce served 
 
Question 1 –which specific destinations in Nigeria? 
 
question 2 –why do they still use the main road for smuggling? 
 
 
 
